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Abstract 
This dissertation revolves around three mam elements: 'male 
infertility'; existing social science research on infertility; and 
ethnomethodology. The substantive topic 'male infertility' is enclosed 
in quotation marks for two reasons. First, following the overall form 
of ethnomethodological inquiry, the aim is to explicate how the sense 
and order of 'male infertility' is constituted through available socially 
organised procedures; hence, the quotation marks are used to 'bracket' 
the phenomenon and focus on the methods that make it available. 
Second, 'male infertility' is a convenient shorthand topic label, a 
general organising concept, as opposed to a precise label for a tightly 
defmed phenomenon. 
While this study's approach makes it very different to existing 
sociological studies of infertility, the difference is not to the extent of 
isolation - a strong attempt is made to engage with prior studies. 
Often this engagement takes a critical form, the general argument 
being that sociological studies which approach phenomena for the 
way they 'bear the marks' of societal structures, will ignore the 
incarnate orderliness of social action - that is, the way social action is 
readily explicable to members, in and as it occurs, using the resources 
at-hand, with 'no time-out'. Etlmomethodology suggests that this 
ready explicability is based upon taken-for-granted, socially organised 
sense-assembly practices - thus, this study's argument that the content, 
the intelligibility of 'male infertility, is interdependent with the social 
scenes and embedded socially organised procedures, with and within 
which 'male infertility' is found. F mID and content stand or fall 
together. Consistent with this viewpoint, four empirical analyses of 
the social organisation of 'male infertility' are offered. The specific 
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topics discussed are: the conversational disclosure of infertility; the 
language of reproduction; humour and infertility; and high rates of 
non-response by men in studies of infertility. 
In general, the empirical analyses are 'indifferent' to the topic of 
study, that is, there is no overriding aim of offering practical 
correctives or broader socio-political critique. However, in at least 
one empirical chapter a more critical stand is taken, and, in the 
concluding chapter, it is argued that an etlmomethodological 
descriptivist approach can have socio-political implications. Overall, 
the study supports the growing trend for ethnomethodological insights 
to be utilised in the study of substantive topics; and, since the 
dissertation is a form of writing 'anew', it can be considered to 
minimally change 'male infertility' as a form of life. 
1 
Chapter One 
Franling the Study: 
Inclusions and Exclusions 
1.1 Introduction 
ill order to frame this study, it is useful to begin by considering not 
only what the study includes, but also what it excludes. While 
description of exclusion could go on indeftnitely, in limited amounts 
it is a useful technique for framing a study. For example, contrast the 
chosen title - "Aspects of the Social Organisation of 'Male Infertility'" 
- with one that was rejected - "Male infertility: Men without issue?". 1 
The chosen title seems nondescript in comparison to the 'catchiness' 
of the rejected title, which has the add~d bonus of providing a useful 
problem for sociological study: do 'men without issue' really find their 
infertility an 'issue'? Given the utility of the rejected title, it is natural 
to ask why it was rejected - why was a much more nondescript title 
chosen instead? The shOlt answer is that the rejected title embodies 
the approach of studying male infertility as an 'issue', a social 
problem, and such an approach is not the principle aim of this study. 
The aim is to bring an ethnomethodological perspective to the study 
of 'male infertility', and although the chosen title may seem opaque to 
the untrained, it is intended to resonate with ethnomethodological 
meamng. 
1 The term 'without issue' is an outdated way of referring to infertility, nonetheless 
still clear in its meaning. 
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Following from the example of the title, the introduction will 
continue discussing what this study includes and excludes in the 
belief that it is a useful means of detailing the overall nature of this 
ethnomethodological study of 'male infertility'. It is not used to 
suggest that what is included is necessarily superior to what is 
excluded, but to show the relation of this study to other sociological 
studies of infertility. Overall, the introductory chapter is organised as 
follows: 
1.2 Unpacking the title; 
1.3 'Social organisation' versus 'social construction': a clarification 
of the ethnomethodological position; 
1.4 The missing literature review; 
1.5 Data description; 
1.6 Final introductory points developed from an observation about 
the data. 
Before proceeding to section 1.2, it is wOlth stressing one overall 
characteristic of this study. In essence, the study is empirical rather 
than theoretical, and this helps to explain the contents of the 
introductOlY chapter, as well as the remainder of the dissertation. As 
can be seen from the outline above, this chapter includes discussion 
of 'existing literature' (1.4), 'theory' (1.3), and 'data and methods' (1.5) 
(although these specific headings are not used). These matters are 
traditionally, in disseltations and theses at least, given much more 
space in separate chapters. Hence, it might seem somewhat 
presumptuous or tisky to attempt coverage of all three areas in a 
single introductOlY chapter. 
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However, this is where the empirical emphasis of the study can be 
usefully stressed: the aim is to produce original empirical analyses of 
'male infertility' and not to pursue lengthy, abstract theorising. The 
upshot of this emphasis is that the empirical chapters form the core of 
the dissertation. Moreover, they are self-contained works which 
pursue specific sub-topics and do not depend upon arguments in other 
chapters for plausibility of argument. Certainly, ethnomethodology is 
used as an overarching framework, and there are common theoretical 
arguments made in the empirical chapters, but there is no explicit 
discussion of these features either here or in the concluding chapter. 
Rather, theory is embodied in the consideration of empirical 
materials, the aim being to keep theoretical arguments relevant to 
descriptions of real-world materials and the specific problems 
addressed in each chapter. 
That said, it can be noted that this introductory chapteris not devoid 
of theoretical discussion. What is offered does not take the form of 
an overview of ethnomethodology - a familiarity with this tradition is 
assumed - but is more tightly focused on explaining what it means to 
study the social organisation of 'male infertility'. 
1.2 Unpacking the Title 
Perhaps the most notable feature of the title is the enclosure of 'male 
infertility' in quotation marks. An explanation of this, and the use of 
'aspects', can be provided by first explaining the use of 'social 
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organisation'. Some subtleties in the use of this term will be noted in 
the next section, but for now it can be explained relatively simply. 
The telm 'social organisation' is a straightforward enough phrase 
which can, and does, appear within many forms of social scientific 
writing. However, it does seem to be used more frequently within 
ethnomethodology, where it is used with a particular meaning and 
purpose in mind. The question of who fITst started using the term is 
immaterial, but certainly Garfmkel peppered his foundational Studies 
in Ethnomethodology (1967) with talk of the "organized activities of 
everyday life" or "organizations of commonplace everyday 
activities" . 2 With Garfinkel and many other influential 
ethnomethodologists using the term, 'organisation' quickly became a 
feature of ethnomethodological writing. 
Again it hardly matters where, but somewhere In the 
ethnomethodological lineage the telm' 'social organisation' appeared 
and gained some favour alongside the established use of 
'organisation' . For example, jumping twenty years from the 
publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology, we find Button and Lee 
entitling an important collection of ethnomethodological work, Talk 
and Social Organisation (1987).3 In this work 'social organisation' 
2 Pre-dating Garfinkel's talk of "organized activities" or "organizations of 
activities" is Bittner's classic paper (1965) "The concept of organization". In this 
paper Bittner addressed his comments to an established body of literature on 
"formal organisations", that is, "stable associations of persons engaged in 
concerted activities directed to the attainment of specific objectives" (1965: 239). 
Bittner argued for a reconceptualisation of the study of organisation, asking how 
members used 'organisation' as a device for solving a multitude of practical 
problems. Thus, the focus is on procedural rules governing language-in-use, 
rather than organisations as units of people working together, and in this sense his 
approach is similar to that of Garfinkel. 
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resonates with ethnomethodological meamng, as shown m the 
following passage: 
.. , C.A. is concelned to study the social organisation o/natural 
language-in-use . ... it seeks to find ways not only of revealing 
society and social organisation as an achievement but of 
observing that order and achievement from inside. That is, 
instead of using data as a resource to test theories as to the 
nature of social organisation, it examines the social 
organisation of materials in an attempt to describe and 
understand that nature. It seeks, therefore, to describe social 
organisation of natural interactions asking what their order 
looks like and how it is put together by those who, in fact, 
produce it. ... The concern is not to try and fulfill some 
theoretical version of what constitutes a proper 'science' of 
society but is instead to determine the orderly ways in which 
conversationalists shape their talk with one another in mind 
thereby constituting it as a socially organised phenomenon. 
(Button & Lee, 1987: 2-3, original emphasis) 
This passage is in effect a description of ethnomethodological 
investigation, and clearly 'social organisation' is centrally important to 
this description. In brief, we see a focus on the question of how 
everyday social scenes are rendered, orderly by those engaged in 
social action - how are social scenes so readily explicable to 
members? A large part of the answer is that phenomena are what 
they are because they are embedded within socially organised 
practices, hence the importance of the term 'social organisation'. 
More details will be provided on the use of 'social organisation' in 
section 1.3, where it will be contrasted with the apparently similar 
term 'social construction'. But the immediate question is, why the 
3 This is actually a collection of conversation analytiC studies, but as made clear 
in Button and Lee's preface, conversation analYSis is a form of 
ethnomethodological inquiry. Despite the degree of its speCialisation, most 
contemporary ethnomethodologists would have no difficulty with the continued 
inclusion of conversation analysis within ethnomethodology; indeed, Heritage 
(1984) has called it ethnomethodology's 'jewel in the crown'. 
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quotation marks around 'male infertility'? To a large degree the 
answer is tied up with an implication of the emphasis on 'social 
organisation'. The ethnomethodological emphasis on the way 
phenomena are socially organised, rather than on the phenomena 
themselves, resulted in the use of so called 'bracketing' devices 
('bracketing' is particularly prevalent in early ethnomethodology, but 
not so common now). These devices were means "to topicalise the 
production (or doing) of activities formulated by expressions within 
the brackets" (Lynch, 1991: 79, original emphasis). Bracketing 
transforms the focus of inquiry from phenomena which may be 
presumed to exist in their own right, to the procedures whereby 
phenomena are constituted (some subtleties of this position will be 
noted in the next section). It is partly in this sense that 'male 
infertility' is enclosed in quotation marks: I wish to avoid treating 
'male infertility' as a resource for either, the application of prior 
theory, or for inquiry into how extemal societal factors supposedly 
construct its form; instead, the emphasis is 011 asking how the sense 
and order of 'male infertility' is constituted through available socially 
organised procedures. 
A correlate of the use of bracketing is to direct inquiry to the use, in 
actual social scenes, of the expression that is bracketed. Without 
elaborating on this step, it points to another reason for enclosing 'male 
infertility' in quotation marks, and additionally, it helps explam the 
use of 'aspects' in the title. To put it simply, the expression within the 
brackets - male infertility - is being used as an organising concept. It 
is a convenient conceptual term which is both short enough to be used 
as a topic label, and sufficiently accurate as a summary of what the 
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inquiries in this study are about. This point can be clarified by first 
considering a simplistic rendition of an ethnomethodological study of 
'male infertility', and then a brief description of the four empirical 
chapters that are actually on offer in this study. 
As any number of sociological studies note ( ego Becker & 
Nachtigall, 1992; Gerson, 1989; Sandelowski, 1990a; Scritchfield, 
1989a; Strickler, 1992), infertility is an historically contingent 
phenomenon which only recently became firmly centred within the 
realm of medicine. As with all classificatory activities, there are 
semantic problems and issues about COlTect definition,4 but the 
medical meaning of 'male infertility' is clear enough: a couple are 
unable to conceive after the period of time in which most couples 
conceive, and all or part of this inability to conceive is traceable to the 
male partner. Thus, if we were to study the use of 'male infertility' in 
actual social scenes, one obvious thing we could be studying is the 
medical classification practices where the label 'male infertility' is 
used. Conceivably, this could involve an investigation into the social 
organisation of laboratory activities where semen is collected, 
analysed, and classified. 
4 This is a largp topic not pursued in this study, because, for one, there is 
sufficient debate on the matter already. The problems referred to include: naming 
practices ~ chOOSing between, infertility, infecundity, reproductive impairment, 
involuntary childlessness, or something else (eg. see Leridon, 1981; Matthews & 
Matthews, 1986b); standardisation - are different studies of infertility based on the 
same referent (eg. see Greil, Leitko & Porter, 1988); and medical claSSification -
what should classification of infertility be based on (eg. see Menken, Trussell & 
Larsen, 1986; Marchbanks et a/., 1989). But more importantly, the issue is not 
pursued here because "adequating the real" (McHoul, 1982) is not part of this 
study. 
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There are several ethnomethodological investigations which could 
be used as general models for such an investigation (eg. Garfmkel, 
Lynch & Livingston, 1981; Lynch, 1985; Rawlings, 1989), and these 
studies do utilise, mostly implicitly, a bracketing procedure. For 
example, Garfmkel, Lynch and Livingston's study of the discovelY of 
a pulsar is not concerned with the question of whether or not Cocke 
and Disney 'really' discovered a pulsar, or what the meaning of it is; 
instead they conceptualise the pulsar as a "cultural object" and focus 
on lithe way that the object-in-hand participates in the organization of 
its discovery" (Peyrot, 1982: 269). Counting sperm and classifying 
their shape while looking down a microscope, obviously inverts the 
scale of discovering a pulsar looking up a telescope, but clearly semen 
analysis could be studied in the same manner (if one could get access 
to such sites). But the point to be taken here is that if one works with 
a more conceptual view of 'male infertility', then there are a large 
number of topics that can be investigated in an equally 
ethnomethodological manner. The simplest way to get this point 
across is to outline the empirical analyses that are actually presented 
in chapters two to five. 
In chapter two the topic of inquiry is the conversational disclosure 
of infertility. Discussion begins with an outline and critique of two 
existing models of disclosure - F oucauldian confession and a 
dramaturgical model - after which extracts from interview data are 
used as a tentative description of conversational disclosure of 'male 
infertility' . Work from conversation analysis is used to point to a 
possible procedural infrastructure for infertility disclosure, with the 
general point made that an analysis of the endogenous orderliness of 
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conversation is essential to understand infertility disclosure - it is this 
emphasis that the other two models lack. Regarding the bracketing 
device, it should be noted that the analysis of the disclosure of 'male 
infertility', presumably, applies equally as well to 'female infertility'~ 
and indeed the discussion uses the general phrase 'infertility 
disclosure'. Thus, although the data are extracts from interviews with 
infertile men, the discussion is framed in general terms, and where the 
term 'male infertility' is used it is mainly as an organising concept. 
Chapter three begins by discussing some feminist research which 
claims that the language of reproduction displays a male bias which 
contributes to, and is reflective of, gender inequality in society. 
Problems with this view are identified, and to justify and elaborate the 
critique of the feminist arguments, an analysis of a medical journal 
editorial is presented. This editorial does not focus on 'male 
infertility', but is about the conviction of a doctor for various illegal 
practices committed while offering ,donor insemination services. 
Thus, clearly the chapter fits within 'male infertility' as an organising 
concept but not so clearly as a bracketing device. 
Similarly, in chapter four 'male infertility' is considered in light of 
other discussions, in particular an argument by Michael Mulkay 
(1988) about the nature of humour in modem society. The chapter 
begins by noting the readiness of people to fmd humour in infertility, 
but then discussion moves to an outline and critique of Mulkay'g 
argument, followed by an alternative ethnomethodological approach 
to humour. hI this alternative approach empirical data of relevance to 
'male infertility' are used, but again, the overall argument is a generic 
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one, the point being that humour can be analysed as a local 
production, seriously accomplished. Thus, chapter four has no 
sustained focus on 'male infertility', but on the other hand it is not as 
if 'male infertility' is irrelevant to the analysis. The aim is to achieve 
some kind of balance between inquiry into an interesting sociological 
topic and inquiry into the social organisation of 'male infertility'. 
The fmal empirical chapter uses researchers' discourse on infertility 
as data for analysis. Specifically, researchers' accounts of the high 
rate of non-response by men in studies of infertility are analysed for 
the imbrication of commonsense in social science reasoning. Non-
response is found to be readily explicable, usually not by reference to 
any 'evidence' provided by non-respondents, but by the commonsense 
procedure of inferring from what is already presumed to be well 
established about the nature of infertility. In this chapter the tendency 
is to speak about 'infertility' just as much as about 'male infertility'. 
Good reasons for this are apparent in the chapter, but again it can be 
noted that the chapter combines 'male infertility' as a general 
orgamsmg concept and 'male infertility' in the sense of 
ethnomethodological bracketing. 
A brief reference to an example of conversation analytic work helps 
to clarify this important point. Consider Tsui's (1991) research paper 
on "The pragmatic functions ofl don't know".5 Throughout the paper 
Tsui presents 1 don't know in italics, and although she provides no 
elaboration, two reasons can be assumed for this practice: frrst, it sets 
the utterance apart from the remainder of the text as the topic of 
5 A point made in this paper is briefly referred to in chapter four. 
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discussion, that is, it marks it as talk taken from ordinary 
conversation; and second, there is a clear sense in which it follows the 
ethnomethodological convention of bracketing. That is, the concern 
is not with the referent of the utterance, but with the activities that the 
utterance accomplishes (ie. its "pragmatic functions"). Now this is 
the point to be taken: 'male infertility' can be a verbatim utterance 
within written or spoken discourse, but it is also understandable as a 
conceptual term that can be applied to many situations where it is not 
actually used. An example of the former is where a medical record 
card includes 'male infertility' as a diagnostic label; an example of the 
latter is where an infertile male discloses his infertility to a stranger in 
an ordinary conversation without using the specific telm 'male 
infertility'. While the words 'male infertility' have not been uttered, it 
is petfectly reasonable to collect this second event, and others like it, 
within an analysis of the "social organisation of 'male infertility'''. 
Overall, it is the latter usage which predominates in this study, but 
both senses of 'male infertility' appear throughout the study and may 
overlap to some extent. While this may seem inexact, there is no 
need for an apology, as the following two points suggest. First, it is 
made clear in the introduction to each empirical chapter just what the 
specific topic of inquiry is. As noted above, the empirical chapters 
are stand-alone pieces - the chapters are not intended to build upon 
each other to ultimately produce a comprehensive view of 'male 
infertility'. This leads to the second point: it should now be 
recognised that attempts to provide comprehensive views of social 
phenomena will be ill~fated. As Silverman (1989) has put it, 
sociologists should now "recognise that the phenomenon always 
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escapes" - it is not possible to 'capture' an expenence by 
ethnographic, or any other, methods. This is not an excuse for poorly 
setting out what it is one is studying. It is simply to recognise that 
"idealized conceptions of phenomena become like a will-o'-the-wisp 
on the basis of systematic field research, dissolving into sets of 
practice embedded in particular milieux" (Silvennan, 1989: 221). 
Clearly, my aim in this research is to focus on the sets of practice, or 
procedures for sense-assembly, within which 'male infertility' is 
embedded, rather than on a ill-fated attempt to describe the essence of 
'male infertility'. 
Very briefly, the above points should also make it clear why 
'aspects' appears in the title. This study offers inquiry into only 
selected aspects of the social organisation of 'male infertility'. 
Perhaps this is stating the obvious as any reader can assume 
selectivity, but in the absence of 'generic readers' the preference is to 
make this selectivity explicit. 
A fmal matter to note here, is that from this point on the brackets 
around 'male infettility' will be dispensed with. There are good 
reasons for the use of brackets around 'male infertility', as I have 
detailed, but it now seems unnecessmy to continue with them 
throughout this dissettation.6 
6 Bracketing tends to get tiresome, and as someone perceptively commented, 
'the trouble with bracketing is that once you start an awful lot of the 'real-world' 
ends up in brackets'. I cannot find the original statement, or its author, but the 
sentiment is worth repeating. 
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1.3 "Social Organisation" Versus "Social Construction "o' A 
Clarification of the Ethnomethodological Po,dtion 
Just as the term 'sO'cial O'rganisatiO'n' resO'nates with 
ethnO'methO'dO'IO'gical meaning, mO're generally, 'sO'cial cO'nstructiO'n' 
resO'nates with sO'ciO'IO'gical meamng. But, even thO'ugh 
ethnO'methO'dO'IO'gy is a fO'rm O'f SO'ciO'IO'gy, the latter term is nO't O'ften 
used within ethnO'methO'dO'IO'gy. In this sectiO'n the difference between 
saying a phenO'menO'n is 'sO'cially cO'nstructed' and saying it is 'socially 
O'rganised' will be cO'nsidered, hence clarifying ethnO'methO'dO'IO'gical 
inquiry and its use in this study. 
TO' recap, the term 'sO'cial O'rganisatiO'n' has been cO'mmO'nly used by 
ethnO'methO'dO'IO'gists to' fO'CUS inquiry O'n hO'W sO'cial O'rder is put 
tO'gether frO'm within actual sO'cial scenes. A similarly brief O'utline O'f 
the term 'sO'cial cO'nstructiO'n' nO'w needs to' be prO'vided. TO' begin, 
nO'te that there are twO' elements to' 'social cO'nstructiO'n'; ftrst, 'sO'cial 
cO'nstructiO'nism' (O'r 'cO'nstructivism') is a cO'mmO'nly used label fO'r a. 
set O'f related approaches within the SO'cial sciences; and secO'nd, there 
is the PO'ssible use O'f the term 'sO'cial cO'nstructiO'n' by sO'cial scientists 
whO' dO' nO't identify with the brO'ader label 'sO'cial cO'nstructiO'nism', 
but nO'netheless use the term (in sO'mething O'f a vemacular manner). 
Despite the twO' elements there is a gO'O'd case fO'r fttting bO'th within 
O'ne general apprO'ach to' sO'cial scientiftc inquiry. FO'llO'wing WO'O'lgar 
(1983), this can be called the 'mediative PO'sitiO'n'. In a cO'nsideratiO'n 
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of the relationship between reality and accounts,7 Woolgar sets up the 
mediative position as follows: 
The position holds that there is nothing inherent in the character 
of real-world objects which uniquely determine accounts of 
those objects. ... Hence, the accounts can be thought of as 
products of the social, cultural and historical circumstances 
which intervene between reality and the produced account. ... 
These accounts are to be understood as actively constructed 
accounts, rather than passively received reflections of an 
external world, and they are to be understood in terms of the 
social circumstances which shape their construction. 
(1983: 244, original emphasis) 
In short, the mediative position still holds to the existence of an 
independent reality, but emphasises that the way we know reality -
accounts - is mediated by social circumstances. Clearly, social 
constructionism fits within the rubric of the mediative position. 
As an example of a social constructionist approach. consider the 
following statement about infertility. 
Thus, the diagnosis of infertility, 'measured and studied by 
medical and social scientists, represents an accounting of the 
"failure" to conceive of those persons who are actively trying to 
conceive at the same time that they are socially designated as 
sanctioned to conceive. (Gerson, 1989: 49) 
In this statement Gerson conceptualises infertility as a product of 
accounting work which is intensely socially mediated. The enc1osw'e 
of "failure" in quotation marks, and the emphasis on the account 
being applied only to those "socially designated as sanctioned to 
conceive", being the key phrases. In ShOlt, infertility is presented as a 
'social construct'. 
7 Note that by account Woolgar refers to a broad range of entities: "words, 
utterances, conversational extracts, signs, gestures, objects, events and so on" 
(1983: 242). 
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Further, as a general approach, social conslluctionism is dominant 
within sociological studies of infel1ility.8 Some researchers use 
social consttuctionist arguments in an implicit way, while others are 
much more explicit, as the titles of the following research papers 
indicate: 
Infertility: The consttuction of desperation. (Gerson, 1989) 
The social consttuction of infertility: From private matter to social 
concern. (Scritchfield, 1989a) 
The infertility enterprise: IVF and the technological conslluction 
of reproductive impairments. (Scritchfield, 1989b) 
Deconsttucting "desperateness": The social construction of 
infe11ility in popu1ar representations of new reproductive 
technologies. (Franklin, 1990) 
Eager for medicalisation: The social production of infertility as a 
disease. (Becker & Nachtigal!, 1992) 
Whether the term is 'consttuction' or 'production' the emphasis is the 
same: infertility is mediated by social circumstances. 
8 This dominance is not at all surpriSing, for at least two points. First. 
contemporary sociology has now firmly rejected 'objectivism' (eg. see Giddens, 
1984), and constructionism fits neatly with this rejection. Second, social 
constructionism is currently very popular as an approach to the study of 'social 
problems' (eg. see Best, 1989; Spector & Kitsuse, 1977; Schneider, 1985), and 
this is where many researchers place the study of infertility (see chapter five). 
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This brief outline of the term 'social construction' will suffice, and 
we can now get to the crux of the matter - what is the difference 
between saying male infertility is 'socially constructed' and saying it is 
'socially organised'? The difference is subtle, difficult to explain, and 
often misunderstood. Following from Woolgar's description of the 
mediative position, we can begin by considering his description of the 
"constitutive position".9 Here is one example of how he sets it out, 
again framed within a concern for the relationship between accounts 
and reality: 
Both reflective and mediative positions contrast with a third 
position, that accounts are constitutive of reality. In this view 
there is no a priori distinction between accounts and reality; it is 
not that accounts reflect reality [the 'reflective position'], nor 
that they are mediated products of actors' attempts to 
characterize an actual reality while under the influence (so to 
speak) of their social milieu. Instead, the accounts are the 
reality; there is no reality beyond the constructs we imply when 
we talk of 'reality' (GarfInkel, 1952: 351). The important 
difference of this third position is that there is no commitment, 
implicit or otherwise, to the independent existence of any 
reality. (Woolgar, 1983: 245-245, original emphasis) 
Thus, in contrast to the mediative position, which still holds to the 
existence of an independent reality, the constitutive position holds 
that "accounts are the reality". 
At first glance, the implication appears to be that if accounts are the 
reality, then there is little point in talking of reality being socially 
constructed by situated actors, for, if all we have are accounts then 
surely everything is socially constructed. One could say that, but 
9 Note that Wooigar is not an ethnomethodologist. His main area of interest is the 
social study of science, but in several places he has used ethnomethodology as a 
base for formulating a program of sociological study in this area (1981, 1983, 
1988). More generally he uses ethnomethodology (mainly Garfinkel) to describe 
the "constitutive position", 
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ethnomethodologists do not. To clarify this point it is essential to 
point out that ethnomethodology does not espouse a naive idealist 
view that 'objects do not exist'. Rather, ethnomethodology draws 
upon a phenomenological position, which 
... does not seek to reduce objects to appearances ... because it 
does not respect the contrast of 'object' and 'appearance' that 
was previously in place. The slogan ['there is nothing behind 
the appearances'] can now be seen to mean something quite 
different than that objects do not exist, that only appearances 
do. Rather than putting appearances where objects used to be, 
one may be seen to be drawing attention to the way in which 
(so to speak) objects are found in their appearance. The 
'objects' have been 'relocated' and are to be found from 
amongst the appearances. (Sharrock & Anderson, 1991: 71, 
original emphasis) 
Or, in simpler terms, " ... social facts are neither 'in the head' or 'out in 
the world' but entirely 'within the (socially organised) practices by 
which they are assembled' (Sharrock, 1989: 673).10 
Thus, there is no denial of reality, nor even. a consideration of how 
reality is 'socially constructed'. Instead, ethnomethodology suggests a 
transferral of focus to the question of just how, in any social scene, 
the objectivity - the readily explicable nature - of that scene is 
available to members. We do proceed through our evetyday life for 
10 Additionally, the above elaboration shows why Woolgar's use of 
ethnomethodology has drawn some critical comment from ethnomethodologists. 
Button and Sharrock (1993) comment that Woolgar's representation of the 
constitutive position as 
scientific knowledge -----------> the natural world 
merely reverses the relationship between language (a large part of accounts) and 
reality, and this is no longer a useful way to frame inquiry. They invoke 
Wittgenstein's argument that there is no determinate connection between 
language and reality, moreover, such questioning is itself an expression of 
confusion and is meaningless as "It is intelligibility, not reality, that is relative to 
language" (Button & Sharrock, 1993: 13, original emphasis). 
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the most part in the "natural stance", that is, assuming that as we see 
things so they are, but the whole import of ethnomethodology is that 
the naturalness of phenomena is accomplished with and within 
socially organised procedures. The suggestion is that it is 'social 
organisation' and not 'social construction' that is inescapable: " ... 
every feature of sense, of fact, of method, for every particular case of 
inquiry without exception, is the managed accomplishment of 
organized settings of practical actions ... " (Garfinkel, 1967: 32, 
emphasis added). 
A passage from Button and Sharrock IS useful to glve a 
concreteness to the above argument: 
That, for instance, we have written this from left to right and 
that you will read it from left to right; that we follow the 
footpath sign by taking the direction marked by the pointed end; 
that when a friend tells us a joke we laugh, and do not fall on 
the floor ranting and raving; that we speak: one at a time and not 
at the same time; that we greet people when greeted, etc. These 
are all examples of what Wittgenstein calls· "natural reactions". 
We do not "negotiate" these matters, we do not, for example, 
speak: one at a time because we have just agreed to. Neither do 
we greet you because we have "interpreted" your utterance as a 
greeting. This agreement, this consensus is embedded in our 
actions, there is a consensus in our actions, they are "natural 
reactions" by vntue of our participation in a language game. 
(1993: 15) 
Ethnomethodology focuses on the orderliness of social life but does 
not use the possibility of "negotiation" or "interpretation" (or anything 
else) to claim that order is 'socially constructed'; rather the argument 
is that order is recognised and displayed, naturally, from within social 
scenes. Social activities are self-organising and naturally ordered and 
this is obvious to members by vittue of their membership of a culture. 
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This argument is exactly what Garfinkel established so well in 
Studies in Ethnomethodology, and it also explains his frequent talk 
of "naturally occUlTIng organizations of ordinaty activity" and the 
"essentially uninteresting reflexivity of accounts". Social order is put 
together upon a whole raft of taken-for-granted procedures, and the 
aim of ethnomethodology is to study the social organisation of these 
procedures in fme detail. Hence, the reason why this study is about 
the 'social organisation' and not the 'social construction' of male 
infertility. 
1.4 The Missing Literature Review 
So far, sporadic references have been made to infertility reseat'ch 
but there has been no review of the social science literatw'e on 
infertility, In fact, this study does not offer such a review. Given the 
accountable nature of such an omission, a justification will be 
provided below. 
Within the infertility literature there are very few studies that focus 
specifically on male infertility (see Bents, 1985; Brander, 1992; Greil, 
1991; Matthews & Matthews, 1986b; also see chapter five). 
Therefore, it would appear to be a simple task to review the few 
studies that do exist However, the trouble is that there is a much 
larger literature on infertility in general, and much of this contains 
comment on matters related to male infertility. The broader literature 
on the general topic of infertility is derived from diverse disciplinary 
backgrounds including studies of a medical, historical, 
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anthropological, ethical, psychological, and sociological, nature. 
There are also studies with a social work and counselling focus, a 
nm'sing focus, and an extremely large body of feminist literature 
critical of reproductive technologies. If one was committed to 
reviewing the literature, it would seem necessary to cover both areas. 
But, while one could attempt to describe this diverse range of studies, 
literature reviews generally involve at least comparison and critique, 
hence, a review of the infertility literature would face the problem of 
reconciling the different bases of existing research. Without detailing 
these bases, it should be obvious that a serious review of this 
literature is a major undertaking. 
The principle justification for not offering such a review is that 
given the framework of this study it is mostly irrelevant, or, of only 
marginal utility to the study. There are two points that elaborate this 
claim. First, at risk of over-generalisation, my feeling is that literature 
reviews reproduce a 'capture' model of inquiry. That is, a researcher 
diligently collects, reads, and critiques as much of the relevant 
literature as possible, with the upshot that lacunae and problematic 
areas are identified, which are then available as a focus in the next 
wave of research. The model is one of cumulative capture of 
phenomena. Obviously, research can indeed build up cumulatively -
the body of work within conversation analysis being a good example -
but what I want to emphasise is that it seems logical to conduct such 
literature reviewing only if the imminent study is viewed as fitting 
neatly within that body of literature. Sm'ely, the flip side of showing 
familiarity with a literature is to stake a claim within that research 
area? If this view is accepted, then the problem for this study should 
21 
be clear: as an ethnomethodologically based sociological study of the 
social organisation of male infel1ility, it does not fit neatly into the 
existing body of research on infel1i1ity. 
Cel1ainly, the empirical chapters will include some discussion of 
existing research on infertility. But, and this is the second point of 
justification, what I wish to avoid in discussing such research is what 
Sharrock (1989) has aptly termed "ritual affirmations of difference". 
In discussing the 'ethnomethodological critique' of other fOlms of 
sociology, and the reaction of many sociologists to 
ethnomethodology, Sharrock uses the phrase as follows: 
A critique which truly deserved that name would be one which 
raised its objections from a distinctly ethnomethodological point 
of view, but such a critique would, in my opinion, merely 
resemble the kinds of denunciation of ethnomethodology itself 
which I have earlier described as 'ritual affirmations of 
difference'. It would effectively decry functionalism (or 
whatever) for not being ethnomethodology. ... The most 
effective criticism is that which queries the viability of projects 
in their own terms, and the criticisms which can be most 
tellingly made by ethnomethodologists are not those which 
presuppose their own standpoint but those which take other 
sociological projects initially at face value and then look at 
problems in their principled implementation. (1989: 665-667) 
Sharrock's argument usefully highlights the difficulty I have with a 
full-fledged literature review. Given that the infel1ility literature has 
not been touched by ethnomethodological insights, but this is what is 
utilised in this study, a review of the infe11i1ity literature would most 
likely end up as a "ritual affirmation of difference". The infe11i1ity 
literature would be declied for not being based on ethnomethodology 
- a pointless and negative option. 
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A more positive alternative is to make a literature review with a 
view to reconceptualising' approaches to infertility. This could 
involve discussion of methodology and/or theoretical 
presuppositions. ll While this option is more attractive than the 
former, it is not pursued here for the point that I noted in the 
introduction. That is, the emphasis of this study is on producing 
original empirical analyses of male infertility. The second more 
positive form of literature review would mainly involve non-empirical 
theoretical discussion - this simply is not the aim of this study. 
In my view, these reasons constitute sufficient justification for not 
offering a review of the infeltility literature. Additionally, it can be 
stressed that this is not a type of 'straw man' argument designed to 
remove the hard task of literature reviewing. I have read a great deal 
of the infertility literature, and am certainly familiar with its range 
and the major work within it,12 and this familiarity will be displayed 
in the empirical chapters as research from the infeltility literature is 
discussed and critiqued. However, this is not a form of literature 
reviewing, rathel', it is velY much a selective utilisation of the 
infeltility literature where my aim is to engage with existing 
empirical research on infertility. 
11 For a good example of this kind of approach, see Gubrium and Holstein's 
(1987) evaluation and reconceptualisation of "family studies". 
12 Some of the more important research has come from those who have 
developed ongoing programs of research on infertility. The key researchers here, 
and examples of their work, are: Arthur Greil (Greil, 1991; Greil, Leitko, & Porter, 
1988; Greil, Porter, Leitko, & Riscilli, 1989;); Ralph Matthews and Anne Matthews 
(1986a, 1986b); Charlene Miall (1985, 1986, 1989): David Owens (Owens, 1982, 
1986; Owens, Edelmann & Humphrey, forthcoming): Naomi Pfeffer (Pfeffer, 
1985, 1987; Pfeffer & Woollett, 1983); and Margerete Sandelowski (Sandelowski, 
1986, 1987, 1990a: Sandelowski, Holditch~Davis, & Harris, 1990). There are 
other researchers engaging in ongOing research on infertility, particularly from 
psychological perspectives, but the above are the most sociological. 
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1.4 Data Description 
Keeping with the theme of inclusion and exclusion, this section will 
provide details of the overall data collection process, and the selective 
use of this data. This section could have been placed in an appendix, 
but it is useful here because it provides a good indication of the nature 
of this study - a point to be developed in the fmal section of this 
chapter. 
Probably not unlike most sociological studies, the data actually used 
in the empirical chapters represent a mere fraction of the total 
available. Briefly, the empirical chapters utilise the following 
materials: 
Ch. Two: 
Ch. Three: 
Ch. Four: 
Ch. Five: 
extracts from interviews with infertile men; 
ethnographic details from an infertility support 
group meeting; 
medical journal editorial; 
ethnographic details from an annual meeting and 
conference of the New Zealand Infertility Society; a 
press clipping; extract from a novel; extract of 
dialogue from a film; extract from an interview with 
a donor insemination technician; 
social science accounts of non-response in studies of 
infertility; this study's response/non-response rate 
for the interviews with infertile men. 
Apart from the use of social science accounts as data, the materials 
used are derived from three sources: a collection of non-academic 
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textual material; ethnographic material; and interview material. More 
details are provided on each of these below. 
Collection of Textual Material 
Throughout the time spent on this research, written material on 
male infertility or infertility in general, was collected and a substantial 
amount accumulated. Sources include: local newspapers, popular 
magazines, novels, infertility society newsletters, and self-help books 
for the infertile. There was no fonnulated plan to use this in any 
specific way, but clearly some of this material has been used. 
Selection of texts to be presented and analysed occurred in an ad hoc 
way: a general topic was finned up for discussion, often by using 
existing research as a starting point and/or from interesting 
observations from my own data, and somewhere in this process I 
would begin putting together material potentially useful for an 
analysis relevant to the topic of discussion. In a roughly consistent 
manner I tried to follow the ethnomethodologicalprinciple of 
approaching real-world materials in an unmotivated manner (any 
programmatic outline of ethnomethodology will include this as a 
principle). Obviously, this broaches the large topic of objectivity, 
indifference and so on (see chapter 6), but while I agree that 
"unmotivated analysis" is a problematic concept, the tenn is a useful 
gloss for the general principle followed. That is, I would try to avoid 
selecting materials because they 'worked' in the argument I wished to 
make; instead a quick decision to use the material was made and then 
analysis proceeded. Obviously, the material that has been used from 
this collection suits the specific arguments in each empirical chapter, 
but the point IS there IS no overarching principle of 
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inclusion/exclusion operating - other materials would have done 
equally as well. Also, this indicates that there is no sense in which 
analyses of textual material are meant to 'add up' to a theoretical 
statement on the representation of infertility in texts. 
Ethnographic Material 
This material is the least used of the three, but again constitutes a 
large amount of material. It was actually collected over a period of 
two years and involved many hours of participant observation and 
ethnographic notekeeping. But because I use this material only twice 
in the study, and then only briefly, there is no need to go into too 
much detail here. Basically, I attended meetings of three groups: a 
local infertility society (seven meetings); the annual meeting and 
conference of the New Zealand Infertility Society (two meetings); and 
a smaller support group with a primary focus on counselling (four 
meetings). I made it clear to the members of these groups that I was 
conducting research on infertility, and there was overwhelming 
supp011 for this research to be done. I did not extend this supp011 by 
broaching the possibility of audio-taping any of these meetings; 
instead, I relied on traditional pen-and-paper methods. While 
audiotapes of these meetings could have provided valuable data, I do 
not see this missed Opp011unity as a serious problem. This is because, 
fll'stly, such data would beg to be analysed with the social 
organisation of conference talk, supp011 group talk, and self-help 
society talk in mind, hence this would extend the already conceptual 
sense in which the study is about male infertility. Secondly, this extra 
empirical material is not needed - there is no problem of a lack of data 
for the study as the small fragments that are used are more than 
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enough for my purposes. It is perhaps somewhat of a pity that more 
of the ethnographic material is not used, but my preference is to deal 
with the material that is presented, in as much detail as possible, and 
avoid the temptation to suffuse the study with references to other 
empirical material -a temptation which might give the study an 
anecdotal rather than analytical tenor. 
Interview Material 
Two sets of interviews were conducted as part of the study. I was 
the sole interviewer in all cases, with all interviews audio-taped with 
the pennission of the interviewees, and all transcribed in full (by me). 
The smaller set 0\T=13) consists of interviews with people whom I 
grouped under the label 'health professionals'. This telm is used 
approximately because not all were working within medical realms, 
but certainly all had in common a major involvement with infe11ility. 
They included: social workers who counselled infertile people; a 
urologist; gynaecologists, scientists, nurses, arid technicians working 
in donor insemination units; and an ivf technician. Fmther 
infonnation on these interviews is not needed as only one extract 
from this set is used in the empirical chapters (see chapter four). The 
second set 0\T=19) consists of interviews with infertile men, where 
this is taken to mean that a couple's infertility had been partly or 
solely attributed to "male factors" (to use a medical tenn). Several of 
the men actually had children, or were expecting children, but the 
main inclusion criterion was that they had, at some stage, been 
considered infertile. Again, because these intelviews were in the end 
not used to a great extent - chapter two and chapter five use or refer to 
interviews with infertile men - there is no need to provide sociological 
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details (socioeconomic status, age, education level, etc.) on this group 
of men. 
These three materials constitute the data corpus. In each empirical 
chapter a strong attempt is made to display the data that are to be 
analysed. This is because inquiry into the incarnate social 
organisation of phenomena calls for close attention to real-world 
practical activities. Of course, data are always only a trace of real-
world activities, and the endorsement of fme-grained analysis is not 
some form of naive empiricism; it merely reflects the fact that some 
data are more useful than others for ethnomethodological inquiry. 
This brief description of the data will suffice, for the empirical 
chapters make clear the basis on which analysis proceeds. 
1.6 Final Introductory Points Developed From an Observation 
About the Data 
While the above section has provided a simple description of the 
data, it also indicates a more general feature of this study. In shOlt, it 
shows that this study is something of a hybrid. This should be velY 
clear from the details provided, specifically the fact that such a large 
amount of what could be called 'traditional' sociological data -
interviews and ethnographic fieldwork - have been gathered, but so 
little use has been made of them. The natural question is, why go to 
so much trouble only to use the data in such a minimal way? The 
truthful answer is that this study did not begin with an 
ethnomethodological framework, rather the utility of such an 
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approach was realised in the process of doing it - the adoption of 
ethnomethodology occIDTed dming the collection of interview and 
ethnographic material, and in considering how to analyse such 
material. 
Obviously, if I considered this a serious problem the disseltation 
would not appear in the form it does. As it is, there are ample data to 
support the form of analysis offered and, perhaps more importantly, I 
do not see any problem in grafting an ethnomethodological frame of 
inquiry onto an initial substantive topic (ie. male infertility). I will 
detail why shortly, but fIrstly, by way of illustrating the point that 
some ethnomethodologists do consider hybrid approaches 
problematic, consider this conclusion from Maynard's appraisal of the 
relationship between language, interaction and the study of social 
problems: 
This paper, however, is not an appeal for a theory of social 
problems that incorporates sociolinguistics, conversation 
analysis, cognitive sociology, ethnomethodology, or any other 
interactional inquiry, where one struts with a concem for an 
offIcial social problem and looks for its interactional 
manifestations using one of these as a method for inquiry. It 
advocates further studies of language and interaction, for these 
are the stuff and substance of social life, and their investigation 
leads to a theory of the interaction order as an organized 
domain in its own right. ... Thus, the general answer to why 
language and interaction matter to the sociology of social 
problems is that their study permits the development of 
propositions about social organization. Although not about 
social problems traditionally conceived, those propositions 
have implications for the sociology of social problems, as they 
do for other substantive ru·eas in sociology. (1988: 326, 
original emphasis) 
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Maynard seems to be offering two choices. 13 Either, 
ethnomethodology remams a relatively pure domain of mqullY 
offering "propositions about social organisation" (or 'ethnomethods'), 
with the possibility of implications for other forms of sociology as a 
bonus. Or, ethnomethodology is incorporated in sociological 
inquiries which start with topics other than social organisation itself 
(eg. 'social problems'). For the sake of brevity, call the ftrst the 
'implications option' and the second the 'incorporation option'. Some 
very useful points can be made in reflection on these options to round 
off this introductory chapter .14 
First, if we attempt to categorise what I have so far outlined of this 
study, it is not at all clear which option ftts best. On one hand, the 
explication of the title shows that the study is more about social 
organisation than it is about male infertility as a 'social problem'. But, 
on the other hand, I see no need to totally abandon an interest in the 
phenomenon of male infertility (more· on this below). Instead, this 
study aims to fmd a balance between the two, and this difftcult task 
constitutes a tension which runs throughout this study. 
But there is something more general to note about the two options: 
the very posing of such a distinction has a histOlY. It is this histOlY 
13 Maynard's argument is chosen not because of any particular feature of 
Maynard's ethnomethodological work, but simply because this passage 
encapsulates one way of framing the relationship between ethnomethodology and 
other forms of sociology. 
14 The final chapter offers a much more detailed discussion of a debate within 
ethnomethodology about matters related to these options, and therefore the 
following points are brief. 
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that Alec McHoul seems to have in mind in the following pe11inent 
comment: 
Consider the phenomena of ethnomethodology: evelyday 
accomplishment and scenic practice, rule, technique and 
systematics ... and so on ... I have suggested above that these be 
seen as anything but independent of ethnomethodological 
discursive production. The question is: to examine that 
production or to perform it? And what criteria might be hauled 
into the argument by which we could choose between these? It 
appears that 'choice' is not what goes on here - only training. 
(1982: 110, emphasis added) 
The passage reflects a very important argument that McHoul has 
developed, but discussion of this will be left until the concluding 
chapter. In the meantime all I want to take from it is the argument 
that ethnomethodology, like the phenomena it studies, is an 
accomplishment, a crucial element of which is "training". My feeling 
is that Maynard's espousal of the 'implications option' is a strong 
reflection of training. Beginning at least with Garfinkel (1967), there 
is a strong tendency within ethnomethodolo!:,>y to consider the 
enterprise as incommensurable with, and alternate to, conventional 
sociology, and this position is still being strongly argued (for the best 
recent examples see, Bogen & Lynch, 1990; Garfmkel 1988; 
Garfmkel & Wieder, 1992; Sharrock & Anderson, 1987; Sharrock & 
Watson, 1988), In my view, Maynard's conclusion reiterates and 
reflects this part of ethnomethodology. 
While solid arguments can indeed be made about 
ethnomethodology's distinctiveness within sociology, there is a more 
dubious side to the 'implications option', It is this: in assuming that 
the ethnomethodological study of social organisation and 
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ethnomethods can have implications for other forms of sociology, 
there is little or no mention of the possibility that the relationship 
might be reversed. That is, that other forms of sociology might have 
implications for ethnomethodology. There are a growing number of 
social researchers aware of this potential two way relationship, 15 
nevertheless, there does seem to be a hard core purist element still 
strong in ethnomethodology. 
This purist element certainly produces cogent empirical research, 
which is frequently referred to in the empirical chapters. However, 
there are some non-empirical troubles associated with this element, as 
some comments by Cooper (1992) suggest. In his review of an 
important position statement for ethnomethodology 
Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences (Button, 1991) -
Cooper noted the tendency of some ethnomethodologists to speak 
with "an almost embattled quality": they wish to proclaim the 
relevance of ethnomethodology to other forms of sociology, but at the 
same time they want to clearly defme the boundaries so that their 
version of the enterprise can be "safeguarded from redescription or, 
worse, incorporation" (1992: 135). Cooper's point is that the offer of 
relevance to other forms of sociology has not been reciprocated -
15 In this study I rely most heavily on the work of Alec McHoul, but some of the 
more well known social researchers that could be included in this group are: 
Melvin Pollner, David Silverman, and Dorothy Smith. Also of interest is Drew and 
Heritage's recently published volume of conversation analytiC works. Specifically, 
an introductory comment by Drew and Heritage emphasises the desirability of 
rapprochement: 
Although the methods employed in the present studies are not always readily 
compatible with those of ethnography or survey research, the contributions to 
this volume sketch the kinds of possibilities that can emerge when CA 
techniques of analysis are applied to institutional interaction. It is in a spirit of 
openness to these future possibilities that the present volume is undertaken. 
(1992: 59, original emphasis) 
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talking and listening across the boundaries has mostly been one 
way.l6 
While 1 have certainly adopted ethnomethodology, and do fmd it an 
insightful sociological perspective, 1 agree with Cooper that there is 
no need for ethnomethodology to isolate itself from the rest of 
sociology. The beauty of my geographic isolation from a 'training 
group' of ethnomethodologists is that this study has had the potential 
to grow both in an ad hoc manner and relatively free (1 hope) from a 
dogmatic style of ethnomethodology. To reiterate, the aim is to 
engage with existing sociological research on infertility and not to 
state a "ritual affmnation of difference". Starting from a hybrid 
position does enable this to a large degree. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that there are an increasing number of 
sociologists engaging ethnomethodology with conventional sociology, 
and doing so in a way which avoids "ritual affmnations of 
difference". There is no need to discuss such work in great depth, but 
it is worth considering a list of such work in order to see the type of 
work being done. Here is a brief list, compiled in alphabetical order -
the studies listed have: 
reviewed approaches to "television and audience activity", 
showing that television viewing needs to be approached as 
a practical activity (Crook, 1989); 
reconceptualised 'family', showing that it is not found in 
anyone privileged place but can be studied as a feature of 
16 See Frank (1985) for a more developed and critical discussion of pOints similar 
to those Cooper raises. 
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language-in-use which accomplishes varied projects 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 1987); 
studied "gender effects on involuntary mental 
hospitalization", describing these effects as situated 
accomplishments of commitment proceedings dynamically 
linked to the social organisation of such action (Holstein, 
1987); 
studied the structure of interview talk in "careers 
counselling for the mildly mentally handicapped", showing 
that interviews are a problematic basis for placement, and 
suggesting possible directions for change (Hughes & May, 
1985); 
studied "the delivety and reception of advice in interactions 
between health visitors and first-time mothers" , 
emphasising that this activity is cruTied out through talk, 
and hence is subject to the constraining and enabling 
aspects of talk as a social organisation (Heritage & Sufi, 
1992); 
studied "negotiating child sexual abuse", questioning the 
claim that investigative interviews are coercive, showing 
instead, through close exatnination of such talk, that 
children can be competent users of socially available 
negotiation mechanisms (Lloyd, 1992); 
suggested that "the getting of sexuality" is a problem within 
cultures which link adult status with sexual competency but 
fail to provide fOlmal teaching mechanisms, noting, 
however, that there are many secondary systems of 
elaboration (McHoul, 1986); 
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studied "the school's work of sorting students", showing 
that such work is accomplished through the local 
application of context independent mechanisms (Mehan, 
1991); 
studied the organisation of counselling talk for AIDS 
patients, showing how interactants worked with and within 
communication fOlmats, and suggested implications for 
both sociologists and practitioners (Perakyla & Silverman, 
1991b); 
studied consultations at out-patient clinics for adolescent 
diabetics, showing that medical interaction is thoroughly 
imbued with moral concerns, but not of a fixed nature: 
participants to clinic consultations use shared resources to 
both construct and rebut moral implications of 
categorisation work (Silvelman, 1987a); 
reviewed the "problem of human machine communication", 
showing that the design of interactive programs cannot be 
modelled without considering the situated interpretative 
practices employed by speakers, together, in natural 
conversation (Suchman, 1987); 
reconceptualised gender as a routine accomplishment 
embedded in evelyday interaction (West & Zimmelman, 
1987); 
studied phone calls to emergency service agencies, focusing 
on a single conversation where "words failed" with dire 
consequences, thus showing that calls for help go 'right' and 
'wrong' in systematic, orderly ways (Whalen, Zimmerman, 
& Whalen, 1988). 
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This is not a comprehensive list, but short as it is, it shows a wide 
range of topics that are being addressed using insights from 
ethnomethodology. From, television viewing, family, health visiting, 
and mental illness, to, child sexual abuse interviews, stratifying 
students, sexuality, human-machine communication, and emergency 
phone calls. Also to be noted is that some of the authors of these 
studies would call themselves ethnomethodologists, while others 
would not. Irrespective of differences in self-labelling, what these 
studies exemplify is the growing use of ethnomethodological insights 
in a manner whereby links can be forged with conventional 
sociological study of substantive topics. This can take the form of 
reconceptualisation of study areas (eg. Crook; Gubrium & Holstein; 
Mehan; West & Zimmerman), or actual empirical study which has 
clear implications for the practical activities studied (eg. Peraklya & 
Silverman; Heritage & Sufi; Lloyd). 
There is also a more general point to be taken from this list. It is 
this: an incorporation or implications binary model of the relationship 
between ethnomethodology and sociology is outdated and unhelpful. 
Those trained in the view that ethnomethodology could proceed 
solely by making "propositions about social organisation" and being 
indifferent to substantive topics, have been overtaken by events -
researchers are proceeding regardless of constraints suggested by 
'training'. Moreover, it is not at all clear whether the studies listed 
above have started with 'social problems' and added knowledge about 
social organisation, or VIce versa. But, surely, gIven 
ethnomethodological knowledge of reflexivity, it is not at all helpful 
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to conceptualise research in such a linear, additive manner. What is 
clear, is that the above authors have retained the ethnomethodological 
emphasis on fme-grained study, and have taken various 'theoretical' 
precepts from ethnomethodology, but have no longer remained 
'indifferent' to their topic of study. Where there is a practical 
implication or a point of social critique that can be made, it is made. 
This rejection of 'indifference' may have a great deal to do with the 
"recognition, acceptance, and even welcome from the neighbors" 
(Pol1ner, 1991: 370) that ethnomethodology is now receiving. 
Additionally, the acceptance and recognition that Pollner rightly 
identifies, has meant the inevitable "incorporation" that Maynard and 
others disfavour. The upshot is that attempts to maintain a 'pure' 
strain of ethnomethodology are doomed, and it now seems pointless 
to claim that ethnomethodology is an "alternate" sociology. Certainly 
it is different, but not so different as to inhibit insightful and 
productive research from hybrid positions, as the above studies show. 
There is one final point that can be developed from the above list. 
In general, these studies illustrate the argument that "there is no 
necessary contradiction in seeking to study both particulars and 
practices. '" [F]or analytic purposes and in real life, form and content 
depend upon each other" (Silverman, 1985: 172, original emphasis). 
That is, apparently 'abstract' formal knowledge about social 
organisation is centrally important for understanding substantive 
research topics. Moreover, such an argument has always been 
perfectly compatible with ethnomethodology. Consider this statement 
of the "symmetry proposal" by Heritage: 
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... CA [as a fOlID of ethnomethodology] focuses on shared 
methods or procedures as the central resources through which 
actions are both produced and understood. The maintenance of 
these methods is a crucial feature of maintaining both the social 
organization of action and the social intelligibility of action. 
Both dimensions stand or fall together. (1988: 139) 
Crucially, the social intelligibility of phenomena cannot be extricated 
from the methods or procedures which constitute actions - "fOlID and 
content depend upon each other", "both dimensions stand or fall 
together". 
It is this interdependence of form and content, particulars and 
practices, that makes this study of the social organisation of male 
infertility inherently sociological. And it is also why the study is able 
to maintain an interest in the substantive topic of male infertility, 
framed within knowledge about generic sense-assembly methods. 
The study of social organisation (form) does provide reciprocal 
information about the intelligibility (content) of male infertility. That, 
for example, when a stranger asks an infertile man whether he has any 
children, and he replies 'no, we can't afford it yet' (chapter two); that 
the fertility of semen is described by presence (percentage normally 
shaped, percentage motile) and not absence (percentage abnormally 
shaped, percentage immotile ) (chapter three); that when we see a 
photograph of five men with musical instruments under the sign 
"Sperm Bank Five", we smile at the zaniness of the band's name 
(chapter four); that when an infertile male refuses to participate in a 
researcher's study of infertility, the researcher invokes the 'well 
known fact' that men fmd infertility a sensitive matter (chapter five), 
and so on; these "natural reactions" are substantive aspects of male 
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infertility embedded in social scenes as natmally organised practical 
activities. The intelligibility of male infertility and the ordered nature 
of the scenes within which it occurs "stand or fall together". In the 
following empirical chapters, attention is tmned to explicating this 
relationship in more detail. 
Chapter Two 
'Do you have any children?' 
and the 
Disclosure of Infertility 
2.1 Introduction 
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A major topic of discussion in the interviews with infertile men was 
how they told others of their infertility. Overall, it was very clear that 
'infertility disclosures'l were highly variable events. They occurred 
between the men and their relatives, friends, and workmates, but also 
between the men and brief acquaintances or with people they had met 
for the fIrst time. They occurred at parties, at work, at dinner, at 
family gatherings, and over the telephone. Special trips were made to 
make disclosures, but often they occurred relatively spontaneously, or 
were 'triggered off' by events like the adoption of a child or absence 
from work for a medical consultation or operation. Sometimes, they 
were made in anger at other people complaining about their children, 
but they were also made because of a professed desire to be open 
about infertility with other people. Infertility disclosures often 
produced an embarrassed silence or a disruption to the flow of 
conversation, but sometimes they resulted in a long and intimate 
conversation. 
1 This term will be more tightly specified below, for the meantime it refers to an 
infertile person's disclosure of their infertility to others. While this could occur 
through written discourse, here the focus is on disclosure in conversation. 
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In the major part of this chapter I will present some empirical 
material and use it to focus on a very small patt of this vatiability of 
infertility disclosure. The focus is on the relatively common situation 
where unacquainted persons strike up a conversation, and as part of 
the exchange of questions and answers that routinely occur, the 
question 'do you have any children' is asked. Despite such a question 
presenting the possibility for an infertility disclosure and subsequent 
talk about infertility, my data suggest that this rarely happens. Using 
work from conversation analysis I pursue this issue in detail and by 
doing so provide an ethnomethodological slant on the disclosure of 
infertility. But, before this section a brief discussion is presented of 
two existing sociological models of infertility disclosure: a 
'confession' model influenced by the work of Foucault; and a 
Goffman inspired dramaturgical model. These models attempt a 
much broader explanation of the variability of infertility disclosure. 
In the concluding discussion some problems with these approaches 
are noted, but, as indicated in the introductory chapter, the aim is to 
engage with this prior research on infertility, and not to discount it out 
of hand. 
2.2 The Beginnings of a 'Confession' Model of Infertility 
Disclosure 
The infertility literature contains the beginnings of a 'confession' 
model of infertility disclosure based upon the work of Michel 
Foucault. The usefulness of Foucault's work is plain to see: amongst 
other things, he presents society as a system of surveillance, where a 
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key part of sUlveillance is the encouragement of subjects (individuals) 
to speak, to confess. He argues that confession has become pervasive 
in modem life: 
... the confession became one of the West's most highly valued 
techniques for producing truth. We have since become a 
singularly confessing society. The confession has spread its 
effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine, 
education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most 
ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; 
one confesses one's crimes, one's sins, one's thoughts and 
desires, one's illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, with 
the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. (1990: 
59, emphasis added) 
For Foucault, confession is more than just a ritual of speech: it 
unfolds within a power relationship where the one hearing the 
confession has required, prescribed and appreciated it, and also has 
the power to "judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile" (1990: 
61-62). It is also a ritual which produces modifications in the person~ 
who confesses: exoneration, redemption, purification, liberation, and 
so on. Foucault suggests that the confession has become 
institutionalised in a whole series of relationships: children and 
parents; students and educators; patients and psychiatrists; 
delinquents and experts (63). Hence, the pervasiveness of confession 
in modem life. 
But despite the usefulness of Foucault's work, there has not been, as 
far as I know, a systematic application of the concept of confession to 
infertility. However, there have been more broader applications of 
Foucault's arguments to infertility, sufficient to suggest that there are 
the beginnings of a 'confession' model of infertility disclosure. Below 
I will briefly discuss these beginnings. 
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Pfeffer (1988) has used Foucault's concept of "biopower" in a study 
of pronatalism and sterility in England. She argues that sterility 
emerged as a problem within a new political concern for the welfare 
of the population - the fertility rate came to signify the Empire's 
political, economic, biological and moral strength. Within this 
context techniques for surveying the fertility (and infertility) of the 
population developed and this served the interests of the science of 
demography, whose practitioners used a paucity of information on 
(in)fertility to establish professional status. Pfeffer's argument 
remains at a structural level, but it is easy to see how such an 
argument could be extended to include a notion of confession. For 
one, demographic surveys of the (in)fertility of a population can be 
conceptualised as forms of confession within the overarching concern 
for "biopower". Secondly, the connection between fertility and the 
moral strength of the Empire could be translated into evelyday-Ievel 
moral pressures to confess fertility troubles. This could lead to an 
interesting search for archival material which records infertility 
confessions from this period (1900-1950). 
A more developed use of Foucauldian concepts is found in Gerson's 
exploratory paper on "Infertility and the constmction of desperation" 
(1989). She utilises a social constructionist viewpoint in arguing 
that 
The whole discourse of infertility, as well as its "diagnoses" and 
"treatments," is a particular historic creation, formed at the 
intersection of women's bodies, women's life trajectories and 
contemporary medical technology and service ... the experience 
of infertility, occurring within individual bodies, is subject to the 
shaping of the "social body" and the "body politic." (1989: 47) 
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In common with Pfeffer, Gerson suggests that the development of 
specialist knowledge of infertility is part of the overall process of 
industrialisation of human reproduction, and part of the specific 
disciplinary control of the body. In this light she suggests that what 
infertility doctors offer their patients is not so much increased 
treatment but "increased surveillance" (1989: 54). 
It is in Gerson's discussion of the involvement of psychologists and 
therapists in infel1i1ity that we see the greatest scope for development 
of a confession model of infertility disclosure. She notes that the 
existence of infertility that could not be explained by physiological 
factors provided a fertile space for psychologists and psychiatrists, 
who set about researching psychogenic causes of infertility. Gerson 
suggests that responses by medical doctors debunking this research 
was an attempt to preserve their disciplinary domain. In time, the 
psychologists and psychiatrists rejected the possibility of psychogenic 
causes of infertility, but they nonetheless moved into infertility 
territOlY: 
By delineating a practice that does not presume to heal a bodily 
condition, mental health professionals can use the diagnosis of 
infertility to safely enlarge their scope of practice without 
stepping on any toes. As one scholar of infertility wrote: "It 
becomes the job of the mental health workers to intervene in the 
emotional aspects of infertility and alleviate the stresses aroused 
by the condition." If the multiplication of discourse -the 
surveillance of the mind- can no longer presume to heal the 
body, it will be enlisted once again to heal the soul. (Gerson, 
1989: 56) 
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Clearly, Gerson is picking up Foucault's emphasis on the disciplinary 
and constitutive effects of bodies of knowledge. In doing so, she does 
not specifically mention confession, but it is reasonable to suggest 
that a key component of "surveillance" is "confession". 
Pfeffers and Gerson's work represents the clearest beginning point 
for a confession model of infertility disclosure. As it is, the model is 
mostly implicit, but making it explicit would only require a tighter 
focus and a continuation of the existing use of F oucauldian concepts. 
The actual minimum details of the confession model could be as 
follows. Within the multiplication of discourse on infertility, 
produced by the disciplinary development of modern medicine - both 
biological and psychological - lie institutional sites which require 
confession. Medical professionals determine who is infertile, and in 
this determination require confessions (eg. they interrogate infertile 
people about their sexual practices and often require them to record 
the frequency of sexual intercourse). The doctor may then recommend 
that the infertile people seek counselling from mental health 
professionals or social workers - if they seek to use reproductive 
technologies they will certainly be required to pursue counselling of 
some kind. The counsellors both require further confessions in their 
private sessions and encourage confessions in the public realm by 
recommending that the infertile disclose their infertility to others. On 
a more 'archaeological' front, the confession model could pursue 
changes in written records of infertility. Past confessional accounts 
framed within the medical or religious theories of the day, could be 
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compared with modern day personal accounts of infertility contained 
in popular magazines, newspapers and so on.2 
Thus, there is little doubt that there is both, a wealth of empirical 
material available for the development of a confession model, and, a 
context within sociology of favourable reception for such a 
Foucauldian model. Some critical comments on the confession model 
will be offered in the concluding discussion. 
2.3 A Dramaturgical Model of Infertility Disclosure 
Within the infertility literature, Miall's work (1985, 1986, 1989) is 
the most conceIted application of Goffman's dramaturgical 
perspective to infertility. Two of Miall's papers deal most directly 
with disclosure: "The Stigma of Involuntary Childlessness" (1986), 
which considers the stigmatising potential . of infeI1ility and its 
supposed involvement in infertility disclosures; and "Authenticity and 
the Disclosm'e of the Infonnation Preserve" (1989), which extends the 
earlier paper and focuses on disclosure by infertile adoptive mothers. 3 
2 See Franklin (1990) and Stone (1991) for two recent examples of infertility 
research which utilise Foucault to analyse mass media texts on infertility. Both are 
similar to Pfeffer and Gerson, but again neither focus explicitly on 'confession'. 
Franklin presents an analysis of "the social construction of infertility in popular 
representations of new reproductive technologies"; Stone does essentially the 
same but chooses to call it "contextualising". Both use popular texts about 
infertility, including personal stories (confessions) from infertile people. 
3 Note that Miall's research focuses on female infertility. Although she attempted 
to study both infertile men and women, she met great difficulty in obtaining a 
sample of men willing to talk to her (see chapter five). Regardless of the fact that 
she only spoke to infertile women, her model of infertility disclosure seems 
equally applicable to men. Also, I am just as interested here in the general 
principles of her model as in its specific details. 
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Miall's method of study was based upon a simple tactic: "In order to 
explore initial patterns of disclosure of the decision to adopt, 
respondents were asked to reconstruct their disclosures" (1989: 286). 
She also asked respondents to imagine a "typical meeting" with 
someone unaware of their adoptive status. She then probed these 
accounts with so called WH-questions (Schegloff, 1992: 1300), that 
is, why?, who?, what? and when? The reconstructions of the 
disclosures and the responses to the WH- questions constitute Miall's 
data. The analysis of this data is informed by Goffman's theoretical 
concepts, mainly from Stigma (1963) and The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life (1959), and the broader framework ofinteractionism. 
Specifically, the dramaturgical model of disclosure is charactetised 
by its emphasis upon selves managing information and appearance in 
interaction to project and preserve their fface'. This is extended by the 
notions of 'discredited' and 'discreditable': discredited refers to 
persons openly available as stigmatised (eg. someone without a nose); 
while discreditable refers to attributes that may be stigmatisable if 
uncovered (eg. Agnes' penis (Garfmkel, 1967)) and hence results in 
"passing", or conscious management to produce good impressions 
(Goffman, 1963). Miall characterises infertility as a 'discreditable' 
state which involves both, self labelling - "respondents themselves 
categorized infe11i1ity as discreditable, as something negative, as 
representing some sort of failure" (1986: 279) - and, the reaction of 
other people - "Self labelling occurs when individuals recognize that 
other people may label their particular attributes as discrediting or 
deviant if they learn of them ... " (1986: 279). Miall glosses the 
deviant potential of infertility as stemming from a pronatalist 
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nOlmative order. Hence, the essential ingredients of Miall's 
dramaturgical model of infertility disclosure are: individuals 
concerned with their face, aware of societal norms, who work with 
socially mediated self-labels to disclose or not disclose in particular 
emergent social interactions. 
In her 1989 paper Miall extends this view to give more attention to 
societal pressure to disclose. She does this because she sees a 
paradox in her data: the majority of her respondents were aware of 
negative attitudes about adoption in society, but these same 
respondents readily told others of their adoptive parent status. Miall 
chooses to explain this by considering the nature of "authenticity". 
Following Goffman, she argues that professionals involved m 
managing adoption utilise "advocated codes of conduct", that IS, 
formal guidelines as to how adoptive parents should disclose their 
status. These codes have some force as failure to adhere to them may 
result in less favourable treatment by -adoption professionals. Also, 
support groups for adoptive parents tend to follow a code that 
revelation produces authenticity. Miall argues that it is the fear of 
being labelled unauthentic by the professionals that encourages 
adoptive parents to disclose their status, and this is regardless of 
whether adoptive parents themselves think revelation is related to 
authenticity. 
Thus, Miall's analysis of disclosure includes a social-control-by-
institutional-professionals explanation. In this sense her argument is 
similar to the confession model, the difference being that her 
dramaturgical frame suggests social control has a self-ish driving 
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force - "to gain public acknowledgement of authenticity" (1989: 298). 
It is 'face' and not institutionalised powerlknowledge that is the focus 
of MialI's model. Again, some critical comments on this model will 
be offered in the concluding discussion. 
2.4 An Alternative View of Infertility Disclosure Based on the 
Findings of Conversation Analysis 
To recap, the beginnings of a confession model of infeltility 
disclosure suggested that individuals confess their infertility to 
surveillants/confessors who mediate the powerlknowledge of 
discourses ( ego biological and psychological medicine). In the 
dramaturgical model pronatalist societal norms and institutionally 
advocated codes of conduct are societal forces which encourage 
'face'-concelned individuals to disclose their infertility to others. In 
traditional sociological tenDS the confession model emphasises 
structure while the dramaturgical model emphasises agency and 
interaction: the former studies discourses and the confessing effects 
they produce, while the latter studies individuals maintaining 'face' - a 
product of identity, self labelling and societal nOlms - in their 
interaction with others. 
Despite obvious differences, the confession and dramaturgical 
model are similar in that both remain indifferent to the socially 
organised nature of infertility disclosures as an exchange of talk. 
Both focus on how infeltility disclosures reflect more general social 
relationships (discourse effects, 'face' concerns). While it makes little 
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sense to focus on lack of attention to this factor as a sole point of 
critique, there are good reasons why attention to the endogenous 
organisation of infertility disclosures is important for any sociological 
model of infertility disclosure. Below, by utilising some conversation 
analytic work and some data on infel1ility disclosure, I explicate the 
importance of an ethnomethodological shift" ... from considering how 
social relationships determine the course of talk to asking what social 
relationships consist in, considered as exchanges of talk" (Sharrock & 
Anderson, 1987: 318). 
Sh0111y, some data extracts will be presented, but prior to this a 
point of defmition and a proviso need to be made. First, the 
definition. In the following discussion I wish to distinguish between 
an 'infertility disclosure' and an 'infertility telling'. 'Infertility 
disclosure' will refer to a one turn disclosure of infertility, as when in 
reply to the question 'why don't you have any children?' someone 
replies 'I'm infertile'. An 'infertility telling' may develop from such a 
disclosure and refers to an extended stretch of talk, involving two or 
more participants, where infe11ility becomes the central topic of talk. 
In the following discussion I focus on these two speech exchanges 
where it is an infertile male4 telling some other( s) that he is infertile 
(or is part of an infertile couple), and that this is a ftrst time 
occurrence within ordinary conversation. 5 
4 Although my focus is on infertile males' disclosure, this is purely an effect of my 
decision to focus overall on male infertility. I am not suggesting that there are 
gender differences in disclosing infertility - there may be - but in the absence of 
evidence on this matter I would suggest that this chapter be read as focusing on 
held-in-common conversational resources for doing disclosing work, irrespective 
of the gender involved. 
5 Defining 'ordinary conversation' is a complex matter which I do not wish to go 
into. It is sufficient here if it is understood to refer to conversation other than that 
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Second, the prOVISO. I want to emphasise that because of data 
limitations the following analysis is rudimentary and exploratory. I do 
not have audiotapes of naturally occurrmg infertility 
disclosures/tellings. Rather, my data are secondary accounts of 
infertility disclosures/tellings, and in this respect they are virtually 
identical in form to Miall's data discussed above. However, I wish to 
analyse my data differently to Miall: the extracts recounting infertility 
disclosures will be treated as very rough approximations to the real 
talk that occurred. Conversation analytic work has shown that even 
the smallest particles in talk are essential components of the work 
accomplished in conversation (eg. see Heritage, 1984a on 'oh'), and 
my data certainly do not provide details of the real talk at this level. 
However, I believe that they do provide details of the overall 
stluctural features of infertility disclosures and this is sufficient for 
my purposes6. Certainly, the fme-grained research of conversation 
occurring in institutional settings, ego medical consultations, counselling sessions, 
requested tellings at infertility SOCiety meetings, and so on. 
6 A very relevant example of what can be done with less than ideal data is 
provided by Rodriguez and Ryave (1992). They present a conversation analysis 
of "everyday secret telling interactions" where the data are not audio or video 
taped, but are based on written recollections of secret telling interactions that 
Rodriguez and Ryave's stUdents were part of. While noting the limitations of their 
data, they argue that it does "display the existence of a general organizational 
pattern" (299). It is exactly this that I believe my data also display. 
A lot has been made within ethnomethodology, particularly conversation 
analysis, about this issue of 'naturally occurring' versus 'contrived' data. Clearly, 
the almost sanctionable preference within ethnomethodology is for the use of 
'naturally occurring' data, but, thankfully, there are enough ethnomethodologists 
about who now reject such a hard and fast distinction. This study contains no 
explication of this matter, I would merely note here that as Rodriguez and Ryave's 
work shows there are conversation analytiC studies using 'contrived' data, and 
more generally, there are good theoretical reasons why this is possible. On the 
latter, Alec McHoul is inSightful, and has certainly been an important part of my 
realisation that a distinction between 'naturally occurring' and 'contrived' data is 
misconceived and analytically limiting (in specific see McHoul, 1982, 1987a, 
1988b) 
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analysis can be used to add confidence to the speculative nature of my 
enqUIry. 
Data Extracts 
In the interviews with infertile men one of the commonest events 
recounted was being asked within ordinary conversation whether they 
had any children. I would suggest that this questioning takes two 
basic forms: fustly, if asked by a stranger (or not well-known person) 
the question is some variant of 'do you have any children'; and 
secondly if asked by someone already known it is more likely to be 
'when are you' or 'are you going to have children'. Different ways of 
eliciting the information can occur and even in a first meeting the 
second question could follow a 'no' reply to the fust, and of course 
without access to naturally occurring data there is no exact way of 
knowing about this variation. But by utilising research from 
conversation analysis we can reasonably confidently flll in the 
circumstances of at least the first form of inquiry, which is focused on 
below. For the sake of brevity, this is represented hereafter as any 
children? Here are three recountings of any children? 7 
(:NIl: Hans) 
H: ... you might have say a social situation, it still occurs 
today, they say !loh, did you have any children". I say 
"no", and then it's almost an anticipation that needs a bit 
of explaining. One person's reaction, just the other day 
was, "don't you like children?". I was never given the 
7 The extracts from interview transcripts are presented in standard orthography 
and not in the transcription style of conversation analysis. simply because the 
extracts themselves are not being analysed in a conversation analytiC manner. All 
names are pseudonyms. except M which stands for Michael. the interviewer. 
opportunity to explain and it straight away categorises me 
as being, ah, somewhat different than I really am, and so 
it's a problem, it's something that continually requires a 
bit of ah - I don't have a problem with that, I just tell 
them why, that's a fact. 
M: What do you actually say. 
H: I say I'm sterile, its a pretty short cut way of stopping the 
conversation but ah ... 
(MI8: Rick) 
R: ... often people will say to you "how many children, have 
you got any children?", and you say "no", and they might 
sort of make a bit of a comment without thinking about it, 
because I mean the fIrst question is quite natural, but then 
sometimes they urn, they might say something like "oh, 
when are you going to?", and you have to say "well, 
when we were", you know, you say something like "well 
if I knew how to do it, I would" sort of thing, and they 
suddenly freeze, you know, I think probably even when 
they ask the question they probably suddenly think 'hell' 
you know ... 
(MI9: Allan) 
A: ... it would normally occur perhaps on meeting people for 
the fIrst time, or early on, you know, if they've got 
children you ask how old they are or whatever and then 
they'll say "have you got any children yourself?" and yeh, 
that's it, that's the opener, you know. 
M: Right, what happens after that. 
A: Urn, I say "well, no we haven't, because we can't", or 
whatever, and I sort of say urn, "I've had a medical 
problem which has meant that I've had to have 
chemotherapy which has, it's meant that we can't have 
children now", and generally that's as far as it has to go, 
yeh. 
M: What do they say then. 
A: Urn, it's hard for them, I think, then, huh huh huh, yeh, 
they don't know what to say ... 
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The extracts show three examples of infertile men being asked some 
variant of 'do you have any children?'. We can infer that these 
questions occur in a fIrst-meeting situation, or at least in 
conversations between people not long acquainted. The following 
discussion will cover, fIrstly, the general structural features of the 
question, secondly, replies and next responses, and thirdly, prefacing 
work and curtailed infertility tellings. 
General Structural Features of Any Children? 
A fIrst thing to note about any children? is that it is indeed a 
question. As McHoul (1987c) argues, a question should be 
conceptualised not as a disembodied word or sentence, but as 
something that does questioning work. What a question turns out to 
be hinges upon how members utilise commonsense knowledge in the 
occasioned setting where the questioning work is done. To illustrate 
this McHoul (1987c: 461) offers the apparently straightforward 
question, 
Did you feed the cat this morning? 
which might receive two types of hearing, as follows, 
That's not my job, it's yours, you creep. 
or, 
Yeh - tuna fIsh. 
The latter reply typifIes how a question can be heard as a 
straightforward inquity, while the former reply typifIes how a 
question can be heard as doing some 'negative' work on the matter, or 
upon the person asking the question (McHoul calls these Q- versus N-
hearings). This relatively simple point is a useful way to begin 
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explicating any children?, because what it points to is a realisation 
that questions are powetful social devices, and as such will be located 
in particular places within the overall organisation of talk. 
Consider the possibility of thesolitruy utterance 'why?' being the 
reply to any children? Obviously, this indicates an N-hearing has 
been made, but it is perhaps just as obvious that we would not expect 
to hear any of the infertile men uttering this response in the contexts 
recounted above. This is because the question occurs between non-
familiars who, as such, face the pressing practical problem of 
coproducing topical talk, and within this context, we would not 
expect a 'why?' reply because any children? is hot accountable in that 
way. A brief outline of conversation analytic research on topic 
production will make this point clearer. 
Once greetings and introductions are exchanged, and perhaps after 
some initial 'make-talk' about the setting of the conversation or the 
weather, frrst-meeting conversationalists often move on to two types 
of question-answer pairs: "categorisation sequences" and "categOlY-
activity sequences" (Maynard & Zimmelman, 1984). Categorisation 
sequence refers to the evelyday practice of asking questions about the 
characteristics of people, for example, where you live, how old you 
are, if you are malTied, and so on. The category-activity sequence is 
similar, but the questions here focus upon activities that people do 
and how these might categorise the people doing them - asking a 
person's occupation would be an extremely common example. There 
are various methodical ways in which these pre-topical sequences 
mayor may not lead on to topical talk (see below) but, typically, 
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several questions from a categorisation or category activity sequence 
are offered before conversationalists take up extended topical talk. 
Given the way in which questions can be dangerous because they 
may be heard in multiple ways, it might seem Sill]Jrising that in 
conversation between non-familiars there is a wholesale exchange of 
questions (ie. pre-topical sequences). But, as Maynard and 
Zimmennan argue, the important point to note here is that the pre-
topical sequence displays sensitivity to coparticipants. The questions 
are precisely pre-topical: conversationalists should orient to them as, 
if you like, means to getting to the 'real' topical talk and not the 'real' 
topical talk in itself. This is the sense in which any children? is 
(often) not accountable in the 'why?', or N-hearing way. It is 
understood by conversationalists that if they do not want to pursue a 
proffered topic then that can be signalled in various ways (eg. by 
minimal response), and other participants should be able to act upon 
those signals without difficulty. It is in this sense that Maynard and 
Zimmennan make the strong claim that the methodical ways in which 
topical talk evolves from pre-topical sequences " ... are reqUired fOlIDs 
for initiating autobiographical talk; they allow that talk to be produced 
properly and with sensitivity to co-participants ... " (309, original 
emphasis). 
Clearly, any children? is a possible patt of a pre-topical 
categorisation sequence - it tries to establish biographical infonnation 
upon which to make topical talk. Within a pre-topical sequence the 
question is likely to be located after some prior questions: a 
questioner will have to ascertain that the recipient is a candidate for 
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parenthood before the question can be sensibly made. One can 
imagine previous talk establishing marital status (or partnered status), 
stage of life (eg. settled down with a horne etc.), and attributions of 
age and sexual orientation. In this sense the any children? question is 
"recipient designed" (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) using the 
knowledge built up in the conversation before topical talk occurs. It 
may also suggest that the question occurs at a point somewhat 
removed from the initial anonymity of the beginning of a 
conversation. Even the minimal exchange of infonnation that IS 
required to be able to make any children? moves the 
conversationalists away from absolute anonymity. 
Replies and Next Responses 
So far I have discussed some general features of any children? It 
may occur within pre-topical sequences in talk between non-familiars, 
where it most likely is positioned after initial questions which enable 
it to be made, and it partakes of the general sensitivity to other which 
pre-topical and topical packages enable. We can now consider 
possible replies and next responses. 
One apparently simple way of replying is with a solitary 'no', and in 
extracts Ml and M18 there are indications that this occurs. If the men 
did indeed make this solitary utterance reply it would be velY 
important for the shape of the subsequent interaction. It stands in 
direct contrast to a long fmID reply which is a clear indication of a 
"topic initial offer" (Maynard & Zimmennan, 1984). It is also 
different from a typical device for rejecting an invitation to talk on a 
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possibly sensitive topic, that is, a short-fonn reply plus a return 
question, as in the following example: 
1. A: Are you a freshman here? 
2. B: Sophomore. Are you- what are you 
3. A: uh, I'm a freshman 
(Maynard & Zimmennan, 1984: 306) 
Maynard and Zimmennan suggest that by offering a minimal reply 
and return question, recipient can clearly fonnulate a reply as only an 
"answer" and not an offer to do topical talk. In the above case, 
possible sensitivity (for either party) stemming from the different 
levels of the students is not taken up in topical talk. We might 
hypothesise then, that a reply such as 'No, what about you?' to any 
children? would, while relevancing an answer about the questioner's 
parental status, shut down the topic after the next response, or at least 
take topical talk away from the question of why the infertile male has 
no children. 
However, by itself the 'no' reply does not seem to shut down the 
topic. Maynard and Zimmennan suggest that short fonn answers 
without return questions are equivocal as to whether they are a topic-
initial offer. They are certainly not so clear an indication of taking up 
topic as a long fmID offer, but they may contain an implicit offer to 
take up the topic. Or alternatively, as Heritage (1988) shows, the 'no' 
reply may result in questioner seeking an account. He notes how 
when second speakers cannot accomplish a projected action they 
usually produce an explanation or account of why. When this is not 
forthcoming the frrst speaker will evidence a belief that one is due by 
overtly pursuing an account or explanation. Heritage gives the 
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example of two people talking, one announcmg a failed exam to 
which the other asks: 
G: So yih g'nna take it agai:n?= 
S: =nNo. 
(0.5) 
G: No:? 
S: No. 
(0.3) 
G: Why no:t.= 
S: = .t.hhhh I don't rilly wan'to. 
(1988: 134, transcription simplified) 
After the initial short fonn reply, there is a long delay while 
questioner waits for an explanation before prompting it with a retwn 
"No". The next response is no improvement, questioner waits again 
for an elaboration, none appears, and so fmally questioner makes an 
overt request for an explanation.8 Overall, Heritage suggests that 
when questioners and recipients uncover an unexpected action (eg. 
failing an exam) account-giving is a nonnatively required feature of 
the subsequent talk. 
It seems reasonable to include childlessness as an unexpected state 
for adults, and the fact that requests for accounts follow a 'no' reply to 
any children? suggests this. Thus, while mindful of data limitations, 
one common development following any children? can be represented 
as follows: 
8 See Button and Casey (1985) for similar empirical examples. Sacks also made 
a similar point in his discussion of "diagnostic sequences": an important feature of 
the use of greeting substitutes ('how are you', 'y'alright') is that it is the recipient 
who initially directs the following interaction. If one replies 'fine' then the floor is 
handed back to the questioner, if one replies 'lousy' then the questioner is 
'required' to pursue enquiries into 'how come' (Heath, 1981, summarising Sacks, 
1975). 
pre-topical inquhy 
minimal reply/equivocal 
topic initial offer 
wait for account 
request for account 
r 
I Do you have any children? 
L 
r 
I No 
I 
L 
r 
I ... (probable pause) 
L 
r 
I Don't you like children? 
I When are you going to? 
I etc. 
L 
Prefacing Work and Curtailed Infertility Tellings 
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The specific talk in the extracts above, and the talk in my interview 
data in general, suggest that when a disclosure of infertility is made in 
response to a request for an account, the conversation does not 
continue to an infertility telling. Regardless of whether the disclosure 
is relatively direct - "I say I'm sterile" (MI) - or euphemistic - "well if 
I knew how to do it, I would" (MI8) - the result seems to be an 
embarrassed silence, stammering, 'ohs', or 'I don't know what to say' 
statements. In short, an infertility telling is curtailed. 
This is an interesting outcome, particularly given the arguments of 
the confession and dramaturgical models. The general tenor of the 
60 
confession model is that people confess on an evelyday basis, 
therefore, presumably they have little trouble in confessing. Why 
then, the curtailed infertility telling? In contrast, the dramaturgical 
model with its emphasis on 'face' and stigma clearly suggests that 
there are good reasons for disclosures being avoided. That is, infertile 
people may choose instead the activity of 'passing' -selective 
infonnation management designed to avoid potential stigma. But, as 
noted, Miall's respondents disclosed their infertility or adoptive status 
quite freely, and Miall suggested this stemmed from a notion of 
'authenticity' imposed by powelful institutional agents. However, in 
the above data extracts there is little evidence of passing9, and rather 
than explain the ease or difficulty of disclosing infertility by reference 
to outside social forces, as Miall has done, I wish to continue 
emphasising how talk as a structure-in-action constrains and enables 
infertility disclosures. 
To precis the following argument, I believe that curtailed infertility 
tellings develop from the 'no' reply to any children because 'no' is 
insufficient to set up an infertility telling. To do an infertility telling 
one needs to forewarn questioner that talk is moving from business as 
usual, and the relative safeness and anonymity that permits, to 
business that may require an initial display of "troubles-
receptiveness" (Jefferson, 1980) and further moves toward intimacy. 
Within the constraints of pre-topical talk the 'no' response cannot 
9 There is some mention of 'passing' in the interview data. One man commented 
that when asked any children? he would reply with something like 'well, we're 
working on it'. I asked how long such a reply could be kept up and the obvious 
answer was 'not a lot longer'. Once a 'pass' is made to the effect that 'one is 
working on it' this provides the questioner with a future return to the topic, all of 
which multiplies the normative accountability of replies to any children? 
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accomplish this prefacing work and the talk moves on. Below I 
outline the basis of this argument, beginning with a brief outline of 
the development of conversation analytic work on prefacing. 
In his examination of storytelling Sacks (1989) noted the 
importance of "stOlY prefaces". As stories take more than one 
sentence to tell, a potential problem occurs at the end of the story's 
frrst sentence: this is a common place where another speaker may 
begin a turn at talk and if this occurs the story's telling may be 
preempted. One effective way to overcome this problem is the use of 
a preface. For example, in Sacks' data the prospective teller prefaced 
his stOlY with, "You wanna hear muh-eh my sister told me a story last 
night" (1989: 338). The preface displays an intention to tell a story 
and also gives the potential hearers an indication of the source. As a 
device a preface maintains the ability of others to take a next turn, but 
it enhances the possibility of coparticipants reselecting the 
prospective teller to tell the stOlY; and -during the course of the story, 
coparticipants will not treat each possible tum completion as a place 
at which to take a next tum, but will offer indications that they are 
following the stOlY. 
Developing on the recognised importance of prefacing work, 
subsequent work in conversation analysis has examined, for example: 
how talk on topic is pre-sequenced (Button & Casey, 1985; Maynard 
& Zimmerman, 1984); how requests of action by others are prepared 
with statements such as 'can I ask you a question' (Schegloff, 1980); 
how "troubles-talk" displays an elaborate pattern of opening, talk on 
the trouble, and subsequent closing and movement to next topic 
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(Jefferson, 1988); how the giving of bad news can be so organised 
that the recipient of the news turns out to be the one who actually 
says it (Schegloff, 1988b). The general conclusion is that in any talk-
in-interaction where participants will take an extended turn at talk the 
"preference" is for inclusion of prefacing work (on preference, see 
Bilmes, 1988). 
A major function of this prefacing work is to maintain sensitivity to 
others and keep interaction at an affiliative as opposed to disaffiliative 
level (Jefferson, 1988; Schegloff, 1980; Heritage, 1984, 1988). A 
further imp011ant point to note about this line of research concerns 
intentions or motivations of the individuals party to the interaction. 
Conversation analysis is not concerned with the issue of whether 
conversationalists come to a interaction with an intention or 
motivation to tell a trouble, give bad news, tell a joke, disclose 
infertility, and so on (see Heritage, 1990/1991). The point is, 
regardless of any attribution of intention or motivation, individuals 
taking extended turns at talk in ordinaty conversation will have to fit 
into the there-and-then constraints of talk. Moerman and Sacks have 
put this well: 
... conversational sequencing is built in such a way as to require 
that participants must continually, there and then - without 
recourse to follow up tests, mutual examination of memoirs, 
surprise quizzes and other ways of checking on 
misunderstanding - demonstrate to one another that they 
understood or failed to understand the talk they are party to. 
(Moelman & Sacks, quoted in DlUmmond & Hopper, 1991: 
305) 
Members, by vntue of then' membership, are expected to orient to the 
placement of their utterances within an overall stream of talk; 
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Moennan and Sacks' statement adds the impOltant point that 
accountability for such orientation is instant, "there and then". 
Prefacing work is precisely a way of providing within talk an 
indication of what is coming up in the talk and how it should be 
understood on an ongoing basis. 
The way in which a lack of prefacing work might be involved in 
curtailed infeltility tellings can be seen by considering one example of 
an extended infeltility telling. In response to an interview question 
about disclosing infertility to workmates, Peter recounted the 
following event. 
(M2: Peter) 
P:Well I was lucky, one day, this is where I say that 
it doesn't affect me, actually, vividly, I can 
remember one day I was at work, and it was a real 
bad time for both of us, I was at work, it was 
probably about ten o'clock in the morning and the 
manager was there, and he said to me "oh, what's the 
problem?". Because nonnally I just carry on, laugh 
and have a joke, but he knew there was something 
wrong, and we talked about it, and bang, I just burst 
out crying, told him the whole story, you know, he 
kind of locked the door, no-one to come in, and we 
talked about it for a good houI, and I think that's 
what, that was my release, you see that's why I say 
you close doors, you don't think of it until you need 
to start talking ... 
In the interviews I did with infertile men it was very uncommon for 
men to report having long ~onversations with anyone except their 
partners about infertility, but here Peter recounts how an apparently 
simple question - "oh, what's the problem" - led to an extended 
infertility telling. 
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As a secondary account the data are obviously limited, however, by 
considering it in relation to conversation analysis research on 
"troubles-talk" (Jefferson, 1988) we can relatively confidently 
identify some features of a larger package for doing extended talk on 
troubles. Through a detailed study of ordinary conversations where 
people talked about their troubles Jefferson (see 1988 for details of 
her research programme) concluded that troubles-talk is a socially 
organised "package" with standard parts which occur in a standard 
order. She noted how "troubles-talk is so alTanged that a 
coparticipant need not know about the presence of a trouble to 
effectively initiate talk about it" (1988: 421). For example, by using a 
It downgraded conventional response" to a greeting substitute a 
speaker can orient a coparticipant to a trouble, as follows: 
A: hh How've you bee:n. 
B: hh Oh:': surviving I guess, hhh! 
(Jefferson, 1988: 422, transcription simplified) 
This is one way in which questioner is alerted to the possibility of 
extended troubles-talk. 1 0 
Clearly, in Peter's account the manager is alerted to the possibility 
of trouble by Peter's non-routine behaviour: " ... normally I just catTy 
on, laugh and have a joke, but he knew there was something wrong 
••• It. While behaviour in itself could lead to a "troubles inquiry" or an 
indication of "troubles receptiveness", it is quite likely that Peter also 
10 There are a variety of next responses and connected ways that the talk may 
then develop, from relatively neutral responses like "continuers" ('mmm', 'yeh'), 
which may require further work by troubles teller to lead to troubles-talk, to 
responses that clearly indicate questioner's "troubles receptiveness" (eg. 'oh no', 
'oh shit') and which greatly encourage subsequent troubles-talk (1988: 423-425). 
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displayed his troubles in the fonn of his talk, perhaps making a 
"downgraded conventional response" to a 'how are you' greeting 
substitute. Either way, as a signal that something is not right, both 
non-routine behaviour and non-routine fonns of talk are efficient 
prefacing devices for a troubles telling. 
It is interesting to note that Peter contextualises this extended 
infertility telling by stating it occurred at a "real bad time", a time 
where he had a "need to start talking". This provides a readily 
understandable motivation or intention for the infertility telling. 
There is no reason to question his account on this point, but we might 
add to it though, that even with a motivational 'need to start talking' if 
the right conversational devices are not used an infertility telling will 
not get done. The right things need to be said by questioner and 
recipient so that each can recognise that there is a trouble to be told. 
This is why prefacing is such a common device: it lets the recipient of 
an extended tum at talk know that a· certain type of extended talk 
could be coming up,11 with concomitant interactional requirements 
and obligations. 
In contrast to Miall's dramaturgical model which emphasises the 
stigma that the discloser may face, the important point gained from 
considering conversation analytic work is that both questioner and 
recipient have selves they are concerned for. Both are at 11Sk in talk, 
and not solely because any of the parties have stigmatisable 
infonnation preserves, but also because of the expectation of 
11 This can work to the extent that the putative recipient of bad news etc. actually 
guesses what is to be told (see Schegloff, 1988). 
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competent use of conversational structures. This competence 
includes general knowledge of just where and when an activity like 
disclosing infertility can be accomplished. Clearly, infertility cannot 
be disclosed in just any conversation, let alone in pre-topical talk 
between non-familiars, because of the contingency that if bad or 
delicate news is volunteered then the recipient of the news may be 
unprepared to fulfil the interactional obligations of being a recipient 
to that news (Button & Casey, 1985). 
Interestingly, on the other hand, my data suggest that by answering 
any children? with a minimal response recipients may fmd 
themselves at the receiving end of active pursuance of an account. 
That is, answers which are not infertility disclosures lead to account 
pursuances which may bring such a disclosure. I suspect that this 
situation may have a lot to do with why, after the second question 
which pursues an account and the response disclosing infertility, the 
conversation breaks and an infertility telling does not eventuate. The 
delay and embarrassing silence may be a time where the questioner 
reflects upon the velY means whereby his or her account pursuing 
elicited a disclosure of infertility without any prefacing work by the 
recipient. The apparently simple utterance any children?, is 
retrospectively constituted as an insensitive one: when uttered it 
appeared as an information elicitor which could lead to topical talk, 
but three turns later its meaning is substantially altered and it has 
become a question which has set up troubles-talk without any 
prefacing work by the infertile male, hence, the questioner being 'lost 
for words'. As Heritage has noted, speakers are treated as having the 
capacity to produce or avoid producing the appropriate packages for 
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eliciting accounts, and "they may thus fmd themselves being 
accountable for and evaluated in terms of how they design and 
package their utterances" (198S: 138). This is precisely what seems 
to happen, and further, the participants to the conversations are aware 
of the accountable nature of their talk: Rick indicates that the 
questioners "suddenly freeze, you know, I think probably even when 
they ask the question they probably suddenly think 'hell', you know" 
(MIS). 
This is the risky nature of conversation, and patticularly so for pre-
topical talk amongst non-familiars. In the business of working up 
topical talk questions can be asked that inadvertently set up 
accounting procedures which may produce accounts that the 
mechanics of pre-topical talk are not well designed to cope with. As 
Jefferson's research shows, it requires a large package to cope with 
the large movement from business as usual to the reciprocal intimacy 
of troubles-talk. If even these large packages are prone to disruption 
by the constant pressure towards business as usual, how much more 
so for the pre-topical sequence which is precisely centred upon 
establishing what business as usual -coparticipants' autobiographicals 
- is to be in the talk that is getting done. 
Thus, the apparently innocent question 'do you have any children?' 
can have major unintended consequences. The question seems to be 
aimed at iniating topical talk on children, but when in reply to an 
account pursuance, a 'truthful' disclosure of infertility is made, it 
seems to cUltail the possibility of talk on that topic - in fact the 
possible topic has moved from children, to not having children. 
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Following Heritage, it can be argued that although members' 
knowledge of the proper use of conversational devices is usually 
taken~for-granted, when the devices are not used in their proper way, 
members are accountable for this improper use, In the case of the 
result of any children?, the questioner stammers and pauses - the 
apparently simple question they uttered turned out to do 'insensitive' 
questioning work. 
This phenomenon is not likely to be isolated to infertility as the 
content of what is being disclosed. Extract MI8 includes a comment 
from Rick on exactly this point: 
it's one of those questions like "what do you do for a living", it 
used to be quite nonnal but now you have to think quite 
carefully about it because the person might have to say "well 
look, I used to work for IBM but I've been unemployed for two 
years and I'm forty five and I don't think I'll ever get another 
job", 
In this case however, the long fonn reply could function as a topic 
initial offer and extended talk on the topic looks likely to occur, In 
the case of the hypothetical fonn of the curtailed infertility telling 
sequence, the movement from minimal reply, to account seeking, to 
infertility disclosure, happens too quickly ~ the pre-topical package 
does not seem capable of handling the c01l'e1ative movement from 
relatively anonymous talk, to talk of a much more intimate nature. 
Briefly, before moving to the concluding discussion, there is one 
other piece of empirical material worth considering. At the flIst 
infertility support group that I attended, the first prot of the meeting 
was taken up with the participants introducing themselves to the 
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group (nine people). When the tum of one man came he gave his 
name and then immediately stated that he was infertile. The 
disclosure produced an almost visible shudder, a definite feeling of 
unease, in the group as a whole, and the man then continued without 
responding comment from anyone else. I believe this example 
illustrates how the preferred conversational devices for doing a 
personal disclosure are recognisable in their very absence. The man 
failed to allow a disclosure of infertility to come 'naturally', that is, 
with prefacing work, and the reaction of the others signalled that this 
was indeed missing. It is important to note that this occurred in a 
context within which personal disclosures might be an expected 
occurrence, but even within such an environment there are right and 
wrong ways to disclose personal troubles. 12 
2.5 Concluding Discussion 
The above discussion has covered a wide range of divergent 
material, hence it might pay to reiterate the proviso noted in section 
2.4. That is, my discussion must be considered speculative as it is 
dependent upon limited empirical material. The secondary 
recollections of real talk cannot reproduce the fme grained detail of 
the original. talk, and therefore my analysis of the curtailed infertility 
tellings could be spurious - after any children? talk may have gone on 
to extended topical talk on infertility. However, the utilisation of 
12 There is a good chance that the 'right way' is the way it is done in ordinary 
conversation, that is with prefacing work, and within a more formal setting this 
device becomes the bedrock form, with departures from it being 'obselVable and 
reportable'. 
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existing conversation analytic studies, which are (usually) based on 
actual instances of talk, provides valuable insights into the overall 
organisation of talk within which any children? is located. Thus, 
although speculative, my discussion has a sound base. Using this 
base I explicated the general structural features of any children?, 
showing how such an apparently simple question is part of the 
complex machinery of talk. I emphasised that infertility disclosures 
were a conjoint accomplishment involving normative aspects in both, 
the pursuance of accounts, and in the very way members are 
accountable for their use of forms of talk. Additionally, I suggested 
that infertility tellings would require some prefacing work, and this 
was an important reason why when any children? is asked within pre-
topical talk it does not lead to extended topical talk on infertility. 
More generally, I think I have made a strong argument for 
approaching infertility disclosure by considering the endogenous 
organisation of talk. For, in disclosing infertility through talk 
members utilise a " ... procedure through which participants constrain 
one another, and hold one another accountable to produce coherent 
and intelligible courses of action" (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990: 288). 
The specific intelligibility of male infertility known through infertility 
disclosures is imbricated within talk as a social organisation - it 
cannot be separated from an already social course of action. 
Such an approach is celtainly in contrast to Miall's dramaturgical 
model of infertility disclosure. She failed to consider the social 
organisation of disclosure talk itself, preferring to use accounts of 
disclosure as a resource for locating 'face-work', 'authenticity', 
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'infonnation preserves' and so on. Clearly, a great deal of this 
approach is derived from Goffman, but it should be emphasised that 
Miall totally neglects the relevance of Goffman's work on 'fonns of 
talk' (1981, 1983). As Maynard and Zimmennan's work shows, the 
general thrust of Goffman's work can be utilised in a different 
manner: 
... rather than approaching relationships as a reality lying behind 
and influencing members' face-to-face behaviour[13], we can 
investigate them for how, in the course of time, they are 
accomplished within everyday interaction by various speaking 
practices, including those involved in the production of topical 
talk. (1984: 305) 
The contrast is also summarised nicely in a distinction that Watson 
(1992) notes: the dramaturgical model is concerned with 'self 
whereas the ethnomethodological approach is concerned with 
'member'. The fonner has a social psychological focus on individuals 
and impression management while the latter is concerned with the 
held in common resources that individuals use and not the individuals 
themselves. 
This contrast probably has a lot to do with the celebrated divergence 
between Harvey Sacks and his initial teacher, Erving Goffman (see 
Schegloff, 1988a). Here an answer that Sacks gave to the question of 
why he sought the "apparatus rather than what people are trying to do 
in a conversation?" (Sacks, 1987: 67) is most gennane. To 
13 This is the essence of Mial/'s approach, and at times it leads to strongly 
essentialist statements. For example, at one point she comments that " ... the 
apparent existence of a self .. labelled, discreditable identity in the absence of 
visible deviant behaviour offers additional support for the concept of deviance as 
an inner essence which can exist independent of behaviour .... " (1986: 280) .. Miall 
fails to note that this supposed independence from behaviour is only known 
about through the process of interviewing respondents about infertility 
disclosures; in other words, the behaviour independent "inner essence" is known 
through the social behaviour of research interviewing. . 
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paraphrase Sacks and apply his logic to infertility disclosure, you 
cannot fmd what people are uying to do by disclosing infertility until 
you find the kinds of things they work with, that is, social resources. 
If the system had a built in device for producing disclosures and you 
did not know about it, then you could be calling these devices 'face-
work' or 'information preserve management' when they were pelfectly 
well accounted for by the devices. What people want to do by 
disclosing infertility is another question, and it may be that detailed 
knowledge of conversational machinery will be sufficient as an 
account of what people are trying to do by disclosing infertility (see 
Sacks, 1987: 67). Thus, analysis begins with detailed consideration 
of the conversational machinelY through which infertility disclosures 
are accomplished, and it is this line that I have followed, albeit in a 
speculative way. 
Although my discussion of the confession model was brief given 
that it exists only in a seminal state, it should be clear that my 
approach is also in contrast to this model. It is now a well known 
point of critique that Foucault's analyses are heavily dependent upon 
textual analysis, that he tends to neglect the contingency of 
discourses, and presents, without sufficient analysis, discourses as 
having general social effects (eg. see Hepworth & Turner, 1982; 
Turner, 1984). The existing use of Foucauldian concepts in infertility 
research presents no exception to this tendency. While I do not deny 
the theoretical interest of a confession model of infel1ility disclosure, 
my analysis has some contrmy implications for it. 
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Firstly, the fmdings of conversation analysis and my own 
speculative fmdings have a strong bearing on the claim that modeln 
Western society is a confessing society. That is, a society where 
confession plays a part in the "most ordinary affairs of everyday life" 
(Foucault, 1990:59). If we assume that we can include ordinary 
conversation here, then my discussion suggests that there are some 
illnesses and troubles that, despite readily available questions leading 
to them, are not readily turned into extended telling of troubles (ie. 
'confessions'), and this irrespective of the existence of a considerable 
machinery for prompting accounts. Hence, anyone serious about 
taking up Foucault's argument on confession needs to avoid making 
blanket statements calling any piece of discursive work a confession, 
or saying that they are a pervasive part of ordinary conversation. 
Doubts about a. confession model were made velY clear in the way in 
which the questioners who asked any children? were themselves 
made accountable for the way they had designed their utterances. A 
simplistic adoption of a confession model forgets that "intelTogators 
have no guarantees" (McHoul, 1987c). 
ill addition, there are difficulties with applying the confession 
model to apparently well developed exchanges where people tell 
others of their illnesses and troubles. Research by Jefferson and 
Schegloff suggests that even extended confessions (of any subject 
matter) may be prone to collapse or divergence. A particular point 
that Jefferson stressed in her study of troubles-talk was that although 
the troubles-talk package is elegant it is also weak: 
... it is constantly encroached upon, and recUlTently breached, by 
the pressure towards business as usual, to which talk about a 
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trouble appears to be inevocably vulnerable, and to the concerns 
of which a "trouble" appears to be inemediably subordinate and 
accountable. (1988: 440) 
Because ordinary conversations are seldom a monologue and require 
display of attentiveness of all parties to what is being done in the talk, 
there are innumerable opportunities for the track of talk to move from 
a 'confession' to ordinary matters. 14 
Schegloff (1980) makes a similar point in his discussion of 
prefacing work. If a speaker sets up a coming extended tutn at talk 
with a preliminary to a preliminary (can I ask you a question), and 
then a preliminary (details which fill in the context for the next 
action), before the action projection that it all leads to (can you do 
something for me), then there is a large amount of material which the 
recipient can take up as "something in its own right". Whatever this 
"something in its own right" is, may well be something to which a 
speaker did not attend, and thus the speaker may be puzzled about 
recipient's reaction to the preliminary work, with the upshot that 
elaborate repair work results (see Schegloff, 1992). There is good 
reason to believe that if 'confessions' do occur at the level of ordinary 
conversation, and Foucault suggests they do, then they will involve 
prefacing work, and in this work the problem of attending to the 
prefaces as "something in its own right" may occur. Again, 
confessions may therefore inevitably go off track and return to 
'business as usual'. In simple terms, a 'confession' will not be 
established by the exercise of power relations which exist prior to the 
14 And, of course, as ethnomethodologists have argued for a long time, these 
'ordinary matters' are also an accomplishment, perhaps the most pervasive 
accomplishment of everyday life (eg. see Sacks, 1984; Pollner, 1987). 
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talk, but must be accomplished conjointly by speakers in conversation 
using the resources they have at hand. 
However, the above points are consonant with one aspect of the 
confession model. If confessions are difficult to achieve in ordinary 
conversation, then this may provide an impetus for the proliferation of 
institutional sites for confession - counsellors, psychiatrists, and so 
on. This in turn could be linked to the ritualistic aspects of confessing 
(and we might therefore incorporate Goffman's work as well). 
Jefferson has made a provocative comment relevant to this discussion: 
Thus, we might be studying a culture which has gotten control 
of small interactional units, but is not yet able to properly cope 
with large units. Such an image projects an evolved-to future in 
which the proper positioning of some Nth component of an 
occasionally- activated large package is insisted upon to any 
child and lapses thereof are complained of by any copruticipant. 
Conversely, we might be seeing, in the ritualized elements, 
remnants of a more primitive, rigid version of interaction, from 
which the culture has been in the process of devolving as it 
becomes more interactionally sophisticated. The projection, 
then, is of a future in which it is no bother or issue as to whether 
someone returns a greeting, answers a question, now, later, or at 
all; where, upon the occurrence of such a strictly ordered pair, a 
participant might remark upon the coincidence that just last 
week something similar occurred. (1988: 439, fn. 6) 
Jefferson's fITst future option does indeed lend itself to a confession 
model: children socialised to recognise and respond to conversational 
packages which require confession. But, the second option is quite 
contrary to a confession model, as it suggests that modern Western 
societies may be becoming less and less confessional in nature. 
Obviously, this matter requires further detailed study. 
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Such matters of enquiry are theoretically interesting and indeed 
worthy of further study. However, as I hope to have shown in this 
chapter, there are good grounds for believing that if sociologists wish 
to study disclosure in this way, then they should include consideration 
of the organised nature of the talk within which disclosures are 
accomplished. Without analysis at this level, these lines of enquity 
will be, at best, theoretically interesting, but at worst, quite unrelated 
to everday activities. 
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Chapter Three 
The Language of Reproduction: 
Is it Doctored? 
3.1 Introduction 
Feminists have made a significant contribution to the sociological 
literature on infertility. This ranges from work with a broader 
theoretical relevance to infertility, such as O'Brien's The Politics of 
Reproduction (1981), to work more specifically concerned with 
women's experience of infertility (eg. Lorber, 1989; Lorber & 
Bandlamudi, 1993; Pfeffer & Woollett, 1983; Sande1owski, 1990a, 
1990b; Unruh & McGrath, 1985). In addition, there is now a large 
body of feminist research on the new,reproductive technologies (eg. 
Arditti, Duelli Klein & Minden, 1984; Corea, 1985; Klein, 1989; 
Overall, 1987; Spallone, 1989; Spallone & Steinberg, 1987). The vast 
majority of this latter research is very critical of the way 
contemporary medical technology is applied in infertility diagnosis 
and treatment. The extent to which this critical element has grown, is 
shown by the formation of an international network of feminists 
opposed to the new reproductive technologies (FINRRAGE 1), and 
the establishment of a journal devoted to critical analyses of 
reproductive medicine (Journal of Reproductive and Genetic 
Engineering, established 1988). 
1 Feminist International Network Resisting Reproductive and Genetic Engineering 
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The size of the latter body of literature suggests that the dominant 
position amongst feminists is to approach infel1ility as a subset of the 
analysis of the oppression of women by men. Cel1ainly, it is 
conventional for feminists to be opposed to the new reproductive 
technologies. However, some feminist scholars have been prepared 
to question the dominant view, arguing, in essence, that it is too 
deterministic and inflexible. Stanw011h (1987) has singled out 
O'Brien's (1981) argument that men have tried to make up for 
procreative discontinuity by dominating nature and women, as an 
example of this overdeterminism. Gerson (1989) suggests that 
feminists have neglected to account for the way in which many 
women actively seek out reproductive technology and male medical 
specialists; and similarly, Sandelowski (1991) has criticised 
pronatalist and patriarchal explanations of the "never-enough quality 
of conceptive technology". The overall tone of these arguments is 
well captured by St. Peter's statement that 
... we make a serious mistake if 'we assume feminism must 
oppose itself theoretically and absolutely to reproductive 
technologies ... the new radical feminist position that treats 
women as a unified category under threat from a total male 
technological-medical takeover, "forces a false unification of 
women's interests" and "comes perilously close to accusing 
women of false consciousness if they are not adamantly opposed 
to the nRT's [New Reproductive Technology]". (1989:367) 
The work noted above indicates that there is a growing divergence 
in the way feminists are approaching the 'politics of reproduction', 
Amongst the divergence, there is a common recognition though, that 
the issues being discussed are serious ones.2 Questions about the 
2 Strickler (1992) presents a concise discussion of the divergent interests of the 
medical fraternity, infertile consumers, and feminist critics, as related to the new 
reproductive technologies. She makes a good case that these groups have 
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status of parenting and the division of labour in that task, what 
medical practitioners, scientists and technicians should and should not 
do to assist people to conceive, where assistance ends and 
experimentation begins, whether there really is a need for expensive 
infertility treatment given current world population growth, whether 
medical technologies objectify womens and men's bodies, are all 
important issues. However tempting it is to make some direct 
comment on these issues, this option will be avoided. Instead, 
discussion will be focused on a very select area: amongst feminist 
approaches is a specific argument which suggests, putting it simply, 
that the language of reproduction is doctored to suit the interests of 
both, male medical practitioners, and, men in general. I think this 
argument is seriously flawed, and in the first part of this chapter a 
critique is offered of some important examples of feminist arguments 
about the language used in describing male (in)fertility or the male 
reproductive system. 
In the second part of this chapter, an ethnomethodological analysis 
of a piece of medical discourse is presented. This analysis is very 
different to the feminist analyses of the language of reproduction. 
This difference stems from the distinct aims of ethnomethodology and 
feminism, and I would emphasise here that the analysis is not 
presented to suggest that one aim is superior to the other. That said, 
in this case it will be argued that the general principles of an 
ethnomethodological approach to textual discourse have important 
implications for the feminist arguments about the doctored language 
different aims, which suggests, overall, that conflict over reproductive technology 
will not be easily resolved. 
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of reproduction. The supposed 'doctored' nature of medical discourse 
is now outlined in the fITst section of this chapter. 
3.2 The Doctored Language of Reproduction 
As indicated above, there is a considerable amount of feminist 
literature relevant to the topic of infertility. However, this literature is 
broad ranging, and there is actually very little which focuses 
specifically on the language used in describing male (in)fertility or the 
male reproductive system. Consequently, only three examples of 
feminist arguments about the language of reproduction will be 
discussed here. This is sufficient given that the aim is not to make a 
general critique of feminism, but to focus on specific arguments 
which relate to the topic of male infertility. 3 
Pfeffer's (1985) paper, "The hidden pathology of the male 
reproductive system", is, as far as I know, the most detailed feminist 
treatment of medical description of the male reproductive system. 
She begins her argument with difference, that is, women and men 
have different health experiences. Women visit doctors more 
frequently than men and this is especially so for conditions associated 
with reproduction. Pfeffer notes that 'biology' is a "well rehearsed" 
(30) explanation of this difference: the female reproductive system 
has more functions and is therefore more structurally vulnerable to 
problems than the male reproductive system, which operates with less 
3 Extensive quotes will be used in this section in order to give a good indication of 
the arguments being made. Undated references will refer to the respective work 
under discussion, and where quotations include emphasis this has been 
reproduced from the original, unless stated otherwise. 
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problems. In reaction to this view, many feminists have stressed that 
biology itself is a 'social construction': the "definition of women as 
biologically vulnerable and unhealthy is a social construction 
formulated in male telms, instrumental in the subordination of women 
by men" (31). Medicine has dermed nOlmal female bodily processes 
as pathological, that is, they have been "medicalised". In tandem with 
this process medicine has also trivialised or overlooked legitimate 
women's complaints associated with reproduction (eg. pre-menstrual 
tension). 
Pfeffer sides with the feminist view, but suggests that there is 
something of a quandary here: just what is, or is not, a legitimate 
female reproductive disorder? "What medicine describes as 
abnormal, feminists claim is 'normal', and vice versa" (31). Pfeffer 
argues that this contradiction arises because feminists have fought 
only half the battle: medicine is instrumental in the subordination of 
women by derming them as weak, -but feminists have neglected 
consideration of the way medicine also defines men as strong, hence 
contributing to their powerful position in society. On this basis, 
Pfeffer sets out to challenge the assumption that the male reproductive 
system is structurally efficient: 
I will argue that whilst medicine highlights the potential for 
reproductive disorders in women, it makes them invisible in 
men. As Ruth Hubbard suggests 'we need to construct a more 
inclusive and, in that sense, truer reality by pulling forth facts 
that have previously been ignored, while pushing back others 
which have received more notoriety than their substance merits' 
(Hubbard, 1981, p. 217) 
(31-32) 
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After this fonnulation of her research problem, Pfeffer indicates 
what data she will be dealing with: "I have drawn on medical sources 
and those of reproductive physiology which infonn much of medical 
knowledge" (32). To indicate that her approach to this data is 
theoretically infonned, she then makes positive reference to Dale 
Spender's argument in Man Made Language (1980) that language 
enhances the male image while diminishing the female image. Pfeffer 
effectively summarises her analysis by stating that "The language of 
reproductive medicine is no exception to this fmding" (32). 
The overall tenor of Pfeffer's argument, and her analytic method, 
can both be seen in the following quote from the early stages of her 
paper: 
There is a whole host of negative words in medicine to 
describe the female reproductive system. A women can suffer 
from irregular menstrual cycles caused by honnonal imbalances 
which can lead to hostile cervical mucus and irregular shedding 
of the lining of her uterus which may be structurally retroverted. 
If she does ovulate, she may fail to conceive because of blocked 
fallopian tubes. Or she may conceive an ectopic (wrongly 
placed) pregnancy. Then she faces the danger of spontaneous or 
even habitual miscarriage due perhaps to a blighted ovum or 
even an incompetent cervix. And once she has given birth, her 
uterus may suffer chronic subinvolution and subsequently 
prolapse. The picture created is of a precarious, inefficient 
system. 
For men, there are almost no negative tenns; testicles may be 
undescended and the prostrate may become inflamed or 
enlarged but the vocabulaIy which so negatively describes 
women is not available for men. (32-33) 
In short, there are faI' more negative tetms applied to the female 
reproductive system, than to the male system. Pfeffer follows this by 
arguing that discussion of the male reproductive system moves away 
from the organs themselves and focuses on the quality of semen. 
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Again, supposedly, we find the same gender bias operating: the health 
of the ovmn is rarely discussed except to impute blame, whereas only 
positive terms are used to discuss the quality of semen. Semen is 
classified by the motility and shape of sperm - in simple terms sperm 
can have nOlmal or abnolmal shape and motility. According to 
Pfeffer, the mode of classification is positively biased because "the 
measures of fertility are expressed in positive terms [ie. 60 % 
normally shaped, 60% motile] and not as 40 per cent misshapen or 40 
per cent immotile sperm" (33). 
Pfeffer's argument covers much more, but this is the central piece 
that deals with language and descriptions of male (in)fertility. 
Therefore, discussion can now move to consider Beagan's "Jargon, 
myth and fetishes: Language use and the new reproductive 
technologies" (1989), and Steinberg'S "The depersonalisation of 
women through the administration of 'in vitro' fertilisation" (1990). 
In a similar manner to Pfeffer, Beagan cites Spender's work as a 
justification for claiming that language constitutes a mechanism of 
power. She does note that the relationship between language and 
action is complex (too complex to be pursued within the limits of her 
analysis), nevertheless, she is confident that "to the extent that it 
illustrates or affects the "reality" of medical professionals, the 
language use examined here indicates a serious threat to women" (4). 
Beagan's analysis consists of an "infOlmal content analysis" (4) of 
articles on new reproductive technologies primarily from the journal 
Fertility and Sterility. Her basic argument is that the language used 
to describe reproductive technologies reflects the aims and interests of 
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a male dominated medical SCIence. This language supposedly 
accomplishes a variety of tasks including: limiting access to 
infonnation; selling the technologies to the public; justifying and 
facilitating experimentation on women's bodies; dehumanising 
women; and constituting women as reproductive raw materials (4). 
She claims that 
Some of these political/linguistic functions are clearly 
intentional; others are incidental to the usual processes of 
science. Regardless of intent, these linguistic devices can prove 
an extremely effective means of expressing or instilling values -
in this case, clearly misogynist values. (4) 
The majority of Beagan's paper then presents snippets of the language 
of the new reproductive technologies accompanied by a rendition of 
the function of this language. Included is a brief mention of the 
medical description of the male reproductive system, and it is 
remarkably like Pfeffer's argument: 
Spenn, unlike ovaries, ova, or uted, are given agency. SpelID 
swim, penetrate, fertilize. Spenn ~ay be categorized by their 
higher or lower "fertilization ability" (Tanphaitchitr, 1987). 
Ova, in contrast, are categOlized by their ability to be fertilized. 
... In men, infertility is treated with linguistic kid gloves, tenned 
"male-factor infertility," or "male-related infertility." In fact, 
when the infertility is "male-related, " women's passivity 
suddenly vanishes, and responsibility is shared equally. Thus, 
for example, Matson et aI., (1986) refer consistently to 
"oligospennic couples." (6) 
In sum, Beagan makes the traditional feminist argument that the new 
reproductive technologies are the result of a masculinist medical 
science and the language they use reflects this reality. It is only in the 
fmal paragraph that Beagan mentions the women undergoing 
treatment with new reproductive technologies. She notes that they are 
not passive recipients nor simple victims of male medical 
exploitation, neveltheless, they have difficulty in fmding their own 
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'voice'. She concludes by stating that a "Tmly accurate language to 
describe NRTs from the perspective of women is simply not available 
yet ... the development of language which can describe women's 
experiences of oppression has just begun" (7). 
Consistent with Beagan's concerns, Steinberg offers an analysis of 
the "depersonalisation" of women through reproductive technologies. 
Just as Pfeffer began by detailing gender differences in health 
experience and medical terminology, and Beagan noted the male 
dominance of medical science, Steinberg also begins with the premise 
of difference. But Steinberg'S view is more comprehensive, including 
four central premises (74-75): 
1. The tools and technologies of medical science are designed, 
developed, named and utilised by experts who are nearly 
always men. 
2. Medical scientific technologies are never value-free or neutral 
- they encode the consciousness of those who invent and use 
them. 
3. The medical scientific community is a "white, patriarchal 
(male dominated) and powerful community" which has been 
"remarkably free from accountability to anyone but 
themselves" (75). 
4. "Women are globally and differentially subordinated to men, 
male power and men in power" (75). 
On this basis Steinberg presents a lengthy discussion of the 
depersonalising effects of the new reproductive technologies. She 
argues that the telID 'infertility' establishes a pathological identity, 
orienting an individual's personhood around 'dysfunction' or 'disease', 
drawing people labelled 'infeltile' frrmly into the medical realm: 
It is a system or classification which rationalises, justifies and 
calls for medical intervention. The way in which 'childlessness' 
is seen as a physiological 'dysfunction' locates it frrmly (and 
only) within the domain of medical science. It posits not only 
the state of 'childlessness', but those individuals who are 
childless (defmed as 'infertile') as appropriately, even 
necessarily, medical territory. In so doing, the classification 
'infertility' sets up a categorical imperative for medical 
intervention. 'Infertility' is set up as a medical problem which, 
therefore, necessitates a medical 'solution'. (91) 
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In addition, the category 'infertility' is supposedly "covertly 
gendered' (91). That is, there is a bias underlying descriptions of 
infertility which situates responsibility for infeltility with women. 
Steinberg provides three factors to elaborate this claim, but it is only 
the third4 that is directly concerned with language. She argues that 
the way in which patients undergoing infertility investigations are 
termed 'infeltile couples' compounds the gender bias of the telID 
'infeltile'. Refening to couples may appear to avoid apportioning 
blame, but it does not in fact do so. Rather, it "subsumes and 
therefore trivialises women's unequal burden and risk in undergoing 
'infertility' investigations under a rhetoric of equivalence" (92). 
The other major argument about language that Steirlberg makes is 
little different from Beagan's argument. That is, the language of the 
new reproductive technologies removes agency from the women and 
places emphasis on the practitioners and the procedures they use, 
rather than on the women involved. In this process women's body 
parts are treated as disembodied fragments (85). However, Steinberg 
is more sophisticated than Beagan in her theorisation of the 
relationship between language and activities. The relationship is 
4 In the first, Steinberg utilises anecdotal evidence from a self-help guide for 
infertile couples, which supposedly indicates that doctors pay more attention to 
the sensibilities of infertile men than women. Secondly, she argues that the 
structure of infertility investigations also displays a gender bias: supposedly, the 
investigation of women is much more intrusive and intensive than the 
investigation of men. 
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supposedly a recursive one: the way the practice and language of the 
new reproductive technologies erase women reflects a prior 
understanding of women as depersonalised entities (ie. the male 
world view outlined in the four premises), but 
At the same time, 'IVF' treatment and language concretely 
(re )construct this depersonalisation of women. The way women 
are represented and, in tum, positioned and (re)constructed in 
the context of 'IVF' treatment reveals an entire conceptual 
framework implicitly concerned with the social meaning of 
women and the relationship of medical science to women, 
particularly to women's reproduction. This conceptual 
framework is not separate from the 'machinery' of 'IVF' but is 
implicitly encoded into its velY procedures and tools. (89, 
emphasis added) 
In other words, the language and practices of the reproductive 
technologies can be read for the patriarchal character of the society in 
which they occur. Their very possibility is a reflection of patriarchal 
society, and in tum they further the superordination of men and the 
subordination of women in patriarchal society. 
3.3 Critique 
In Pfeffer, Beagan and Steinberg'S analyses of the language of 
reproduction there is a common general argument and some shared 
specific points. The general argument is as follows: 
i) society displays gender inequality whereby men dominate 
women; 
ii) the institution of medicine is not neutral but shares the 
character of the society it operates within; 
iii) thus when medicine focuses on reproduction, both its activities 
and language are gender biased (for men, against women); 
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iv) this bias is possible because of i) and in tum contributes to the 
reproduction of gender inequality in society. 
With this general argument as a framework, five specific points are 
made. First, negative words are used in description and discussion of 
the female reproductive system, but, in contrast, the male 
reproductive system is treated with "linguistic kid gloves". Second, 
medical descriptions of male (in)fertility move quickly away from 
possible dysfunction to a focus on the quality of semen, which again 
is described positively. Third, in descriptions of the new reproductive 
technologies, the practitioners and procedures are given agency, while 
women disappear from view or are treated as mere body pruts. 
Fourth, the language of reproductive technologies produces 
pathological identities, also focused on women, which capture the 
infertile in a system of treatment glorified and euphemised to hide its 
real exploitative nature. Fifth, there is currently no language in which 
to authentically voice women's experience of the new reproductive 
technologies. 5 
In considering these arguments it should be stressed that the 
following critique is not concerned with the more general feminist 
proposition that modem societies display gross forms of gender 
inequality (for men, against women). There is no argument on this 
score. However, I do take issue with the specific points made in the 
feminist analysis of the language of reproduction, as the following 
critique details. 
5 For the sake of brevity, at times in the following discussion these five points will 
be referred to as 'point one', 'point two', 'point three', and so on. 
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In my view, point one is the product of very tendentious reasoning. 
Leaving aside for a moment the issue of what a "negative" word is, 
any quick scan through medical literature on infertility will tmn up 
"negative" words referring to the male reproductive system or its 
functioning. There are more than enough of these words to reject the 
claim that male (in)fertility is treated with "linguistic kid gloves". 
Using Pfeffer's italicising device one can concoct a convincing list of 
woes: men can suffer from weak or short-lived erections, retarded or 
retrograde ejaculation, or indeed, the absence of ejaculate. If there 
are no problems with erection or ejaculation, a man can display 
genital underdevelopment or soft and reduced testicles, and he may 
also suffer from endocrine and chromosal defects, or obstruction in 
the vas deferens or epididymis. If his sperm count does not reach the 
stipulated level he may be described as having severe oligospennia, 
and sperm itself may have various defects, abnormalities, 
immaturities, or aberrations.6 For a "negative" description of sperm 
one could not go far past this piece: 
The spermatozoa of many infe11ile patients often display 
sluggish, ineffective motility (asthenospermia) or total 
immotility; this could be the expression of either sperm agony or 
death (necrospennia), or of defects of the motor apparatus. 
(Zamboni, 1987: 726) 
I have resisted italicising the "negative" words here as given the 
previously established pattern the reader should know how to 
interpret this piece. With only this brief consideration, it seems fair 
to say that the "linguistic kid glove" argument is based on a very 
selective reading of medical discourse. 
6 These words were culled from Joel (1971), and Newton (1983) with a minimal 
amount of effort • there are many other "negative" words used to describe the 
male reproductive system. 
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But, looking again at the preceding quote, note how it refers to 
"infel1ile patients" and not infertile men. Could this not be evidence 
for the claim, made as pal1 of point four, that male infertility tends to 
be subsumed within terms like "infeltile couple", thus displaying a 
double bias against women? The title of the paper from which the 
quote is taken is "The ultrastructural pathology of the spennatozoon 
as a cause of infertility: The role of electron microscopy in the 
evaluation of semen quality". This could be used to further the 
argument, that is, the title avoids specific mention of male infertility, 
using instead the couple inclusive tenn "infertility", thereby 
concealing male infeltility behind the more general category. 
However, if we approach medical texts with a notion of readerly 
competence, there are strong grounds to doubt that concealment of 
any kind is occurring. Readers fmd the meaning of individual words 
not in the words themselves but in relations between words and their 
placement within a sentence, and in tum, sentences gain meaning in 
relation to prior sentences and prospective sentences. In the sentence 
quoted above the telm "infertile patient" is part of the larger phrase 
"The spelmatozoa of many infertile patients", thus suggesting that the 
topic is male infe11ility. The same applies to the paper's title: although 
the tenn "infertility" is used instead of specific reference to male 
infe11ility it is clear through reference to "spelmatozoon" and "semen" 
that the paper is concerned with an aspect of male infertility. 
Similarly, once we introduce a notion of readerly competence, 
Beagan's argument that the phrase "oligospermic couples" conceals 
male infertility looks somewhat silly. The paper where she fmds the 
term is in a journal of obstetrics and gynaecology, and we might 
expect that the readers of such a journal would know the meaning of 
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"oligospennic" and could ungloss the telID "oligospelIDic couples" as 
'couple infertility resulting from male factors, specifically a reduced 
spenn count'. Lay readers might also deduce from the "spelIDic" part 
of the phrase that it refers to male factor infeltility, or indeed, they 
might well consult a glossary of infertility tenns to find its meaning. 
Clearly, the point here is that the argument that the categories used to 
refer to infertility conceal male pathology and doubly emphasise 
female pathology, is a 'cultural dope' model of texts and audiences. It 
hm'dly needs to be said that such a model is no longer convincing (see 
McHoul, 1982). 
Now consider point two. That is, as Pfeffer argued, the mode of 
classifying semen is positively biased because "the measures of 
fertility m'e expressed in positive tenns and not as 40 per cent 
misshapen or 40 per cent immotile spelID" (33), But the problem here 
is that if medical practitioners measure the feltility of semen in tenns 
of percentage motile and percentage <nonnally shaped; and Pfeffer 
measures it in tenns of percentage immotile and percentage 
abnonnally shaped, how do we decide who is right? While I aIn wary 
of using a 'sledge hammer to crack a nut' it seems that Wittgenstein on 
language gaInes7 is most gelIDane here. For, the best way to approach 
this problem is actually to drop a notion of 'right' or 'wrong' 
measurement and focus on presuppositions. Negotiating an 
agreement on the measurement of semen is not possible because the 
truth of the matter cannot be gained from negotiation: the medical 
practitioners and Pfeffer are approaching the measurement of male 
fertility from different vantage points, different 'language gaInes' , 
7 The argument in this paragraph is based on a discussion of Wittgenstein by 
Button and Sharrock (1993). 
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When medical practitioners use the same measure within medical 
discourse "agreement resides in the consensus in their activities in a 
language game" (Button & ShalTock, 1993: 14), and if Pfeffer 
persisted in measuring fel1ility by percentage immotile and percentage 
abnormally shaped, then the medical practitioners would conclude the 
Pfeffer does not know how to participate in their language game - she 
had not learnt its basic principles. It is not that the form of medical 
description is necessarily cOlTect, but that it is what is intelligible, 
'naturally' sensible, within the language game of medicine. 
Currently, the basic principles of medical knowledge about male 
fertility are that sperm density, motility, and shape, are important in 
achieving fertilisation. Following from this, the investigation of male 
infertility takes the following logical form: fIrstly, assess the presence 
of sperm - if there is none, then this is a fITst categorical cut-off point 
where further investigations are pursued - then, secondly, evaluate the 
motility and shape of the sperm in relation to a conception of their 
'normal' state - if the sperm fail to reach the stipulated criteria then 
apply a second categorical cut-off point with further investigations. 
Now, Pfeffer can cel1ain1y take issue with the presuppositions of 
the language game of medicine, but this is not what she has done. 
Her argument is that the pathology of the male reproductive system is 
hidden. This is not an argument about presupposition, it is 
essentially a functionalist argument. Whether there is any mention of 
intention or not, she argues that one function of medical descriptions 
of reproductive systems is to hide the pathology of the male system 
and emphasise the pathology of the female system. Obviously, this 
suffers from the traditional problem of functionalist reasoning, in 
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short, tautology, but I do not want to go into the weaknesses of 
functionalist argument here (see Giddens, 1984 for a good 
discussion). The point is, that the fOlm of medical description of 
male fertility is part of a language game ~ that is where it receives its 
sense. Surely, the view that description of male (in)fertility bears the 
marks of patriarchal society, and functions to reproduce the 
inequalities of that society, seriously ignores the intial framework 
within which descriptions of ina Ie (in)fertility are situated. 
Moreover, it seems to me that the medical description of male 
fertility reflects a generic, as opposed to gender based, way of doing 
description. Quite simply, if in any practical activity, there is a 
concern for an end state and it is known (or presumed) that some 
entity will accomplish that end state, then the rule is to measure the 
presence rather than the absence of that entity. With male fertility, 
given that most males are fertile, and have rates of motility with 
sperm shape within the 'normal' range, it is good common sense to 
describe by presence - percentage motile, percentage nOlmally 
shaped. It is also possible that spelm may have a specific "normative 
identity" (Lynch, Livingston & Garfinkel, 1983: 224)) whereby 
description of it cannot escape commonsense knowledge of its 
'proper' function.8 In her pursuit of a feminist explanation of the 
description of male fertility, Pfeffer seems to have missed both this 
point, and the embeddedness of medical descriptions within a 
language game. 
8 This comment is made speculatively and will not be taken up in any more detail. 
See Lynch (1991) for a good discussion of the way 'measurement' can be treated 
as an ethnomethodological topic. Lynch includes a good discussion of Sacks' 
notion of "usualness measures" which is clearly relevant to my suggestion that 
sperm have a "normative identity" - in short, measurement is inescapably a social 
activity and cannot escape everyday knowledge of what is being described, and 
what would constitute a 'normal' description. 
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The neglect of local production 
In the remainder of this critique I would like to follow on from the 
above argument and focus on the way Pfeffer, Beagan, and 
Steinberg'S approach ignores a wide range of factors involved in the 
production and reception of textual descriptions of reproductive 
systems and technologies. To begin, it is useful to consider an 
adaptation of Dorothy Smith's (1974b) model of the production and 
reading of textual documents: 
"VVhat reproductive systems are" 
"VVhat reproductive teclmologies do" 
"'~ 
Account 
What reproductive systems are 
What reproductive teclmologies do 
I", Social organisation of 
~----------------~ I' production of account 
Readingthearing If:~---------........j Social organisation of 
reading of account 
Figure 3.1 The Production and Reading of Textual Documents 
(Accounts) 
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In Smith's original model the top two boxes were, respectively, "what 
actually happened" and, what actually happened (ie. no quotation 
marks). I have modified Smith's model by substituting "what 
reproductive systems are"l"what reproductive technologies do" and 
the same terms without quotation marks. 
In the feminist analyses the accounts focused on are those from the 
medical realm, and clearly, the main point of their analysis is that 
"what reproductive systems are"/"what reproductive technologies do" 
is mediated by the social organisation of production of account. This 
latter input is conceptualised in velY broad terms as the gendered 
nature of society, that is Steinberg'S four premises about patriarchal 
society, and Pfeffer and Beagan's reduced versions of the same, or, on 
a more specific but still very general level, it. is conceptualised as the 
masculinist medical system or the masculinist new reproductive 
technologies. 
With reference to figure 3.1, two points can be made very quickly. 
First, if language embodies or imposes a world view, as Pfeffer, 
Beagan and Steinberg argue, how have they managed to escape it? 
How has language which functions so repressively allowed them to 
see through its repressive machinely9. While they are certainly 
9 This 'exemptionalist' point of argument has probably been noted many times. 
Sharrock and Anderson (1981) provide a good rendition, which helped me realise 
its importance, and for a cogent critique of social constructionist approaches 
which bears on this issue, see Woolgar and Pawluch (1985). They question how 
sociologists can claim that other people's knowledge is socially constructed but 
avoid applying that finding to their own knowledge - they provide the apt term 
"ontological gerrymandering" for this process. More relevant to feminist discourse 
is an interesting paper by Mulkay (1991 (1989» which I read as a parody of 
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correct in maintaining that ideas (and medical descriptions) are 
historically contingent and hence 'socially consbucted', Pfeffer 
Beagan and Steinberg cannot get away from issues of reference: 
underlying their concern with biased description is a concern with 
'correct' descliption, But as Wittgenstein and many others have 
noted, there is no possibility of 'correct' description: language is not a 
nomenclature, there is no neub'al 'reality'-mapping-process available 
to us (see Sacks, 1963), The upshot of this is that some languages 
cannot be more authentic than others, and there is little sense in 
appealing to the private experiences of women (or men) undergoing 
treatment by the new reproductive technologies in order to pursue a 
notion of authenticity, Subjects who speak of medical experiences 
cannot utilise a private language, rather they must use publicly 
available ways of speaking (Silverman, 1987), Thus, we might 
wonder just what Beagan is calling for when she notes that a "Truly 
accrn'ate language to desclibe NRTs from the perspective of women is 
simply not available yet" (7), We might also wonder about Pfeffer's 
suppOltive quoting of Hubbard: "we need to consbuct a more 
inclusive and, in that sense, buer reality by pulling forth facts that 
have previously been ignored, while pushing back others" (quoted 
above), Just who will play the role of neutral arbiter to select which 
facts need to be pulled forth, and which need to be pushed back - quis 
custodiet ipsos custodes? 
Second, Pfeffer, Beagan and Steinberg totally neglect the bottom 
part of the model - the social organisation of the reading of account 
and the readinglhearing, To a large degree this is what enables them 
contemporary claims that the "Women's Movement alone offered the possibility of 
rebuilding social life on a new linguistic basis" (215), 
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to argue, from a few snippets of the language of reproduction, that the 
infertile are trapped in a system that pathologises their identity, that 
limits their access to infonnation, that justifies experimentation on 
their bodies, that hides male pathology and emphasises female 
pathology, and so on. To recall a quote from the introduction to this 
chapter, such a VIew comes close to accusing women of false 
conSCIousness if they are not opposed to the new reproductive 
technologies, but more than this it seems to doubt whether they have 
any consciousness at all! Just how does the label 'infertile' set up a 
"categorical imperative" (Steinberg) that draws one ilTevocably into 
the clutches of the "technodocs lt and their experimental medical 
technologies? Is the label actually used in infertility treatment and by 
whom? More specifically on male infertility, who is it that reads the 
medical textbooks that are supposedly hiding the pathology of the 
male reproductive system, and with what purpose do they read them? 
Language does nothing by itself, but this simple point seems to have 
eluded Pfeffer, Beagan and Steinberg who have gained more mileage 
from treating the readers and writers of medical texts as 'cultural 
dopes'. 
Despite the undoubted cogency of the claims about gender 
inequality in society, it is simply not sufficient to present some 
decontextualised fragments of language in the light of gender 
inequality and then claim that the function and meaning of such 
language is clear. In the absence of detailed knowledge of the whole 
range of activities represented in figure 3.1, the feminist accounts of 
the language of reproduction bear an unknown relationship to the 
activities that they depict. The language of reproduction, just like any 
language, is a "naturally organised ordinary activity" which cannot be 
98 
dissociated from local organisational practical purposes. As 
Garftnkel and ethnomethodologists have well established, the 
meaning of language is not derived from pre-established culture in a 
top-down manner, rather, meaning is established in a multitude of 
shared methods of reasoning which are pat1icularised to local 
circumstances (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990). In contrast, Pfeffer, 
Beagan and Steinberg posit a " "bucket" theory of context, in which 
the situation of action is treated as anterior to - as "enfolding" and 
determining - the action that takes place within it" (Goodwin & 
Heritage, 1990: 286). In their case the "situation of action" IS 
patriarchal society, or nested versions of it. 
This view has a strong bearing on the argument about "negative" 
description of the female reproductive system and "positive" 
description of the male system. The ethnomethodological view is that 
it is not for analysts to simply state what the meaning or function of 
language is. Rather, they should attempt to show how the pat1icipants 
to social action enact and display the meaning of their language, in 
the process of using it. It is faulty analytic practice to assert that a 
word or phrase is "negative" without considering the fullness of 
language-in-use. Consider the following extract of talk: 
A: Fuckyou 
B: Man, you haven't even kissed me yet. 
(Goffman, 1971: 216, quoted in Manning, 1989: 368) 
It would not be hat'd to argue that the term 'fuck you' has a "negative" 
meaning, and commonly so. But this extract shows that the possible 
"negative" meaning can be reframed by a recipient's rejoinder. How 
the telm should be categorised after B's reply would require some 
discussion, but it cel1ainly seems far from a simple "negative" tmm. 
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Exactly the same process can occur with what seem like 
unproblematically "positive" words, as the following example of an 
encounter between a black doctor (D) and a white policeman (P) 
shows: 
P: 'What's your name, boy?' 
D: 'Dr Poussaint. I'm a physician.' 
P: 'What's your frrst name, boy?' 
D: 'Alvin.' 
(Speier, 1973, quoted in Watson, 1984: 63) 
Here, the "positivity" of the words 'Dr' and 'physician' are rendered 
inoperative by the white policeman, who insists on treating the black 
doctor as a 'boy'. 1 0 
These examples should make clear how senous the feminist's 
omission of the social organisation of reading of account and 
readinglhearing is. Of course, the above examples are extracts of talk 
and not texts, but there is a developing body of work that provides 
good grounds for believing that similar.principles apply to language in 
texts (eg. Anderson, 1978; Anderson & Sharrock, 1979; Crook, 1989; 
McHoul, 1982; Morrison, 1981). Regardless of the problem of 
comparing talk and text it is still the case that texts are read by 
competent members thus making reading a social accomplishment. 
The upshot is that the meaning of words cannot be unproblematically 
fixed by analysts. 
10 Who uses a word is also important for its situated meaning. Watson (1983: 36) 
notes the following about "nigger": 
... if someone who is categorised as "(a) white" terms some other person as 
a "nigger," then that term may readily be seen as a "put-down." However, if 
the speaker is not white but is also categorized as a black person, and he 
calls some other black person a "nigger" then the term may not necessarily 
he a "put-down." In some local ghetto cultures in the USA, young male 
blacks may call each other "nigger" as an upranking rather than a 
downranking category label.. .. 
THF U;:;~I\RY 
aNIVERSITY D~: (:A"r'TERBURY 
CI-IRISTCHURCH, N.t,. 
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To hammer this point home, reconsider how Beagan makes the 
argmnent that women are depersonalised in the language of 
reproduction, while medical practitioners and their procedures are 
foregrounded. In considering medical journal accounts of the new 
reproductive technologies Beagan claims that 
Agency is attributed almost entirely to the (predominantly male) 
technodocs: they do the stimulating, the inducing, the feltilizing, 
the transplanting, and the delivering. Consider the attribution of 
agency in this atticle abstract: "After performing 56 nonsurgical 
uterine lavages in 42 fertile donor women, we transferred 17 
conceptuses and produced eight pregnancies. Four of the 
infertile recipients have now been delivered of healthy neonates" 
(Formigli et aI., 1987, my emphasis). In patriarchal accounts, 
body parts, women's stand-ins, passively receive the 
administrations of male doctor-scientists, the central actors in 
the script. (1989: 6) 
With a little help from the fatniliar italicising device, Beagan's 
suggestion that this abstract illustrates the dominance of "technodocs'" 
accomplishments seems feasible. 
However, even technodocs' accomplishments are not made solely in 
abstracts. From looking at the journal that this abstract crune from -
Fertility and Sterility - it was very apparent that Beagan's argmnent 
misrepresents the local production site within which this abstract is 
located. The paper the "abstract" swnmarises is part of the 
"Communications-in-brief" section of the journal, and as such an 
"abstract" is not included with the text. What Beagan calls an 
"abstract", actually comes from the contents page of the journal where 
all papers in the issue are summarised under their title. In the issue 
we are concerned with there are twenty eight papers listed and the 
"abstracts" generally take the fmID. of a one or two sentence statement 
of the issue exatnined and results. In this local context the abstract 
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that Beagan chooses is very atypical: it is the sole abstract that uses 
the pronoun "we". . The remainder all avoid the use of personal 
pronouns and utilise a style where X "is reviewed". Y "is supported", 
and Z "is evaluated". Here are two typical examples: 
The use of frozen semen in artificial insemination is strongly 
recommended over fresh semen. Its comparable fertilizing 
capacity and superiority in testing for AIDS is supported. 
The increment in serum progesterone after vaginal 
administration during the luteal phase was inversely related to 
duration of treatment. Possible mechanisms for this observation 
are discussed. (both from contents page, Fertility and 
Sterility; 1987; 47(1)) 
When reading twenty seven other "abstracts" like those above, it is 
not the italicised portions of Beagan's "abstract" that stand out, but the 
use of "we" .11 It is the "we" that is the pivot for the active form the 
abstract takes (eg. "performing", "transferred", "produced") and 
without it Beagan could not claim that the "male doctor-scientists" 
appear as "the central actors in the script". But as I mentioned above, 
this is a very atypical "abstract"; it would have been far more 
consistent for Beagan to have argued that medical discourse avoids 
pronouns because this furthers the "technodocs'" ability to conceal 
their involvement in their suspect medical practices. 
The latter tack is actually the dominant tenor of Pfeffer, Beagan, 
and Steinberg'S arguments. Either way, the point being emphasised 
here is that it is dangerous to neglect the local practical purposes 
11 When browsing through other contents pages of Fertility and Sterility an 
abstract that began "A young woman with a small prolactinoma ... " (1992; 58(2» 
stood out in a similar way to Beagan's abstract. In this case the paper is based on 
a single case study and amidst the large sample, third person style of other 
papers, the reference to "A young woman" marked it for notice. 
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involved in the production and reading of texts. Abstracts, for 
example, are velY specialised pieces of writing, therefore, any 
consideration of pronouns or other discursive characteristics used in 
abstracts surely must take into account how the discourse 
accomplishes 'abstracting'. Equally, the feminist approach forgets that 
medical jOUlnals are designed for a specialist audience, and together, 
audience and jOUlnal discourse represent an existential world 
undergirded by background knowledge. Gynaecologists, 
obstetricians, scientists, nurses, and so on, who read jOUlnals like 
Fertility and Sterility are perfectly aware that women give birth, that 
it takes effort, that it is painful, and so on. It can also be suggested 
that such people read descriptions of body pat1s as 'doing specialised 
description' and not as 'doing depersonalisation'. No doubt when they 
move from reading texts to examining patients they are quite aware 
that they have a whole person in front of them. There is no need to 
pursue this further, it can merely be noted that there is a good amount 
of literature which suggests that despite medical discoUl'se being 
technical and specialised, its use within interaction is subject to the 
contingencies of mundane reasoning and social-organisational 
procedUl'es (eg. see Cicourel, 1986, 1987; Garfmkel, 1967a; Raffel, 
1979; West, 1984). 
In sum, I believe that the argument that the language of 
reproduction is doctored to further the subordination of women and 
the superordination of men is seriously flawed. The language of 
reproduction is doctored, but not in the sense of being an ideological 
tool. It is doctored in the sense that it is produced by and for doctors 
and it assumes and enacts the background knowledge of this 
existential world. 
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If ideology is to be found here, it seems to be more located in 
Pfeffer, Beagan and Steinberg's theorising rather than medical 
discourse. Modifying Smith (1974a), their theorising is ideological 
because it takes the following path: 
L Take some texts on a common theme. 
2. Detach pieces from the texts, do not indicate how the pieces 
were chosen, treat them as data. 
3. Manipulate the data to show an order among them. 
4. The original texts are now changed into the sociologist's 
structural forces. The text's practical work and site of 
production is now turned into a reflection of structural forces 
beyond it, that is, the structural forces are presented as causing 
the text. 
To put it simply, Pfeffer, Beagan and Steinberg have taken medical 
discourse and found what they wanted in them, rather than treating 
them as one aspect in a multiple accomplishment of readers, writers 
and organisational frameworks within existential worlds. 
Finally, it is worth noting that amidst all the complaints about the 
language of reproduction, Pfeffer, Beagan and Steinberg have 
neglected to suggest an alternative lexicon for the description of 
reproductive systems. Just what words do they propose to use to 
replace the supposedly doctored language of reproduction? Perhaps 
the trouble here is that we are back to the search for an authentic 
language, and given that such a language will never be found, any 
existing language-in-use can be found wanting, that is, displaying the 
marks and purpose of "patriarchal society". 
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3.4 Analysis: Editorialising on a doctor's issue 
The second part of this chapter is devoted to an empirical analysis 
of an editorial from a medical journal. The form of analysis is very 
different to that of Pfeffer, Beagan, and Steinberg. While the extent 
of this difference almost means the analysis is unrelated to the fITst 
part of this chapter, the difference is also the reason why the analysis 
is included here. This will become clearer below, but for now it can 
be noted that a principle function of the analysis is to show that along 
with the critique there is a "reasoned alternative" (see Silverman, 
1989, rule 1). Firstly, some details will be provided of how the 
editorial was chosen as data, along with a brief background of the 
journal in which it appears. Mter displaying the full editorial the 
analysis focuses on the issue of how the text accomplishes the activity 
of editorialising. A summary of -the chapter and an overall 
implication will be made in the concluding discussion. 
Choosing the text to be analysed. 
It is important to provide some details of how I chose this 
particular text as it saves me from my reproducing a fault I noted 
above, that is, no details are given about how or why data extracts are 
chosen. Initially, in working up this chapter, I was aiming to find 
some medical texts that 'disproved' at least Pfeffer's thesis about the 
lack of negative words used to describe the male reproductive system. 
An early idea about where to start was provided by a radio report 
about a medical researcher who had just published a paper in the 
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British Medical Journal providing evidence for a worldwide 
decrease in the quality of semen (Carlsen, Giwercman, Keiding & 
Skakkebaek, 1992). AImed with this possibility and a few others I set 
out to the medical libnuy at the Christchurch School of Medicine. I 
located the article on semen quality, and a few others, and began 
considering their usefulness for the task of 'disproving' Pfeffer's 
thesis. 
In the midst of this process I did some browsing through general 
pathology texts and medical journals. Going through some current 
issues I picked up the latest issue of Human Reproduction, a 
relatively new journal that I was not familiar with. Flicking through 
the journal I had an 'aha' experience upon sighting an editorial with 
the title "The fraud conviction of Cecil B. Jacobson". I was 
previously acquainted with the events to which the editorial referred 
(from newspapers and television news), and a quick glance at it 
revealed that it was an interesting text; Cutting a long stOlY shOtt, I 
photocopied the editorial and kept it 'on file' as the fITst patt of this 
chapter took shape. Subsequently, I developed an analysis of it, but in 
the process all thought of it being a direct rebuttal of the feminist 
arguments disappeared, and it became a stand-alone 
ethnomethodological analysis. 
Briefly, before considering the editorial there are three background 
details worth noting. 
1. The Journal. Human Reproduction was fIrst published in 1986 
and is published monthly for the European Society of Human 
Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE). This organisation was 
founded in 1985 as a scholarly forum for European scientists and 
106 
medical practitioners working in the field of human reproduction and 
relevant animal studies. The journal's scope, as outlined in its 
instructions to authors, includes: "fertilization; early embryology, 
implantation; pregnancy (to the end of first trimester)". Thus, readers 
of the journal are likely to include: gynaecologists, general 
practitioners, lU'ologists, andrologists, medical and laboratOlY 
assistants, nurses, endocrinologists, embryologists, comparative 
physiologists and research scientists. 
2. The slot in the journal. The editorial occupies the first 
substantive section of the journal - a section given over to "news and 
views". This section more commonly presents an "Opinion", 
although occasionally neither an opinion or editorial are presented. 
Opinions are usually longer than editorials, and can involve 
substantial presentation of research fmdings. hi contrast Editorials do 
not present empirical research but reserve themselves for short 
comment on relevant issues. 
3. Editors. Editorial writers come fl'Om four groups: the principal 
editor (Prof. R.G. Edwards); associate editors; international editors; 
and invited editors. hi our case the editorial is written by the principal 
editor along with an invited editor - Pl'Of. D.J. Sharpe. In the twenty 
issues that I looked at, this was the only time that the principal editor 
had written an editorial. This point is mentionable because of the 
status of the editor: Pl'Ofessor R. G Edwards was a main force in the 
establishment of ESHRE (Burfoot, 1990), but further, he is the 
scientific pioneer of in vitro fertilisation. He is undoubtedly an 
internationally recognised research scientist in the field of human 
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reproduction, and it would not be an overstatement to say that he is 
the most well known scientist in the field of in vitro feItilisation. 12 
With these background details the following points can be made. 
First, the editorial is unavoidably an event in the operations of an 
organisation. The journal is published for ESHRE (this is stated on 
the cover) and the principal editor was instrumental in the foundation 
of this organisation. Hence, it is manifest that the editorial is 
concerned to speak with ESHRE's practical purposes in mind. 
Second, while there is no doubt that the text itself provides 
biographical details of the authors of the editorial, I think in this case 
background knowledge of Professor R. G. Edwards is brought into 
action to establish "Author Authority" (Anderson, 1978). That is, the 
usual reader of the journal will know something of Edwards and his 
status and this will form pm of the background knowledge used in 
reading the editoriaL Thirdly, we might take from the historical 
course of the joumal's issues that "Opinions " are more common that 
"Editorials" and ceItainly that editorials by the principal editor are 
uncommon. This leads to the reasonable suggestion that the editorial 
has a formal-historical noticeability irrespective of its content. 
The Text 
The full text is photocopied (slightly reduced) with line numbers 
added on the next two pages. 
12 Edwards retired from his Professorship in 1991 and the January issue of 
Human Reproduction that year carries a preface, including photograph, 
curriculum vitae and two personal appreciations, to mark his retirement. One of 
the personal appreciations is titled, "In the beginning there was Bob" (p. 5) and 
'catchiness' aside, this indicates the esteem in which he is held. Also see Burfoot 
(1990) for a citation analYSis of the published work of Edwards, which amongst 
other things testifies to his importance in the field. 
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DITORIAL 
The fraud conviction of Cecil B.Jacobson 
1 The trial of a legal case of concern to everyone practising assisted 
2 human reproduction has recently concluded in the USA. On 
3 March 4. 1992 a federal court jury in Alexandria. Virginia, found 
4 Cecil B.Jacobson. MD, guilty on 46 counts of fraud and six 
5 counts of perjury. He was alleged to have told perhaps 20 women 
6 patients that they were pregnant, based on levels of HCG in 
7 plasma which could have arisen from an injection, and to have 
a used his own semen for donor insemination in perhaps 75 women 
" while telling them he used semen from anonymous donors. On 
10 May 8, he was sentenced to 5 years in prison without parole, 
11 after his routine motion for a new trial on fraud counts was denied 
12 on April 3. He was fined $116 000 in addition, and the judge 
l3 commented how he 'had not seen a case where there had been 
1.4 this degree of emotional anguish and psychological trauma'. His 
15 appeal is pending. 
16 Conducting the case' in a federal court for fraud was a matter 
17 of first impression. In the United States, state courts usually 
16 handle criminal fraud cases under state law, and state agencies 
19 handle abuses of medical licences. As for civil actions for 
20 damages, Dr Jacobson's medical malpractice insurance company 
2l had already paid former patients sums of money to settle 
22 their claims. and it is no crime, state or federal, to be sued for 
23 medical malpractice. 
24 In the early 1970s Jacobson built a worldwide reputation as 
25 an innovator in human infertility. His work was not done in a 
26 hospital setting, so institutional oversight was absent. Witnesses 
27 testified how he told a patient that she had miscarried without 
2a expelling tissue and had accompanied his explanation of 
29 'resorption' with instructions not to have a dilatation and curettage 
30 nor to consult another physician. Jacobson's public troubles began 
3l in January 1988 with broadcasts by a Washington DC invest-
32 igative reporter, Lea Thompson. Her television series was based 
33 upon patients' accounts of Dr Jacobson's HCG treatment, 
34 pregnancy, miscarriage and resorption, followed by specialists' 
35 contradictions. A local gynaecologist filed a complaint with the 
36 Virginia State Board of Medicine in November 1987, having 
37 examined two women the same day and finding neither pregnant 
38 after Dr Jacobson had told them that they were pregnant. In early 
39 1989, the Board assessed a $7000 fine after he promised to cease 
40 practice for 5 years. After refunding $250 000 to - 100 patients, 
41 Dr Jacobson closed the clinic in Virginia and moved to Utah, 
42 where he conducted privately funded genetics research. 
43 The local United States Attorney initiated federal prosecution 
44 of Dr Jacobson in 1989, No federal statute makes a crime of 
45 impregnating a patient with the doctor's spermatozoa and without 
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4" the patient's consent, nor is it a federal crime to tell a patient 
47 that she is pregnant when she is not. However, if Dr Jacobson 
48 obtained money from patients by lying about whether women 
49 patients were, or had been pregnant, or that semen used for 
50 artificial insemination came from anonymous donors. the lies 
51 could be charged as fraud under federal statutes. The prosecutor 
52 accumulated evidence to support federal fraud theories from 
53 1989. Two years later a federal grand jury approved an 86-page 
54 indictment of Dr Jacobson for federal crimes of 'wire fraud' in 
55 using the telephone to make medical appointments and discuss 
56 treatment, 'mail fraud' in obtaining supplies and sending bills, 
57 'travel fraud' because patients crossed state lines to reach the 
58 clinic in Virginia, and perjury in 1988, testimony given under 
59 oath before the Federal Trade Commission in an action relating 
60 to hormone injection treatments. 
61 At the trial in February 1992, the prosecution presented 11 
62 parents as witnesses. Some former patients testified in disguise 
63 and under false names to protect 15 children proven by DNA 
64 tests to have been fathered by Dr Jacobson, whose resemblance 
65 to the children was noted by the witnesses. Employees testified 
"6 that no anonymous sperm donors ever came to the clinic, though 
67 patients stated that the donors were supposed to be medical 
6a students or other men who bore a resemblance to the parents. 
69 Expert witnesses gave evidence for both sides. Dr Jacobson 
70 testified at length about using HCG in exploring his theories of 
71 pregnancy. He admitted making mistakes in interpreting 
72 sonograms, but denied lying to patients in order to receive money. 
73 He was found gUilty on all counts by the jury of eight women 
74 and four men. 
75 Motive and motivation kept appearing in the case. Some of 
76 Dr Jacobson's patients were angry at the govemment's motivation 
77 in bringing the criminal prosecution. which intruded into their 
78 privacy, Why did a distinguished medical researcher, married 
79 for 30 year. to a loyal wife, a religious ntan with seven children 
ao in the family, expose himself to loss of licence to 
81 practise medicine, and conviction of crime? The jury foreman 
a2 believed motive was not part of the jury's analysis; he thought 
a3 that Dr Jacobson's fees were low, and ego was his principal 
84 motivation. An ex-patient thought Jacobson's motivation had been 
85 scientific discovery, and resented having been used as a 
86 guinea-pig. 
a7 Under the judge's instructions, the jury could have concluded 
aa that Dr Jacobson's conduct constituted criminal fraud. even if 
89 he was motivated by ego or scientific exploration. Alternatively, 
90 concluding that Dr Jacobson's other motives displaced the intent 
91 to defraud, the jury could have found him not guilty. and that 
92 would have been the end of the case. The verdict was guilty. 
93 The principal ground for appeal is expected to be that the evidence 
94 was insufficient to show fraudulent intent beyond reasonable 
95 doubt. 
96 Could similar events happen in clinics elsewhere? It is easy 
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97 to assume they could not, but detailed inspection and verification 
98 of records is perhaps the only safeguard. Pressures on doctors 
99 to obtain good success rates in assisted reproduction are 
100 sometimes enormous, indeed, the fate of a clinic can depend on 
101 them. This is not a healthy situation. Clinics and practitioners 
102 are licensed under parliamentary legislation in several countries 
103 and it is to be hoped that this practice spreads wider, With or 
],04 without legislation, however, standards must be established 
105 nationally-even internationally-and strong steps taken to ensure 
106 that the practice of assisted human reproduction is conducted 
107 properly. 
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Accomplishing the Editorial 
Whatever else we might see in this text, it is directly observable as 
an editorial. The position, boldness and size of the caption indicate 
this in no uncertain tenns. Therefore, my principle aim will be to 
analyse how the text accomplishes the work of editorialising, and this 
will be undertaken by studying the fonnal features of the text. 
Anderson (1978) has argued that texts display three fonnal features 
- sequencing, categorisation, and recipient design - which all point to 
reading as a "social activity constrained by expectations and 
concessions" (134). Moreover, these three fonnal features are 
... not optional, but necessary aspects of natural language 
descriptions. In the very general sense that actors must have 
names, reports must start and end and readers know what is 
expected of them, these features are ubiquitous. (Anderson, 
1978: 134, original emphasis) 
Thus, reading the text as an editorial is a social activity based upon 
the orderly and sequential nature of its discursive contents. 
The initial ordering device of the text is the caption EDITORIAL. 
Familiarity with editorials would infonn anyone that the text as an 
editorial will probably do two main things. For one, it should 
establish a "mentionable" (Schegloff & Sacks, 1974) to go to work 
on, that is, a topical issue to pass comment on. But secondly, 
editorials do not merely describe mentionables - they make something 
of them. Warning, moralismg, worrying, exalting, contemplating, 
collaborating, taking heed, and so on, are all possible ways to do this. 
While not downplaying this variety, I will use the shorthand tenn 
'moral' to describe the cultural object editorials produced with 
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mentionables. This is used in the sense of the saying 'what's the moral 
of the story?', and it seems clear that a major task accomplished in 
editorials is making a transition from mentionable to moral. Further, 
a moral should apply to some group, it should be particularly relevant 
to some sort of people, or peoples' activity, and therefore if the 
editorial is to be recognisable as such it should also accomplish the 
identification of a target population. Part of the second task an 
editorial accomplishes then, is not only to construct a moral but to 
make clear its applicability. 
The accomplishment of these tasks begins very early in the text. As 
noted, the caption EDITORIAL could be seen as an instruction to the 
reader to look for a moral in the text. Then the title "The fraud 
conviction of Cecil B. Jacobson" immediately provides the particular 
mentionable to be worked on in transition to the moral. Interestingly, 
the very next thing that is established is the target population -
"evelyone practising assisted~ human reproduction" (11 .. 1-2). Thus, 
the structure up to sentence one is: caption (providing an overall 
instruction to read for editorialising work), followed by title 
(providing flIst encounter with mentionable), followed by explication 
of target population. I would suggest that this initial structure is very 
important in setting up a successful transition from mentionable to 
moral. Detailing the target population before the moral13 is one way 
of indicating that a moral is coming, hence, the details of the 
13 There is an obvious parallel here to story prefaces. As noted in chapter two, a 
story preface functions to let the recipient know that an extended turn at talk is 
coming and to get that turn on its way. In a similar manner, by giving the target 
population first, the editorial efficiently keeps the reader on track to the moral 
which is yet to come. There are undoubtedly similar examples in other discursive 
realms. For example, newspaper advertisements of the form, 
'Single, healthy, aged from 18 to 25, and qualified to enter university? Yes. 
Have you considered a career in the airforce' 
seem to work with the same device. 
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mentionable that will be provided are framed within a concern for the 
forthcoming moral. Detailed explication of Jacobson's fraud 
conviction is never understood as a simple description of legal 
proceedings against a doctor, but is available for the making of a 
moral. 
Paragraph one follows from the title by presenting details of the 
activities that Jacobson was alleged to have committed, and again it 
contributes to the accomplishment of the transition from mentionable 
to moral. In effect, the paragraph presents a concise summmy of the 
mentionable, but the text does not then proceed from this summmy 
straight to the moral. It seems that in the velY fact of having 
presented a summmy and various details, it sets up the relevance of 
further comment and unpackaging. This is made clear if we 
summarise the actors and concomitant activities that are presented in 
paragraph one, as in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 
Actors and Their Activities as Presented 
in the First Paragraph of the Editorial 
Actors 
evelyone practising 
assisted human 
reproduction 
federal court jury 
Cecil B. Jacobson, MD 
anonymous donors 
judge 
women patients 
Activities 
concern about the case 
deliver guilty verdict 
told women they were 
pregnant, used his own 
semen for DI, moves for a 
new trial, appeals the case 
(no explicit activities) 
sentencing, fining, 
commenting 
suffer emotional anguish 
and psychological trauma 
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Thus, the summary gives the reader the framework of a particular 
type of story which we 'naturally' want to hear more of - a court case 
involving criminal, victim, and motive. 
The paragraph is obviously densely populated with people and their 
activities appropriate to such a story. This in itself does not guarantee 
the need for further comment, or lend itself to establishing a moral. 
However, I think the paragraph does accomplish this and we can 
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cel1ainly identify one important sentence involved in this work. This 
is the sentence which presents the reported speech: "the judge 
commented how he 'had not seen a case where there had been this 
degree of emotional anguish and psychological trauma' " (11. 12-14). 
Note how the sentence builds up the expectation of a fOl1hcoming 
moral, but further, it tells us something about the sort of moral we are 
looking for. My feeling is that it says, 'this is a big case, look for a 
big moral'. This is reinforced by the previous presentation of the 
information that the target audience is everyone practising assisted 
human reproduction, not, for example, everyone practising donor 
insemination, or, people practising assisted human reproduction in the 
United States. 
Further, the statement is accredited to someone with believable 
authority to make such statements - the judge. The quoting of the 
judge's statement also does some important naturalised 
recategorisation work. When we read the statement we do not 
understand from it that it is Jacobson who suffers the anguish and 
trauma, nor the lawyers, nor the jury, nor the court stenographer. We 
know, precisely, that it is the women patients who were told they 
were pregnant, and who were inseminated with Jacobson's semen, 
that suffered the anguish and trauma. Hence, they have moved from 
being "women patients" to victims. The cOll'elate of this 
recategorisation is that the reader is encouraged to read on looking for 
more details of the story. It is a stOlY with a compelling readability in 
our culture -the nalTative of criminal and motives, victims, and the 
pursuit of justice within the courts. 
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The next five paragraphs elaborate upon the points presented in the 
first summary paragraph. Respectively, they are concelned with: legal 
particulars; Jacobson and a brief histOlY of how his crime was 
discovered; the legal specifics of the charges; who testified at the 
trial; motive; motive and the verdict. All this constitutes a large 
amount of specific detail on the mentionable, and given that the stOlY 
can be situated within a common narrative framework it is 'natural' 
that these details be provided.14 But, a possible problem with the 
provision of so much detail is that the moral is lost to sight. However, 
I would assert that the reader does not get lost along the way and 
forget that he or she is reading with a mind to the forthcoming moral. 
We are not surprised when the moral does appear in the fmal 
paragrap~ and it does not seem out of place with all that has gone 
before. The transition is successfully accomplished. Just how 
successful the editorial is in solving the transition problem can be 
seen if we count the number of lines devoted to the mentionable - 84 
(11. 2-86) - and compare it to the text devoted to the moral and target 
population - 23 (11. 1-2, 87-107). That is, the text devotes nearly 
eighty per cent of its space to the mentionable, and yet the moral is 
clearly drawn in the remaining space and the link between the two 
parts does not seem strained or tenuous. 
A velY efficient device for accomplishing this continuity occurs at 
the beginning of the moral paragraph, and I will discuss this shortly, 
but before this there are various keys within paragraphs two to seven 
that ready us for the transition from mentionable to moral. The first 
two sentences of paragraph three (11. 24-26) seem particularly 
14 Also, given that Human Reproduction is published primarily for a European 
audience, there is some need of details of the American court system. It could be 
inferred that this is related to the enlistment of a law professor as co-author. 
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important. The first tells us that "In the early 1970s Jacobson built a 
worldwide reputation as an innovator in human infertility". Prior to 
this we have encountered our protagonist as Cecil B. Jacobson, Cecil 
B. Jacobson MD, he, his, and Dr Jacobson. Up to this point then, we 
have minimal infOlmation on Jacobson himself, and therefore it seems 
relevant to ask why this information is presented in paragraph three 
and not earlier.15 
I believe the reason for the late presentation of this information lies 
in the tacit guidance work the text contains. The reader is being 
encouraged to read for a moral which has to do with the 
organisational nature of medical activities, and not to read for an 
editorial on medical practitioners themselves. Hence we read twenty 
three lines with minimal information on the mentionable's protagonist, 
and then we are presented with the considerable knowledge that he 
was an "innovator in human infertility". We know from this that we 
are not dealing with a medical conman; but crucially, this infOlmation 
is immediately juxtaposed in the next sentence with the fmther details 
that "His work was not done in a hospital setting, so institutional 
oversight was absent" (11. 25-26). These sentences are an unusual 
pairing: when I read a fITst statement that someone is an innovator or 
a leading researcher in some field, I then expect to read details of just 
what they did and just how it constituted innovative or leading 
research. Instead, the next sentence moves from Jacobson's qualities 
as a researcher to the organisational nature of his research activities. 
The notable term "institutional oversight was absent" seems to 
retrospectively alter the sense of "innovator" given in the fITst 
15 For example, the editorial could have started 'Cecil B. Jacobson, a recognised 
innovator in the field of human infertility research, was recently convicted' and so 
on. 
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sentence. It overshadows the infonnation that Jacobson is an 
innovator in human infertility research, and seems to focus the reader 
towards a moral on medical institutions and accountability, rather 
than on Jacobson himself, or the common pressures that doctors face. 
The opening sentence of each paragraph in the mentionable section 
further reinforces this focusing work. The pattern is to focus on the 
legal proceedings as a whole rather than the individual actors within. 
This is done in a very orderly manner, as the beginning of each 
paragraph opening sentence shows: 
"The trial of a case ... " (1. 1) 
"Conducting the case ... " (1. 16) 
"The local United States Attorney ... " (1. 43) 
"At the tt-ial .,." (1. 61) 
"Motive and motivation kept appearing in the case," (1.75) 
"Under the judge's instructions, the jmy ... " (1, 87) 
The only exception to the pattern of focusing on the trial in the 
paragraph opening sentence is paragraph three. As I noted above, this 
does begin with Jacobson but then rett'ospectively focuses on 
institutional accountability. So, in addition to the initial ordering 
function of the caption and title, the text displays mini sequential 
ordering devices throughout. Paragraph openers could be seen as a 
nested instruction within the overall instruction provided by the 
caption and title, that is, they provide indications of how the contents 
of individual paragraphs should be read: 'keep looking for details of 
the "case" or "trial" or the "judge's instructions"', Collectively, this is 
an effective device for solving the transition problem, which is 
specifically concerned with moving from an individual doctor's crime 
to a moral about institutional accountability. 
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The only other place where the text opens up on Jacobson himself 
is on the issue of motive. It is worth considering how the text deals 
with this potential problem before we fmally consider the transition to 
the moral paragraph. I say it is a potential problem because some 
discussion of motive appears to be 'naturally' required in any stOlY 
with the narrative contents of criminal, victim, and court proceedings. 
It could also be reasonably suggested that the nature of the 'crime' 
seems to add to the natural quest for motive: the question of why 
Jacobson substituted his spelID for that of anonymous donors is an 
interesting one. Overall, readers could quite naturally be looking for 
some discussion of motive, and it does come, in orderly fashion after 
the details of the criminal, victims and court proceedings, in 
paragraphs six and seven. My impressionistic feeling is that these 
paragraphs are clucial to the successful accomplishment of the 
editorial, not so much for what they contain but for how they avoid 
being drawn into an extended discussion of motive in its own right. 
Motive is dispensed with quickly, essentially by following the 
pattern of focusing on the legal proceedings rather than the individual 
actors. Paragraph six opens with the statement, "Motive and 
motivation kept appearing in the case" (1. 75). Thus, although the 
opener signals to the reader that we are fmally to be offered some 
discussion of motive, we are also given a framework for the 
discussion - it kept appearing in the case. Consistent with this, 
paragraphs six and seven restrict themselves to details from within the 
case. We are presented with summaries of motive-talk from: "some 
of Dr Jacobson's patients" (11.75-76); "The jmy foreman" (1. 81); and 
"An ex patient" (1. 84). In a very neat manner the text avoids 
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presenting evaluations of the 'truth' of the various motive attributions, 
instead they are presented for their belongingness to the case - they 
are what happened in the case. This seems to be a crucial point in the 
editorial: to have changed footing and entered into an authorial 
discussion of motive would have been an extended matter, and surely 
one which given current dominant understandings of motive would 
have involved a heavy emphasis on individual psychology. There is a 
trace of this in the paragraph: Jacobson is described as a 
"distinguished medical researcher, married for 30 years to a loyal 
wife, a religious man with seven children in the family" (11. 78-80), 
but any further consideration of how his character traits might be 
related to motive is quickly suspended and the text immediately 
returns to what happened in the case. Thus, the potential problem of 
motive is dispensed with, and the editorial keeps on track to the moral 
and its emphasis on organisational accountability. 
An economical transition to the moral is made via the very effective 
device of beginning the fmal paragraph with a question: "Could 
similar events happen in clinics elsewhere?" (1. 96). The term 
"similar events" takes the whole prior explication of the mentionable 
and treats it as a signifier - we do fmd after all that we were not 
interested in the events themselves, but in their function of pointing to 
the possibility of "similar events" occurring. And the phrase "clinics 
elsewhere" does not pose a question like 'clinics just where?', for we 
know from the fust sentence that the target population is "evetyone 
practising assisted human reproduction", hence, "clinics elsewhere" 
refers very efficiently to 'clinics evetywhere'. So, in one short move 
this sentence takes the reader from the previous details of the 
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mentionable to a conceln for the upcoming moral, and in the process 
reinvokes the target population. 
In telms of form, the opening sentence of the fmal paragraph is a 
question - one of only two that the text uses. Of course, as a question 
the sentence relevances the production of an answer. However, as 
this is written discourse there is no possibility of a direct interactive 
answer coIning from the reader, so the question seems akin to a 
"formulation", that is, a point in discourse where what is reflected 
upon is the discourse itself - what the question is doing is "saying-in-
so-many-words-what-we-are-doing" (GarfInkel & Sacks, 1970: 351). 
Although it is not quite a formulation - 'we are now going to make the 
moral' - it does very effectively signal that the moral is about to be 
made. 
Further, as a question it very effectively draws the target 
population, or any reader for that matter, into the making of the 
moral. Note that while the question has obviously been posed by the 
editors, there is no break from the "transcendental narrator" style 
(Morrison, 1981), that is, the answer is not 'We do not think so' - no 
pronoun is introduced. The ftrst part of the answer - "It is easy to 
assume they could not" (11. 96-97) - keeps the answer at a general 
level and incorporates the target population in the work of assuming. 
It is not the editors that are seen to assume, but "everyone practising 
assisted reproduction", or even 'Anyperson reading the editorial' that 
assumes. This collaborative assutning work means that it is an easy 
matter to make the moral and proceed to a closing. 
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Indeed, the closing is done most economically in eleven lines. 
Within these eleven lines there is another 'It' statement - "it is to be 
hoped that this practice spreads wider" (1. 103) - that again draws the 
reader into the making of the moral. This accomplishment of 
collaboration seems crucial to the overall success of the text as an 
editorial. Editorials face a problem of limited textual space, and 
additionally may face problems of warrant: given that in the above 
editorial a general point is being made from one specific case, there is 
the issue of the validity of such generalisation. Hence, it is important 
to get the reader collaborating in the making of the moral. 
That the editorial succeeds in this task is indicated by the fact that 
while it calls for accountability to ensure that assisted human 
reproduction is "conducted properly", no discussion at all is offered 
as to what proper conduct might consist of, nor to who will "establish 
the standards". But of course, it does not need to: the editorial in its 
wholeness provides tacit knowledge of just what such proper conduct 
is, and at the very least we know that it is not the type of conduct that 
Cecil B. Jacobson indulged in. In a logical sense the editorial is 
relatively vague, but the point is it is not read in a logical detached 
manner. By successfully utilising various taken-for-granted orderly 
properties, the editorial very clearly describes a mentionable and 
makes a moral which 'Anyone' can readily understand. 
In sum, the editorial is successful in accomplishing editorialising. It 
makes very clear its moral and to whom it is applicable, all within the 
space of 107 lines of text. While the above analysis has been 
relatively simple, the strength of the general principle underlying it 
should not be underestimated. In essence, it is this. If in a text like 
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that above, there is an indication of an overall task the text is about to 
accomplish, then any particular part of that text will be interpretable 
in relation to the overall task. In the editorial, the relationship 
between the mentionable and the moral pervades the whole text in a 
back and fOlth reflexive manner: particular words, sentences, and 
paragraphs are read in the light of the underlying concern to make a 
transition to a moral, and the solution to the transition problem is 
accomplished using the aspects of the mentionable as manifest in 
particular words, sentences, and paragraphs. l6 
3.5 Conclusion 
As noted above, the two sections in this chapter are to a large 
degree separate. The analysis of the editorial is not intended to show 
that the male reproductive system is just as amenable to "negative" 
description as the female reproductive'system, nor any other rebuttal 
of Pfeffer, Beagan, and Steinberg's arguments. But, at a general level, 
the analysis can be contrasted with the feminist arguments, and a brief 
reiteration of this point is a useful way to ftnish this relatively long 
chapter. 
To recap, I outlined how Pfeffer, Beagan and Steinberg argued that 
the language of reproduction was doctored to further the 
subordination of women and the superordination of men in society. 
In specific they argued that: the male reproductive system is treated 
with "linguistic kid gloves"; semen is described positively; 
16 Of course, this is merely a reiteration of the "documentary method of 
interpretation" (see Garfinkel, 1967). 
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practitioners and procedures are emphasised at the expense of women 
who are depersonalised; the language of the new reproductive 
technologies captures the infertile and focuses on women; there is no 
authentic language to describe women's experience of reproductive 
technologies. For data they used various extracts from medical 
discourse: textbooks, phrases, abstracts, scientific terminology, and so 
on. My critique covered the variety of arguments made, but 
essentially I argued that the language of reproduction was only 
'doctored' to the extent that it is produced by and for doctors, and it 
assumes and enacts the background knowledge of that existential 
world. 
Following from this critique, in the analytic section I avoided a 
substantive rebuttal of Pfeffer, Beagan, and Steinberg'S arguments. 
Instead, I took an editorial from a medical journal that I chanced upon 
and showed how it accomplished its intended aim -editorialising - by 
using held-in-common social resources. That is, the focus was on 
how the editorial was "done together", how it was a social activity. 
The social resources I focused on were primarily those of sequencing, 
and the overall interpretative procedure of relating underlying pattern 
and particulars (the documentary method). Via such an approach, 
order was found in the text itself. The argument is that the editOlial's 
competence as an editOlial is locally produced; its objectivity as an 
editorial which makes-a-moral-from-a-mentionable is accomplished 
by readers using social resources applied to what they have in front of 
them in the text. This stands in contrast to approaches which bring 
external structural forces to texts and argue that these forces explain 
discursive features of texts. While it could be argued that the 
editorial does other things, for example, hiding accountability for 
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medical misdemeanours within the realm of medicine itself, frrst and 
foremost the text must accomplish editorialising, and do so locally. 
Essentially, it is the importance of local production that Pfeffer, 
Beagan and Steinberg have neglected. EvelY piece of data that they 
present is an extract, frrstly, from some whole text - paper, chapter, 
book - and, secondly, it is extracted from some local organisation - a 
particular journal and its readership, a particular medical specialty 
and its practitioners, a particular medical body, and so on. The point 
pure and simple is that the extracts Pfeffer, Beagan and Steinberg use, 
receive their sense, their stmcture, their order, from these first two 
levels and not primarily from any aspect of social stlUcture -
patriarchy, medicalisation, depersonalisation, and so on - that they 
bring to the texts from their stock of second order concepts. 
As moral citizens we are celtainly free to debate the 'politics of 
reproduction', but as analysts using' socially organised discourse, 
whether it is written by scientists, doctors, nurses, technicians, or 
infertile people, we have an obligatiori to treat it as an embodied 
production of an existential world. That is, we must avoid treating it 
ironically. 
Of course, this is a standard ethnomethodological argument, one 
that is traditionally framed in the distinction between "topic and 
resource" or between "constlUctive analysis" and 
ethnomethodological studies. While there are good grounds for 
arguing that ethnomethodology is not immune from the topic-resource 
problem (see McHoul, 1982: ch. 4), at a technical-methodological 
level the point still seems cogent. However, it must be noted that 
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cogency at this level incurs a pnce. The pressmg Issues of the 
'politics of reproduction' must be held in check until attention is given 
to documenting the socially organised nature of the practical activities 
that make possible both 'politics' and 'reproduction', That price may 
seem too high for some, but I would endorse Crook's comment (on 
another issue) that, "however heavy that price may seem to be, it must 
be paid" (1989: 376), 
Chapter Four 
From 'the Serious and the Humorous' 
to 'Doing Humour, Seriously' 
4.1 Introduction 
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Academic discourse on infeltility velY often begins with statements 
like, 'Infeltility is a major life crisis'. Consider the following 
statements culled from the opening passages of academic papers: 
infettility, "involves profound biographical disruption" (Sande1owski, 
Holditch-Davis & Harris, 1990: 195), "ranges from a minor irritation 
to a major life crisis" (Link & Darling, 1986: 46), is "a major 
biosocial life crisis that also represents a serious threat to the 
development of psychosocial generativity" (Snarey et al. 1987: 593), 
has "profound psychosocial impact" (Oreil, Leitko, & Potter, 1988: 
172), "can provoke a complex hiopsychosocial crisis that may take 
several years to resolve" (Piel Cook, 1987: 465, original emphasis), 
and, returning to more mundane language, is "a common life crisis" 
(Abbey, Andrews & Halman, 1992: 408). It is not difficult to think of 
a sociological basis for this view of infe11ility as a "life crisis". 
Without doubt, children have a velY positive value in modem society, 
indeed, it has been argued that children have become "emotionally 
priceless" and "sacralised" (Zelizer, 1985). If this is even partly true, 
infertility could be a severe disluption to people's ,lives. 
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But, alongside the senousness of infertility, there is a lighter 
humorous side. This side became obvious to me in the process of 
interviewing infertile men and health professionals, observing 
infertility society meetings, and collecting textual material on 
infertility. Jokes, laughter, puns, wisecracks, and funny incidents, 
were remarkably pervasive features of the experience of infertility. 
No matter how serious the matter being dealt with, people are able to 
fmd room for humour. 
Further, such incidents of humour need not be mere asides or 
afterthoughts. They can have a good deal of time devoted to them 
and might occur right in the midst of serious aspects of infertility. A 
good example occurred at the 1991 annual conference of the New 
Zealand Infertility Society. The conference was formally opened 
with a welcoming address, and within seconds of beginning, the 
speaker - a middle aged woman - began quivering and broke into 
tears. She explained her tears by saying that infertility was obviously 
an emotional matter. The audience displayed a hushed attentiveness 
throughout her address. In contrast, the end of the two day 
conference involved a debate on the topic 'Infertility: is it in the heart 
or the gonads', where, if anything, the participants were brought to 
tears by laughter. The debate featured skilled debaters who took 
every opportunity to make jokes and puns, almost universally on a 
sexual theme. This was complemented by the presence of a large 
anatomical model of the. human head, featuring amazingly breast-like 
and penis-like parts, which, of course, were used as 'evidence' in the 
debate. 
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There were other humorous incidents throughout the conference, 
but the debate was by far the most sustained period of humour. This 
identifying feature of the debate might therefore invite sociological 
questioning. One possible avenue is a functionalist argument that the 
debate functioned to ease the seriousness of the preceding parts of the 
conference, hence contributing to its overall success. This form of 
explanation could be extended to the point noted above, that is, 
people frequently find room for humour in their experience of 
infertility: given the seriousness of infertility in our society, humow' 
functions to make the difficulty of infertility more bearable. While 
these statements are simplistic, more developed fOlms of such 
argument have been the staple of functionalist explanation for many 
years, and there is little doubt that such arguments have a certain 
explanatory power, for both lay people and academics. 
However, in the last two decades at least, functionalist explanation 
has fallen out of favour as a result of sustained criticism (see Giddens, 
1984). Given this context it is therefore very smprising to fmd an 
essentially functionalist argument prevalent in one of the few book-
length sociological studies of humour - Michael Mulkay's On 
Humour (1988). While Mulkay's book is an eclectic attempt to 
synthesise vanous theoretical perspectives including 
ethnomethodology - in the analysis of humour, overall, it makes a 
functionalist argument. Below, in the fITst part of this chapter, the 
functionalist aspect of Mulkay's study will be detailed and critiqued. 
In the second part of the chapter, the explication and critique of 
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Mulkay is used as a basis for an original consideration of humour 
within discourse on male infertility. 
4.2 Mulkay on Humour 
Rather than offer a literature review of sociological work on 
humour, here I will focus solely on Mulkay's study. The main reason 
for singling out this work is that Mulkay's argument is centrally 
concelned with an area that ethnomethodologists have paid particular 
attention to - mundaneity, the ordinary world, everyday life. Indeed, 
Mulkay utilises ethnomethodological studies in a frequent and 
detailed way. For specific research on aspects of humour he uses 
Sacks (1978), Jefferson (1979, 1985), and Drew (1987); for its more 
general applicability he uses Pol1ner's work (1974, 1975) on mundane 
reason; and he also cites Garfinkel (1967) and Heritage (1984). 
Consequently, the cogency or otherwise of Mulkay's argument is of 
interest given this study's framework. In addition, it should be noted 
that Mulkay's study is the most recent, in fact one of the few, book-
length sociological studies of humour. Further, Mulkay's credentials 
as a sociologist are good: he is a leading researcher in the sociology 
of science (see 1991) and has produced some interesting thoughts on 
the fonn of sociological investigation (1985). 
Despite the distinctive fOlm of this latter work, Mulkay opts for a 
very traditional approach in his study of humour. He begins routinely 
by commenting on the lack of research on his chosen topic: the 
apparently universal phenomenon of humour has been neglected by 
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sociologists. As a possible reason for this neglect he suggests that 
sociologists may have confused the 'non-serious' with the 'trivial'. 
With this lead-in he then sets out the central theme of his study: 
They [sociologists] may have assumed that humour, because it 
is by definition outside the domain of the serious, is not worthy 
of serious investigation. The central theme of my analysis, in 
contrast, is that the exact opposite is the case. I will show that it 
is precisely the symbolic separation of humour from the realm 
of serious action that enables social actors to use humour for 
serious pmposes, and that makes humour an essential area for 
sociological inquiry. Humour is of interest, not only in its own 
right, but also because its study helps us better to understand our 
serious social world. (1988: 1)1 
From the frrst page then, Mulkay sets out a bi-polar model 
consisting of what he calls "the humorous mode" and "the serious 
mode". This introductory set-up provides Mulkay with two clear 
tasks: firstly, detail how the two realms are different, that is, make a 
good case that they really are different; but secondly, show how the 
two are related. In a twelve chapter book these core tasks occupy 
chapters one, two, and twelve; the remainder are mainly concerned, to 
use the subtitle of the book, with humour's "place in modem society". 
The following discussion will not touch upon Mulkay's analysis of 
humour's place in modern society, but will focus on his core theme. 
Mter describing this, some fundamental conceptual problems with 
Mulkay's argument will be identified. 
1 From this point on numerals in brackets without a year date will reference 
Mulkay, 1988. 
131 
Distinguishing the Humorous from the Serious via "Plausibility 
Requirements" 
In his attempt to characterise the humorous mode, Mulkay begins 
by noting that there are inherent difficulties in analysing humour 
seriously. A major risk is that in treating what is by defmition non-
serious as serious, humour is distorted beyond recognition. However, 
this problem should not be seen as insurmountable, and to illustrate 
this Mulkay discusses Sacks' analysis (1978) of a dirty joke's telling. 
He suggests that Sacks' use of naturally occurring data is a good first 
step in alleviating the risk of dist011ing humour, and, in general, he 
commends Sacks' analysis as an example of how humour can be 
analysed sociologically and shown to be a fmely organised social 
activity. 
But a fintber reason that Mulkay explicates Sacks' analysis in such 
detail - at least nine pages - is that he wishes to take issue with the 
way Sacks comments on the relationship between jokes and 
implausibilities. Rather than try to explicate what Sacks 'really' said, 
or what Mulkay 'really' said about Sacks' analysis, I intend here to 
focus on Mulkay's introduction of "plausibility requirements II and for 
the moment simply gloss what Sacks said. The gloss is: Sacks 
commented that the structure of dirty jokes hid away implausibilities 
in the chain of events utilised to produce humour. 
Sacks' argument will be returned to in the concluding discussion, 
for now, it is sufficient to note that despite a generally positive 
evaluation, Mulkay accuses Sacks of falling into the trap of 
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rnisframing humour by approaching it with serious analytical devices. 
Instead, what Mulkay wishes to do is 
... build upon this part of Sacks's analysis by proposing that, as 
patucipants, we approach humour with an interpretative 
procedure which differs significantly from that applied to 
serious discourse. When we listen to a joke, we do not expect or 
require that the events depicted should exhibit the same kind of 
interpretative consistency as that to be found in serious 
conversation. I suggest that we distinguish humorous from 
serious discourse and that we employ what we may call 
different 'plausibility requirements' within these two discursive 
modes. (17) 
Basically, Mulkay is suggesting that the "plausibility requirement" of 
the humorous mode is "anything is possible" (19). Because of the 
adoption of an interpretative frame suitable to the humorous mode, 
we do not expect that the events depicted will exhibit the 
interpretative consistency found in the serious mode. 
To reinforce this argument Mulkay provides the example of two 
jokes,2 where in contrast to Sacks' asselUon that implausibilities are 
hidden away, the implausibilities are inescapable. It is worth 
reproducing the jokes here: 
1. What do you get if you cross an elephant with a fish? 
Swimming trunks. 
2. 'The dapper man' 
On the frrst evening after moving house, Bob went down to 
the local pub and started talking to the barman. After a 
while, their talk was intenupted by the an'ival of a dapper 
little man, evidently a regular, who greeted the batman, 
2 Note that despite identifying Sacks' use of naturally occurring data as one way 
that analysts can avoid the problem of the serious analysis of the non-serious, 
Mulkay does not heed his own advice. That is, he chooses to compare two 
'written' jokes with Sacks' written representation of a joke's telling. While the 
'written' jokes certainly contain the material for the telling of a joke, or vice versa, 
actual verbal performance of jokes will always be different from written jokes. 
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ordered a glass of sherry, drank it, said goodnight, walked 
up the wall, across the ceiling, down the opposite wall, and 
out through the door. There was a short silence before Bob 
said, quaveringly: 
Wow! That was strange'. 
'Yes', mused the barman. 'That was strange. 
He usually drinks whisky'. (Nash, 1985, p. 107) 
(17-18) 
With reference to these examples, Mulkay observes that humour often 
depends upon incongmity or implausibilities. We must assent to the 
occurrence of utterly implausible events for jokes to come off - in the 
examples, crossing a fish and an elephant, and a man walking across a 
ceiling. This is taken as an illustration that jokes operate outside the 
assumptions and expectations of serious discourse. 
supposedly, creates its own "framework of expectation": 
Humour, 
Participants are surely aware that the events depicted in a joke 
occur within the special world of humour where, in principle, as 
long as the speaker sustains the humorous mode, almost 
anything can happen. ... These impossibilities are possible 
because humour is marked off frpm serious discourse; and 
because the requirements of acceptable discourse vary from one 
mode to the other. . .. humom' operates according to plausibility 
requirements that are quite different from, and much less 
stringent than, those operative in serious discourse. (19-20) 
Thus, Mulkay is arguing that the humorous mode has objectives and 
principles that are fundamentally different from, and alien to, the 
serious mode. Content that he has made this clear, and in the process 
improved upon Sacks' analysis, Mulkay moves on to detailing the 
basic characteristics of serious discourse. 
In this progression Mulkay offers a very brief discussion of some of 
Pollner's work on mundane reason (1974, 1975), and then a 
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reiteration of the difference between the humorous and senous 
modes. Mulkay uses Pollner's work to fix the core characteristic of 
the serious mode as the assumption of a unitary world: people assume 
that they inhabit a real social world, and assume other people share 
that view. This is not to say that there are never disagreements, 
contradictions, or ambiguities. These do occur, but significantly, they 
are treated as problematic and they will be resolved by reference to 
the assumption that there is still an underlying, unitary, real world. 
Mulkay makes two main uses of this characterisation of serious 
discourse. The initial point is that it is precisely the assumption of a 
unitary world that the humoro~s mode reverses: 
In the realm of humour, recipients are not expecting or seeking 
congruity. For they have temporarily abandoned the 
assumptions of the ordinary world and are responding to, 
registering and celebrating a world of discourse where 
interpretative duality is the basic principle and understandable 
incongruity the overriding aim. (37) 
The second point, which in the fmal chapter becomes the apogee of 
Mulkay's central theme, is that it is supposedly in the core 
characteristic of the serious mode that we see the ultimate reason for 
the existence of humour. The argument proceeds as follows: people 
both, differ from each other, and, have different experiences within 
their own everyday life; and even though they all assume the 
existence of a unitary real world, these differences result in the 
existence of multiple formulations of the real world: 
In other words, the basic structures of social differentiation that 
occur in all societies generate a potential babble of discrepant 
voices, each of which speaks as if its particular version of the 
135 
world is the real world within which all other voices have their 
being .... (214) 
Thus, Mulkay sets up modem life as fundamentally paradoxical and 
inherently unstable due to individual differences and the tendency to 
'see things my own way'. All this leads to Mulkay's core explanation: 
"Humour occurs because mundane, serious discourse simply cannot 
cope with its own interpretative multiplicity" (214). 
That is, we seem to be trapped within an 'iron cage' of mundane 
reason, and within this cage it is humour that allows us to go on: 
When we adopt the humorous mode, we are able to give voice 
to the deficiencies of serious social life and of our serious 
procedures of language-use, whilst at the same time disregarding 
them. By signalling that we are abandoning the serious mode, 
we indicate that there is a legitimate region of the social world 
in which the requirements of that mode are inapplicable. Having 
signalled our departure, we are not obliged to take seriously 
whatever follows; that is, we no longer have to employ a 
unitary, internally coherent speech .... Humour furnishes a realm 
of safety and release from these problems. ... [In humour] the 
onerous duty of maintaining a unitmy world-view has been 
replaced by the joyous creation of multiple realities. (214-215) 
Essentially, Mulkay's m'gument is an 'escape attempts,3 thesis: 
humour allows escape from omnipresent, oppressive, and always 
serious, reality, 
4.3 Critique 
Mulkay's analysis of humour is certainly interesting and broad 
ranging, nevertheless, there m'e several dissatisfYing aspects to his 
3 This term is taken from Cohen and Taylor's Escape Attempts: the theory and 
practice of resistance to everyday life (1976). 
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argument. It is not easy to set these out briefly, but I will attempt to 
do so by making two main points in critique. First, problems will be 
identified with the notion of differing plausibility requirements and, 
second, with the 'multiple formulation of reality' argument and its 
utilisation in a functionalist explanation of humour. After these 
critical points the chapter moves on to an analysis of humour in 
discourse on male infertility. 
To begin, I want to adapt a conceptualisation from Sharrock and 
TruDel' (1978). In their paper based on a corpus of telephone calls to 
a metropolitan police force, they identified a subset of "complaint 
giving" calls. The useful conceptualisation they introduced was to 
refer to the phone calls as conversational events as a "complaint" and 
to use the "less euphonious term complainable to refer to the state of 
affairs a complaint formulates" (1978: 174). Adapting their logic, the 
term Joke' is used to refer to the conversational telling of a joke, or 
jokes in textual discourse, and the (again less euphonious) term 
Jokeable' is used to refer to the events a joke formulates. 4 
Problems with Plausibility Requirements 
There is little doubt that as members we know that a joke is 
different from serious discourse. There is certainly some ground here 
for Mulkay's argument about differing "plausibility requirements". 
4 I have introduced the terms joke and jokeable rather than humour and 
homourable because my critique is essentially focused on the argument that 
begins in Mulkay's first chapter, and here he focuses on jokes. Besides which, 
humourable is a ghastly phrase. 
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However, if unpackaged a little, it can be shown that his argument 
suffers from a problem of infmite regress. 5 
Mulkay's model of humour as a discursive event is quite rightfully 
predicated upon a view of the human actor as an interpretive being. 
However, we are presented with a relatively static model of 
interpretation which utilises a type of 'macro-micro' framework: at a 
'macro' level Mulkay talks in a very Goffmanian way of 'frame' shifts 
to and from the serious and humorous modes (and note that there is 
very little attention to how these shifts are actually achieved and 
maintained). At a 'micro' level these frame shifts supposedly set up 
very clear expectations of what will then be done within the new 
'frame', This is all presented in very static terms as, essentially, 
information processing: as cognitive beings we use appropriate 
"interpretive procedures" to select the frame-appropriate "plausibility 
requirement", within which we process information (jokeable) to 
reach the pre-set outcome of joke-acknowledgement. 
When he adds into this model the quite reasonable assertion that 
humour seems to depend upon incongmities and implausibilities we 
see a logical problem in Mulkay's argument. The problem begins 
when we realise that no matter how shOlt humorous discourse is, it 
must contain some talk of plausible events - you cannot get to 
implausible events without fIrst moving through some unproblematic 
and ordinary events. To take Mulkay's example of the joke about 
5 This argument is inspired by McHoul's critique (1983) of information systems 
models of human communication. a model to which Mulkay's analysis of humour 
is remarkably similar. 
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crossing elephants and fishes, the real world action of "crossing" is 
not to be treated as implausible - it is unproblematically available as a 
serious practice that actually happens.6 So, when Mulkay suggests 
that the plausibility requirement of the humorous mode is "anything is 
possible" he omits at least three essential words which render the 
statement meaningful: 'anything is possible amidst the normal'. He 
does hint at this realisation when he suggests that "understandable 
incongruity" is the "overriding aim" of humour (37), but he does not 
pursue this further. 
Mulkay's model is of a cognitive actor reading information in a 
joke, recognising that it is implausible, that is, checking in a 
correspondence fashion with knowledge of the real world, but letting 
the implausibility pass because he or she is in humorous mode. But if 
he wishes to argue in this manner he must also be implying the 
recognition of plausibilities. This is a logical consequence of his 
emphasis on interpretive procedures (and also his loose adoption of a 
model of cognition as information processing): one cannot have the 
recognition of implausibilities (not A) without the recognition of 
plausibilities (A) - they are a duality and not a dualism. 
If one accepts the above point then we can see how such a 
presupposition leads to an infinite regress. To reiterate, Mulkay has 
set up a model where a mode of discourse produces a :frame where the 
interpretative process is to accept implausibilities and indeed to 
expect them. I have added the fact that this model of the interpretive 
6 Obviously if the joke is told to someone who does not know what "crossing" is, it 
will not 'work'. 
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process includes recognition of what is nOlmal, or in other words, 
plausible. Thus, this view holds that the interpretive process( es) 
involved in the humorous mode involve a monitoring for both 
plausibility and implausibility. The trouble is, to paraphrase Ryle 7, 
the consideration of plausibility/implausibility is itself an operation 
which can be more or less plausible, less or more implausible. But if, 
for any operation to be plausibly executed, a prior theoretical 
operation had first to be performed plausibly, it would be a logical 
impossibility for anyone to break into the circle.8 As McHoul puts it 
(read hearer for speaker), 
If a speaker is assumed to "look up" those criteria then the same 
criteria must apply recursively to the "look up" rules. And so 
rules for the application of rules could be specified, recursion 
upon recursion. This must be a consequence of any theory 
which separates thought and language - a self-annulling 
consequence of the theOly. (1983: 284) 
I believe that this is exactly what Mulkay has done: separated 
thought (interpretive processes/plausibility requirements) from 
language (humorous discourse). Hence, ultimately, Mulkay's 
theoretical explication of humour will have an unknown relationship 
to the actual interactional accomplishment of humour. The way 
Mulkay frames his argument is heavily dependent upon cognitive 
processes which are exogenous, or additional, to the interactional 
accomplishment of humour. Just how can an analyst satisfactorily 
identify "plausibility requirements" within empirical materials? In the 
7 As quoted in McHoul (1983: 284). 
8 See Coulter (1991) for a more general formulation of the ethnomethodological 
critique and respecification of cognition. He presents a similar 'infinite regress' 
argument about views of language as mental/neural processing. 
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absence of a good answer, it seems more worthwhile to search for 
modes of analysis not so heavily reliant on exogenous factors. 
Multiple Realities and the Function of Humour 
It is clear that the background to Mulkay's discussion of the 
characteristics of serious discourse is the work of Alfred Schutz. 
Even though Mulkay does not discuss Schutz's work directly, the path 
from Schutz to Pollner to Mulkay is clear enough, and is 
acknowledged (see 22-24). However, in the transition something 
seems to have been lost: Sharrock and Anderson's (1991) succinct 
discussion of Schutz leads me to the conclusion that Mulkay has 
made some fundamental mistakes in his treatment of serious 
discourse, multiple realities and the function ofhumour.9 
In the beginning of his discussion of the characteristics of serious 
discourse, Mulkay keeps with a key import of Schutz's argument, that 
is, that doubt, ambiguity, and contradiction occur within the natural 
attitude but do not jeopardise the assumption of an extelnal real 
world. To recap, Mulkay argues that despite commonsense providing 
us with a notion of one extemal world, each individual formulates it 
in their own way, and each believes their formulation to be COHect. 
From this it is argued that humour functions as a release from the 
tensions created from living in a paradoxical state - humour allows 
the creation and celebration of multiple realities. Thus, there are two 
9 I am not saying here that Mulkay has misread Schutz, for he never claims to 
base his arguments on Schutz, only Pollner, and hence Schutz secondarily. What 
I am saying is that a consideration of Schutz, like that provided by Sharrock and 
Anderson, casts into doubt the way Mulkay has formulated serious discourse and 
used this in his argument about the functions of humour. 
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areas where Schutz seems particularly relevant to Mulkay's argument: 
ego and intersubjectivity; and talk of multiple realities. 
As Sharrock and Anderson forcefully argue, Schutz did indeed 
start his theorising from a concern with intersubjectivity (and hence 
subjectivity itself), but he was a long way from arguing that the 
natural attitude is ego-centred, or that individuals assume the extelnal 
world revolves around them. On this point, they present a cogent 
analogy: people speak of 'my home town' in the sense that it is the 
town in which they grew up or currently live, hence, it is not that the 
town belongs to the speaker, but the speaker belongs to the town - the 
town may be the centre of the speaker's life, but the speaker is not the 
centre of the town's life. Talk of 'my world' is made in the same sense 
as talk of 'my town' - to say that the social world is, in the natural 
attitude, encountered as 'my world', is not a statement of ego-
centredness. Even though we each have a unique experience and may 
express this through utterances such as 'my view', this in no sense 
implies that each individual holds his or her view to be the correct 
view of reality. The cogency of this position is seen very easily by 
considering our everyday lives: it is very rare to experience life as a 
"babble of discrepant voices", as Mulkay would have it. 10 
Schutz theorised that a large degree of the orderliness of social life 
was derived from intersubjectivity. He made two crucial theses: 'the 
10 A very powerful analysis which illustrates this point is provided by Schegloff 
(1992). He shows how our culture provides very strong devices which members 
can call on to maintain intersubjectivity. His specific analysis is of "repair after 
next turn", which he calls the "last structurally provided defense of 
intersubjectivity in conversation". This could be thought of as a common 
mechanism for producing mutual understanding and avoiding Mulkay's "babble of 
discrepant voices", 
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reciprocity of perspectives' and 'the interchangeability of standpoints' 
(Sharrock & Anderson, 1991: 66). In essence, these theses hold that, 
while person A will not see things in exactly the same way as person 
B, they will reciprocate each other, such that differences will be 
attributed to different locations. 'Interchangeability of standpoints' 
refers to an assumption that if A and B were to change places, what A 
saw would now be what B sees, and vice versa. These assumptions 
are held to operate in the natural stance, but the crucial point is that 
they are assumptions - they are not guaranteed and it is known that 
they do break down. Thus, it should be emphasised that Schutz 
formulated these two theses from an ideal starting point - they have 
legitimate application only when it is assumed that biographical 
differences are non-existent. The point is that individuals do know 
that others differ and have different life experiences and this 
knowledge does not lead, as Mulkay would have it, to the formulation 
of multiple realities. Rather, it is incorporated into the natural stance: 
"allowance for the diversity of experience and culture is built into the 
socially distributed stock of knowledge itself ... (ShalTock & 
Anderson, 1991: 66). Built-in knowledge of diversity does not alter 
the utility of the 'reciprocity of perspectives' and the 
'interchangeability of standpoints', but rather strengthens them as the 
baseline of intersubjectivity. 
If Schutz's argument is accepted, then there is no watrant for setting 
up evetyday life as a paradox where individuals operate with a 
reciprocal assumption of one real world, but which they selectively 
apply to their own formulation of reality. Nor, as Crook (1989) notes, 
does 'indexicality' present a similar problem of multiple viewpoints -
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people swunmmg "in a thick soup of immediacy [where] salient 
'meanings' remain implicit, and incapable of explicit fOffi1Ulation" 
(1989: 377, fn. 8). As he notes, quite frequently in our encounters 
with formal organisations, for example, we are met with explicit 
requests that meanings, opinions and information be fOlmulated 
explicitly for the practical purposes of the organisation at hand. 
When, within such organisations, disjunctures, ambiguities, puzzles, 
and contradictions occur, remedial action will not be to demand the 
correctness of an individual's viewpoint, but to demand that anyone 
and everyone sees things in a pat1icular way given the local 
organisation's knowledge. As ShatTock and Anderson note, Schutz's 
work emphasised the "experiential underpinning of the socially 
sanctioned unity of the world, of the mutual demand that we 
recognise the commonality of circumstance" (1991: 65, original 
emphasis). 
This point about the "socially sanctioned unity of the world" was an 
important one that ethnomethodology subsequently incorporated in its 
emphasis on social facts being both natural and moral (see Heritage, 
1984, ch. 7). This seems to be a point that Mulkay has picked up 
from Pollner, but misconstruing it, has turned it into an 'escape 
attempts' thesis. That is, a view of individuals tiring of adhering 
ceaselessly to the natural-moral accountability of the real world and 
resorting to humour as a major device which allows them to 
proliferate opposing (and "joyous") multiple realities. But, by 
returning a last time to Schutz and what he said about multiple reality 
and paramount reality, some fundamental problems with Mulkay's 
position are apparent. 
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Schutz clearly takes a constitutive VIew of reality: " we 
emphasize that it is the meaning of our experiences, and not the 
ontological structure of the objects, which constitutes reality" (Schutz, 
1962: 341). With this as a base, he argues that meanings can be 
subdivided into "fInite provinces" and it is in this sense that he talks 
of "multiple realities". However, he also identifIed the world of 
everyday life in the natural attitude as "paramount reality". But again 
there is nothing ontological about this conceptualisation: the point of 
differentiating fmite provinces of meaning is to emphasise the 
episodic nature of experience. In anyone day we typically move 
from periods of sleep to periods of wakefulness, between moments of 
unreflective activities and moments of thoughtful reflection, between 
leisure and work, and so on. Sharrock and Anderson (1991: 64) argue 
that there are four important points that Schutz was making here: 
1. the transition between these episodes is ablupt, with each 
sphere being self-contained; 
2. within each sphere an 'accent of reality' is assigned to the 
things experienced there; 
3. the transition from one episode to another is typically Vla 
'paramount reality'; 
4. the standards of reality which are applied in paramount reality 
pre-empt those in the other provinces of meaning. 
Keeping with Mulkay's initial focus on jokes, there is no reason 
why we cannot consider even the quickest telling of a joke to be a 
"self contained" sphere: it will probably have a clearly defIned 
beginning in the form of some preface, it will have a lniddle content, 
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and it will have a clearly defmed ending in the fOlID of laughter (or 
some substitutive activity). If this is accepted, then the import of 
Schutz's fOlIDulations can be realised. In comparison to Mulkay's 
attempts to fonnulate distinctions between the humorous and the 
serious mode - talk of differing plausibility requirements and humour 
as a temporary abandonment of the ordinary world - Schutz offers the 
more concise view that what occurs within the self contained sphere 
of humour is treated with an "accent of reality". That is, the jokeable 
is treated as having really happened, but with the upcoming transition 
back to "paramount reality", we know that despite the "accent of 
reality" given to the jokeable in the making of the joke, in reality the 
events did not happen. 
This view bears some similarity with Mulkay's argument, but the 
essential point of difference is that Schutz emphasises the sequential 
placement of humour (or any self contained event) in respect to 
"paramount reality", while Mulkay strives to portray humour and the 
ordinary (serious) as two distinct realms each with their own 
interpretative processes. The point is that Mulkay's distinction 
between the serious and the humorous modes is an entirely 
unnecessary and artificial one. The import of Schutz's view is totally 
damning of Mulkay's argument that "In its purest fonn, it [humour] 
constitutes a radical alternative to the way in which we create our 
ordinary social world" (222). While humouT can certainly be seen as 
a fmite province of meaning, it is not as if it is operating against 
paramount reality, but in sequential relation to, and within, it. 
Iokeables receive an accent of reality, but to suggest that humour is a 
potentially liberatOlY force is, to use Sharrock and Anderson's 
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examples (64-65), like having a dream of winning a million dollars 
and then telling the bank manager you would like to clear your 
overdraft; or like informing the police that you have just seen the 
murder of Julius Caesar, but fortunately, you can name the murderers. 
Paramount reality both antedates and postdates other provinces of 
meaning, including humour, and as such provides the ultimate 
evaluation of reality - a stable baseline. When the joke fmishes we 
return back to the known-in-common and taken-for-granted ordinary 
world which as the base for humour and the evaluator of reality forms 
a 'seamless web'. With Mulkay, this view does not deny that 
problems of multiplicity, contradiction, and incongruence occur in 
everyday life. But, against Mulkay's view that the ordinary, serious 
world is a "babble of discrepant voices", Schutz's view presents 
paramount reality as an essentially uninteresting background, which 
confers a sense of stability and order because of its very taken-for-
grantedness. Garfmkel's breaching demonstrations (1963) highlighted 
this feature of paramount reality: when Garfmkel and his 
experimenters 'made trouble' in the taken-for-granted realm the 
subjects were extremely threatened and disrupted. This showed just 
how clucial the assumption of a routinely structured reality was for 
social order. In addition, the demonstrations showed that social order 
is a 'serious' accomplishment: departures from routine interaction 
drew sanctions and morally implicative work by participants. In the 
face of these findings, Mulkay's argument that people face an 
"onerous duty of maintaining a unitary world-view" (215) seems 
badly misfounded. It is much more likely to be an absence of 
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'paramount reality' as a backdrop that makes the social world an 
"onerous" place. 
Overall, when Mulkay's analysis of the relationship between the 
humorous and the serious is closely sClutinised, serious problems 
appear. It may be far more productive, analytically, if we move from 
a conceptual framework where the serious and the humorous are 
distinct modes of discourse, to a view where humour is done seriously 
within evelyday organised activities. This view will be discussed 
more fully in the concluding discussion, but in the meantime it is kept 
central in the following empirical analyses. In general, the analyses 
exemplify the rejection of Mulkay's approach to humour, and return 
to Sacks' project for guidelines on how humour should be analysed 
sociologically. 
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4.4 Analysis 
The following analysis focuses on three exhibits of 'humour' at 
work. Each exhibit is approached using a standardised fOlmat which 
consists of an examination of the following: 
1. practical activity: the overall practical activity displayed in the 
exhibit. 
2. solution: how the practical activity is achieved. 
3. endogenous order: here, the question pursued is how humour is 
accomplishable using the smface materials that the exhibit 
provides for sense-assembly work. That is, the assumption is that 
humour is locally produced through a manipulation of the 
materials embodying it, for example lexical choice, categorisation, 
and sequential properties. 
4. background knowledge/import: the 'seen but unnoticed' 
background knowledge which operates all along at the core of the 
exhibit contributing to its intelligibility. 'Import' is used in the 
sense of the question: what may be learnt about male (in)fertility 
(or other matters) from the exhibit and its analysis. 
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Exhibit 1. Sperm Bank Five11 
The Auckland band, Sperm Bank Five. The zany group will perform at the Subway, Tavern Rachel, tomorrow evening 
*** *:!It* .... 
The Sperm Bank Five, 
an Auckland band whose 
wacky stage outfits and 
antics recall the legend· 
ary Tubes, will be per· 
forming at the Subway, 
Tavern Rachel tomorrow. 
The group once per· 
formed as support for 
American band the 
Butthole Surfers dressed 
with horns and pink saus-
age costumes. At other 
gigs, their singer was sus· 
pended from a bungy 
cord, sang inside a giant 
yellow duck, had a TV set 
on his head and a 
"muscle" . suit on. 
'Sperm Bank Five de· 
scribe their music as 
humorous, "death grunge" 
and rap. They use samples 
of TV advertisements and 
squeaky toys over a tra-
ditional bass, drums, 
guitar line-up. 
Bassist Lindsay Fog 
says Sperm Bank Five 
"like to take ridiculous 
parts of ordinary, every-
day life and make them 
seem even stupider". 
The group are promot· 
ing their recently reo 
leased, seven-song "Slave 
To Momba" cassette. 
Their talents are also 
being tapped by Me OJ 
and The Rhythm Slave. 
Sperm Bank Five are cur· 
ren tly creating two back-
1ng tracks for the rappers' 
second LP and live show. 
•••••• *** 
11 Photocopied (slightly reduced and adjusted) from an article in The 
Christchurch Press, August 23, 1991, page 27. 
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1. Practical Activity. Clearly, the practical activity is to provide 
advanced notice of Spenn Bank Five's appearance. But I want to use 
this exhibit for its evidence of an earlier practical activity which is 
canied forward and instantiated in this text: coining a 'catchy' band 
name (surely an activity which has had a great deal of time devoted to 
it since the advent of pop music). 
2. Solution. The solution to the problem of coining a 'catchy' band 
name is to take something which nonnally would be treated seriously, 
and treat it in a somewhat frivolous, profane, contemptuous way. The 
band seem to adapt a common understanding of 'spenn banks' as a 
serious matter for their own organisational purpose -finding a 'catchy' 
name. Manifestly, this purpose has nothing to do with 'real' spenn 
banks. The exhibit is included as an example of humour, because, to 
take the apt phrase from the blurb which accompanies the photograph, 
the band is "zany" and they have found a "zany" name. The name 
does not invite sustained laughter, rather, it is more likely to produce 
an invisible smirk or stifled one-outbreath laugh - there is cettainly 
something humorous about it. 
3. Endogenous order. When we look at the picture we do not see a 
band perfonning in front of what might be the signpost for a spelm 
bank, one numbered five. We do see a five piece band called Spelm 
Bank Five: the name-as-backdrop tells us who the band is, and the 
five members tell us what the large emblem and words are -their 
name. Fmiher, the caption to the photograph tells us that the group is 
"zany", and we add this to our previous sighting of the appearance of 
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the band and its name to look further for its zaniness. If we proceed 
to read the text which accompanies the photo we leatn more about the 
zaniness of the band, including a 'quote' from one band member: 
"Sperm Bank Five "like to take ridiculous parts of ordinary, everyday 
life and make them seem even stupider". Thus, there is little problem 
in finding order from within the surface materials provided: the 
explanation for the band members' choice of name is manifestly 
obvious - they are doing being zany. 
4. JmportJBackground knowledge. There is something senous ill 
Sperm Bank Five's doing being zany, but I do not think it is the case, 
as Mulkay's line of argument would suggest, that the band's choice of 
name is contributing to a liberatOlY discourse on sperm banks or male 
infeltility. The exhibit provides scenic material for how it is to be 
understood: the 'natural' reading is of a band doing being zany, where 
a patticular instance of this is the use of a phrase with relatively fixed 
semantic qualities as a name. The fact that the words "sperm bank" 
are now used for a different reason and in a different context than the 
ordinary (serious) usage, is not a warrant for a functionalist argument 
connecting the two realms. Rather, in any context the use of the 
words "sperm bank" should be seen as a device for accomplishing 
local practical activities. 
This said, there is some value in looking at the exhibit for its 
relation to the serious side of spelm banks. It can be suggested that 
the act of inverting the ordinarily serious to create zaniness, fITst 
involves the utilisation of 'essentially uninteresting' knowledge of 
what counts as a serious matter. The Spelm Bank Five exhibit offers 
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evidence that spelID banks can be treated in a presuppositional way as 
serious matters - the seriousness of spelID banks has become an 
unexplicated resource for the band's social act of doing zaniness. 
Hence, the exhibit contains a secondary elaboration on the nature of 
spelID banks, one which does not challenge the ordinary seriousness 
of discourse about spelID banks, but makes it presuppositiona1 that 
they are indeed serious matters. 
Exhibit 2. Woody Allen's Joke 
This exhibit is an extract of dia10gue from Woody Allen's 1985 
movie Hannah and Her Sisters. A major theme of the movie is the 
vagaries of modem adult life, and included in the troubles that its 
protagonists face is infertility: Mickey (played by Woody Allen) and 
his partner, Hannah, are infertile and this has been attributed to ma1e 
factors. The following dialogue occurs' between Mickey and Hannah: 
Mickey: I'm so humiliated. 
Hannah: Could you have mined yourself somehow? 
Mickey: How could I min myself? 
Hannah: I don't know. Excessive masturbation ... ? 
Mickey: Hey, you gonna start knocking my hobbies? Jesus! 
(as transcribed in McCann, 1990: 236) 
While this is an extract from continuing dialogue, the existence of a 
'punch line' gives the talk a self-contained feel, and it can be treated as 
a unit irrespective of the preceding and following talk. 
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1. Practical activity. The practical activity here is to make the 
viewers of the movie laugh and it is probably safe to assume that the 
dialogue does indeed do this. 
2. Solution. At a basic level the production of humour is achieved by 
a simple inversion: Mickey admits that he treats masturbation - an 
activity nonnally done in private and not openly talked about - as a 
'hobby'. In tenns of a jokeable, the humour of this strip of talk is 
achieved by this clear inversion. 
3. Endogenous order. As noted above, humour is produced here by 
inverting commonsense knowledge that masturbation is, in one word, 
sensitive - the punch line works by a revelation that Mickey 
masturbates as a "hobby". But from an ethnomethodological point of 
view, the sensitivity of mastUIbation as a topic does not exist 
independently of talk about it; instead, the sensitive character of 
masturbation is constituted by ways of talking about it sensitively (see 
Bergmann, 1992; Silvelman & Perakyla, 1990; Weijts, Houtkoop & 
Mullen, 1993). In velY condensed fonn this is exactly what happens 
in the joke: the fonn of the talk leading to the punch line establishes 
the sensitivity of masturbation so that it can then be inverted. 
Looking at the joke it seems clear that the question Hannah wants to 
broach is whether Mickey's infertility is due to excessive 
masturbation - a sensitive topic. However, instead of a blunt 
accusation stating her suspicion, she accomplishes sensitivity by first 
asking "Could you have ruined yourself somehow?". "Ruined 
yow'self" flags sensitivity because its imprecision is sufficient enough 
to minimise directly negative accusation. Then, in choosing to ask for 
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an unpackaging of the telID, Mickey perfOlIDs a crucial action: a 
favourable environment is created for the negative assessment 
because it is now being offered in response to an inquiry, rather than 
as something volunteered. 12 There is a request for Hannah to tell 
Mickey what he is being accused of, which by now is flagged as a 
sensitive topic. 
The accusation does indeed follow next, but in a two part form 
which further enhances the production of talk about masturbation as a 
sensitive matter, thus making it available for inversion. The fust pad 
is the standardised utterance "I don't know" which is a pelfectly 
legitimate answer by itself, however, once uttered it is immediately 
followed by an offer of a candidate explanation - "Excessive 
masturbation ... ?". The "I don't know" appears to be doing within-tum 
preliminary work, that is, by fust offering "I don't know" the offered 
candidate explanation is flagged as a sensitive one. 13 This 
accomplishment of sensitivity is further enhanced by the movement to 
a term from a clinical register: "excessive masturbation" comes from 
medical-psychiatric-psychological discourse and its use in preference 
to folk terms (which are often used as forms of abuse, ego 'wanking', 
'wankel") gives the assessment a detached, clinical tone. 
12 Button and Casey (1985) provide empirical examples of instances where 
interactants introduce negative comments in a sensitive way, or talk on a 
sensitive topiC, by an answer to an inquiry rather than as an unsolicited comment; 
and the joke seems to follow this common conversational device. Also see Weijts, 
Houtkoop and Mullen (1993) for other examples. 
13 Tsui (1991) identifies six pragmatic functions of the utterance "I don't know" 
within ordinary conversation. The particular use of the utterance in the joke fits 
best with what Tsui calls "minimization of impolite beliefs". This refers to the 
situation where "I don't know" is used to preface negative assessments of the 
addressee, hence functioning to minimise the face-threatening effect of the 
negative assessment. 
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This carefully crafted sensitivity is, however, overturned in the 
punch line, where we find Mickey refonnulating the candidate 
explanation as a direct accusation, one, moreover, which he is not 
happy about. This unhappiness is not because he has been accused of 
"excessive masturbation", but because his "hobby" has been 
"knocked". Hence, the humour of the joke. In addition, given that 
the joke involves a male making a direct complaint about sensitively 
packaged explanations by his spouse, it opens up the possibility that 
this joke is secondarily elaborative of the relations between the sexes 
in marital situations (the latter is a major theme of the movie). I will 
pick this latter point up in the next section, because it obviously 
seems to operate more at the level of background assumptions. 
Before proceeding, given that the above discussion of this exhibit 
has covered diverse material, it is worth providing a brief summary of 
the endogenous order of Woody Allen's joke. The argument is that 
the endogenous order is crucial to the joke's success in accomplishing 
humour. First, it is accomplished in an economical way through the 
use of question-answer adjacency pairs - questions require answers 
and are therefore economical devices for providing the material for 
humour. Second, questions can be used in a way which accomplishes 
the sensitivity of a topic: in this case "excessive masturbation" 
emerges as a candidate explanation through a request rather than a 
volunteering. Third, the candidate explanation is prefaced with the 
utterance "I don't know" which effectively indicates that the 
explanation's producer offers it with due respect to how the recipient 
may hear it. All this is crucial to the fmal punch line. For, while at a 
content level the joke's humour is produced by an admission that 
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masturbation is Mickey's hobby, that is, a clear inversion of the 
sensitive manner in which masturbation is discussed in our culture, 
the sensitivity of talk about masturbation is displayed incamately in 
the joke's fOlmal structure, thus making it available for humorous 
incongtuity. The joke's form and content are inseparable elements in 
its successful accomplishment of humour. 
3. Background knowledge/Import. The exhibit is a useful one for 
pursuing MUlkay'S argument that humour is a potentially liberatory 
force in society. As noted above, "excessive masturbation" is a term 
from the clinical register of me dic al-p sychiatric-p sychological 
practice, where it has been identified as a possible causal factor for 
male infertility.14 The exhibit also shows the use of a more general 
and lay concept for the same causal knowledge, ("mining oneself"), 
and given the presence of both these aspects it is clear that the 
humour is grounded in real world discourse about masturbation as a 
possible cause of infertility. In other words, from Mulkay's point of 
view we have some refelTal back to the world of serious discourse 
about real events. Following from this it could be argued that because 
the joke inverts norms about masturbation, it could fOlm a small patt 
of resistance to serious discourse about masturbation and the way 
such discourse might constrain people. Sketchiness aside, there is a 
degree of plausibility to such an at'gument. 
14 For example, one of the more comprehensive medical textbooks on infertility 
states that "Sexual abuse through excessive masturbation with pollution or abuse 
of the sexual drive leading to or associated with sexual psychopathology may be 
accompanied by infertility" (Joel, 1971: 74). 
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However, I would like to offer a different view, as follows. If, in 
any situation we take a view of the human actor as an inquirer into 
social affairs (Sharrock & Anderson, 1982), rather than an expert on 
social affairs, then this exhibit can be approached not for how it can 
be used as ammunition to break down existing ways things are known 
or talked about, but for how it makes knowledge of a culture available 
to that culture's members. In this instance, and this is the imp01i of 
the exhibit, it makes available for us the knowledge that within 
heterosexual marital unions, which provide a normative-legitimate 
site for stable sexual relations, masturbation by the male partner may 
be a 'normal' and ordinary state. However detailed private knowledge 
of such events may have been, in the joke as a social event it is now 
made available as common cultural knowledge, albeit at a secondmy 
level. Somewhat speculatively, I might also suggest that Woody 
Allen's joke tells us something about the character of this practice: it 
is a sensitive topic within relationships. While, on one hand, Mickey 
knocks down the sensitivity with -which Hannah so cm'efully 
constructs her candidate explanation, on the other hand, he reinstates 
sensitivity at another level: he shows men being sensitive about the 
issue of their private sexual practices within stable heterosexual 
unions. The humour lies in the punch line as a complaint, but for all 
that it is a complaint about real world practices, which are now made 
available to members as inquirers into their own culture. 
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Exhibit 3 The Garp Extract and Joan's Story 
Two pieces of data make up this exhibit. The first is an extract 
from John Irving's (1976) novel The World According to Garp. The 
extract covers the stOlY of how Garp's mother, Jenny - a nmse in a 
hospital - went about conceiving Garp. The whole story is 
interesting, but unfortunately it occms over several pages and so I 
have summarised sections of it, while ttying to keep its sequentiality 
intact. Here is the extract: 
Jenny told the other nmses that she would one day fmd a man to 
make her pregnant - just that, and nothing more. She did not 
entertain the possibility that the man would need to try more 
than once, she told them. They, of comse, couldn't wait to tell 
everyone they knew. It was not long before Jenny had several 
proposals. She had to make a sudden decision: she could retreat, 
ashamed that her secret was out; or she could be brazen. 
A young medical student told her he would volunteer on the 
condition that he could have at least six chances over a three-
day weekend. Jenny told him that he obviously lacked 
confidence; she wanted a child who would be more secure than 
that. 
An anesthesiologist told her he would even pay for the baby's 
education - through college - but Jenny told him that his eyes 
were too close together and his teeth were poorly founed; she 
would not saddle her would-be child with such handicaps. 
One of the other nmses' boyfriends tt'eated her most cmelly; 
he frightened her in the hospital cafeteria by handing her a milk 
glass nearly full of a cloudy, viscous substance. 
"Spenn," he said, nodding at the glass. "All that's one shot - I 
don't mess around. If one chance is all anyone gets, I'm yom 
man." Jenny held up the horrid glass and inspected it cooly. 
God knows what was actually in the glass. The nmse's 
boyfriend said, "That's just an indication of what kind of stuff 
I've got. Lots of seeds," he added, grinning. Jenny dumped the 
contents of the glass into a potted plant. 
... [we then leam that because of Jenny's attitude she is shifted 
to a new section of the hospital -intensive care. This is mainly 
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full of soldiers, whose non-accidental injuries are categorised by 
Jenny as 1. Externals, 2. Vital Organs, and ... ] 
3. There were the men whose injuries seemed almost 
mystical, to Jenny; they were men who weren't "there" anymore, 
whose heads or spines had been tampered with. Sometimes they 
were paralyzed, sometimes they were merely vague. Jenny 
called them the Absentees. Occasionally, one of the Absentees 
had External or Vital Organ damage as well; all the hospital had 
a name for them. 
4. They were Goners. 
"My father," Garp wrote, "was a Goner. From my mother's 
point of view, that must have made him very attractive. No 
strings attached." 
... [We are then given a description of how Garp senior 
sustained his injury, and then we see Jenny taking him under her 
care ... ] 
Given the evidence, the shadows, and the white needles in 
the X rays, Gunner Garp was probably a Goner. But to Jenny 
Fields he looked very nice. A small, neat man, the former ball 
turret gunner was as innocent and straightforward in his 
demands as a two-year old . 
... [Subsequently, Garp regresses to the state of a baby. Jenny 
recognises this and gives him the comforts that babies need, to 
the extent of suckling him at her breast; amidst this Jenny's wish 
to have a baby still persists and is stimulated by Garp's nursing 
... ] 
... Her feelings were so vivid - she believed for a while that she 
could possibly conceive a child by simply suckling the baby ball 
turret gunner. 
It was almost like that. But Gunnel' Garp was not all baby. 
One night, when he nursed at her, Jenny noticed he had an 
erection that lifted the sheet ... And so one night she helped him; 
with her cool, powdered hand she took hold of him .... 
When he came, she felt his shot wet and hot in her hand. 
Under the sheet it smelled like a greenhouse in summer, 
absurdly fertile, growth gotten out of hand. You could plant 
anything there and it would blossom. Garp's spelm snuck Jenny 
Fields that way: if you spilled a little in a greenhouse, babies 
would sprout out of the dirt. 
Jenny gave the matter twenty-four hours of thought. 
... [And the next night she copulates with Garp, for the one and 
only time, confident" that the magic had worked"] 
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Thus was the world given T.S. Garp: born from a good nurse 
with a will of her own, and the seed of a ball tulTet gunner - his 
last shot. (from pp. 13-24, emphasis in original) 
The second part of exhibit three comes from an interview that I did 
with a technician whose work within a donor insemination unit 
involved managing the sperm bank. This particular piece of talk came 
in response to my questions about what she told people about her 
work: 
(H9: Joan) 
M: Are there any things that you can actually remember that 
have been said? 
J: To me? 
M: Yes 
J: About it, jokes made? 
M: Yes 
J: Oh yeh, someone, we were out for dinner for our netball, 
someone tossed over, it was said quite loudly, someone 
said to someone else 'did you know what Jackie does?'. 
And they said 'no'. They said that she does the spelID 
bank, and someone tossed me over a, an inner out of a 
wine cask, and said, 'here, I've ftIled this, it's yours', you 
know. I thought 'oh, okay'. And they said 'you do not' and 
I said 'I do', and they said 'you don't', I said 'I do', they 
didn't believe me at all '" 
I will call the first part of this exhibit 'the Garp extract' and the second 
part 'Joan's story'. While there is obviously a lot more to the Garp 
extract than Joan's story, I have put these two extracts together 
because, amongst other things, they both use the activity of a man 
handing a 'sperm' sample to a woman to produce humour. I will 
analyse these together using my previous format; the analysis will 
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focus mostly on the Garp extract because firstly, it provides more data 
for analysis, and secondly, because an understanding of Joan's story 
flows nicely from an understanding of the Garp extract. 
1. Practical activity. The Garp extract is part of a humorous novel 
which has the antagonistic relationship between the sexes as a central 
theme. Thus, the overall concern of the novel is to accomplish 
humour, and this is done in an incremental way by providing 
individual instances of humour, which are very evident in the Garp 
extract. But the other side to the novel is that its humour occurs 
within the background theme of the relation between the sexes - a 
perennial and serious topic. 
Joan's stOlY provides a very brief account of some (presumably) real 
world events, and I think that these events are an example of what 
most people would recognise as a 'practical joke'. It seems clear that 
we have a perpetrator (the male 'filling' the inner with 'sperm'), a 'fall-
guy' or victim (Joan), and an audience (the others at the dinner who 
see or hear the event). The practical activity is to make the audience 
laugh using the events foisted upon the 'fall-guy'. It appears from the 
Joan's comments that she did not laugh but accepted the events in a 
somewhat neutral manner, while we can only assume that some 
laughter eventuated in the audience. 
2. Solution. The Garp extract and Joan's story contain two very 
similar events. In the Garp extract a milk glass nearly full of spelm is 
handed to Jenny as proof of suitability for the part of 'one-shot' 
candidate. This action is sensibly labelled in the extract as a "cruel 
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joke". That is, it achieves humour by making fun of something that 
somebody takes seriously. In this case Jenny's intention to have a 
child, and in one attempt, is serious; the 'glass-filler' takes this serious 
intent and makes public fun of it by exaggeration - he suggests the 
filled glass is the result of one ejaculation. The same seems to apply 
in Joan's stOlY, but this time it is a wine-cask inner that is handed 
over. The humour is accomplished by treating something which is 
serious in an exaggerated fashion. 
3. Endogenous Order. There are difficulties in analysing Joan's story 
as it is obviously a retelling of real events, but we can make the very 
simple observation that the 'practical joke' has a basic temporal 
grounding in that a first part is the serious disclosure by Joan that she 
works in a sperm bank, and this then becomes the base for the 
offering of a 'filled' inner as a practical joke. The Garp extract offers 
greater potential for analysis and we can see in it a more complicated 
sequential base to its order (here I am- refelTing to the whole extract 
and not just the 'practical joke' part). 
The story begins with Jenny telling the other nurses that "she would 
one day fmd a man to make her pregnant - just that and nothing 
more" ,15 Further, Jenny "did not entertain the possibility that the man 
would need to tty more than once"; and it is this belief that sets up a 
very effective humorous play on words. First, a candidate offers to 
do the job but on the condition that he can have six chances - it is 
clear that he 'wants a shot" but once is not enough. Jenny declines 
15 It should be added here that it has been established previously in the book that 
Jenny dislikes the physical act of sex, or as she calls it "peter treatment", and this 
is well known amongst the hospital staff, who subsequently treat her as an oddity. 
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this offer with reference to the seriousness of her endeavour - a man 
who needed more than one chance was not suitable. Next, in a 
somewhat more serious vein, an anesthesiologist offers but is turned 
down on the grounds of his physical appearance. The next offer is 
what I am suggesting is a practical joke: in a public space Jenny is 
handed a glass, apparently full of spelm, with the male saying that if 
one chance (shot) is all anyone gets then his "one shot" is evidence 
that he is the man for the job. 
Note the economy with which the practical joke is achieved. The 
glass filling incident is preceded by two men trying to get a shot, but 
being turned down by Jenny. Thus we have a sequential environment 
where a third action is related to the previous two but can be different 
in important ways (see Sacks, 1978). It can be suggested that given 
the prior offers being turned down, the action of the 'glass filler' is 
rendered as an action on behalf of men who are being bettered by the 
woman, hence, its availability as a 'practical joke'. The offer of a 
glass filled with 'sperm' is naturally framed within the prior rejections 
thus giving it meaning beyond its immediate environment. 
But of course, Jenny is not upset by the practical joke and triumphs 
again. She dumps the glass of sperm in a potted plant and then fmds 
the perfect candidate - a "Goner". That is, a man who cannot display 
the typically masculine intent of the previous candidates: intent 1 
(medical student), to have sex; intent 2 (anesthesiologist), probably 
the same, but unsure; intent 3 (nurse's boyfriend) to have a shot at 
Jenny, in both senses of the term. As a 'goner' Garp cannot make a 
negative 'shot' at Jenny, only a procreative 'shot', hence, the wonderful 
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culmination of the play on words: Jenny gets her one shot (at 
procreation), which she is sure is enough, and ball turret gunner Garp 
gets his last shot. 
These are the embodied materials with which the humour is 
produced. They are organised in a very common stmctural form 
which is more than sufficient to produce multi-layered humour. It is 
multi-layered because while it produces humour it is also 
recognisably 'saying' something about the relations between the sexes: 
it is a tale in miniature of a woman attempting to get something she 
wants within a male system, and in this quest we see her coming up 
against typically male motives and intentions. The only way she 
finally wins is by finding a male without motives and intentions, but 
with the biological capacity to reproduce. But, again this secondary 
aspect of the humour is also made available within, and from, the 
incarnate order of the extract: we fmd this other meaning within the 
exhibit's order and not primarily by bringing exogenous factors to it. 
4. Background Knowledge/Import. A particularly important part of 
the background knowledge used to accomplish the humour in exhibit 
three stems from membership categorisation. Briefly, typifications of 
masculinity are central to the exhibit, and provide crucial links to the 
overall theme of Irving's novel, that is, antagonistic relations between 
the sexes. In the practical joke's development we deal first with a 
candidate who is categorised as a "young medical student". We fmd 
that he will take up Jenny's quest if he can have six chances over a 
three day weekend. The key word here is "young": we have no 
difficulty in inferring that the appropriate category bound activity for 
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a young male is to be on the search for sex, and as frequently as 
possible. The second candidate is described as an "anesthesiologist" 
and he tells Jenny that "he would even pay for the baby's education -
through college". Thus, the essential activity that goes with being an 
anesthesiologist is being able to pay for a college education. We are 
told little else of this candidate, except that he is rejected because of 
his appearance; and in a way he seems unimpOltant except for the 
stmctural reason of 'making up the numbers' for the pattern of two 
rejections (victory for Jenny), followed by an attempt by men to get 
back at her via the practical joke. 
When we get to the practical joke, the practical joker is categorised 
as "one of the other nurse's boyfriends". This is what Sacks (1974) 
calls a "duplicatively organised" MCD, that is, it involves a pair that 
goes together, in this case girlfriend and boyfriend. Cmcially, a 
natural inference about boyfriend-girlfriend pan's is that such a unit is 
a place to fmd sexual activity. Sexual activity is a categOlY bound 
activity for someone described as 'boyfriend' or 'girlfriend'; this may 
be an inference of full fledged adult sexual competency, but at the 
least it is of sexual learning and familiarisation. I believe that this 
categorisation is cmcial for the practical joke that this male plays on 
Jenny. Given the categorisation of him, we are likely to see a 
sexually competent ma1e handing over a putative sperm sample to 
Jenny, and not an inexperienced boy. In this way the male is 
available as one who can playa practical joke by the display of a 
glass full of a "viscous substance", and without this base of sexual 
authority the practica1 joke very likely would not work. The use of a 
"filled glass" of sperm for a joke is strongly connected to the 
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recognition of sexual competence. If, for example, we substitute the 
categorisation "young medical student" for "one of the other nurse's 
boyfriends" the practical joke seems less natural - it just does not 
seem an appropriate activity for a "young medical student". For the 
practical joke to work, an important activity that the employed 
categorisation must accomplish is a male "doing masculinity" 16 of an 
adult, sexually competent kind,l 7 
In many ways, the Garp extract is a literary sociological analysis of 
"doing masculinity". The description of Garp senior is the climax of 
this analysis. While he possesses male genitalia, he cannot do 
masculinity as an activity-bound display. He is a "Goner", and then a 
goner who regresses back to infancy. But, he still possesses what is 
needed for reproduction: he is, if you like, a baby with an erection, 
and moreover, his sperm is assessed by Jenny as "absurdly fertile". 
This is interesting, because both the practical joker and Garp have a 
sample of their spelm available for Jenny's assessment, in fact, one is 
in a glass and one is "in her hand", but the former is assessed by 
Jenny as "holl'id" and is dumped into some soil, while the latter is 
assessed not for what it is, but for its potential - "Y ou could plant 
anything there and it would blossom". The essential difference 
between the two candidates, which has been skilfully built up all 
16 For a detailed discussion of the notion of "doing masculinity, or "doing gender", 
see West and Zimmerman (1987). 
17 Somewhat speculatively, there is a possible extrapolation to Joan's story. One 
could hypothesise that in Joan's story the male offering the 'filled' wine inner 
would not be a sexual learner, for this would be to risk having the joke turned 
upon him. Just as with the 'glass filler' in the Garp extract we can reasonably 
suggest that as well as accomplishing a practical joke, the male offering the filled 
inner is doing masculinity, and again this is particularly bound up with the activity 
of sexual competence. 
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along in the text, is that one has typical male motives and intentions 
while the other has none - one does masculinity and the other cannot. 
It is the one who cannot do masculinity whose speffil is assessed 
positively by Jenny, and it is he who gets his 'shot' at Jenny, except 
now Jenny is 'on top'. 
In this very artful mixing of incongruity and inversion humour 
abounds, but so also does serious comment on male-female relations, 
in specific, troublesome male motives and intentions. Overall, we see 
in exhibit three, as in all the exhibits, members doing humour, 
seriously. An explication of the phrase 'doing humour, seriously' 
brings us full circle to the work of Sacks, and this will be discussed 
briefly in the concluding discussion, which now follows. 
4.5 Concluding Discussion 
It should now be apparent why this chapter began with an 
explication and critique of Mulkay's On Humour. In a sense, to 
understand the import of treating humour as a procedurally structured 
activity that is done seriously, one needs to juxtapose such a treatment 
with alternative and, at the moment, dominant sociological 
treatments.18 Mulkay's work happens to be a very recent and in-
depth treatment of humour, which also utilises ethnomethodological 
research, hence, its choice as a foil. It should be clear both from the 
18 For another recent, detailed SOCiological study of humour see Zijderveld 
(1983). Zijderveld makes a very similar argument to Mulkay, again using 
Schutzian concepts to argue that humour establishes alternative realities .. 
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critique and the analyses above, that I do not find much appeal in 
Mulkay's approach. 
To summanse, I argued firstly that Mulkay's recourse to 
"plausibility requirements" to understand humour was unnecesswy. 
The concept displays a clear tendency to separate thought and 
language-in-use, consequently, its analytical value is doubtful. The 
concept bears an unknown relationship to actual instances of humour 
in action, and, in logical telms it leads to an infinite regress. If these 
arguments are valid, then there w'e good grounds for dispensing with 
the concept of differing plausibility requirements in the analysis of 
humour. Secondly, I considered the general functionalist theme in 
Mulkay's argument. That is, he suggested that the serious social 
world contained a fundamental contradiction: people assume a unitary 
real world, but actually experience vastly different lives, which makes 
social life a "potential babble of discrepant voices". Making a 
functionalist step, Mulkay argued that humour could be used both, as 
an 'escape attempt' from the serious world and its "onerous" duties, 
and, as a potential point of resistance to serious social issues. Via the 
arguments of Sharrock and Anderson, I argued that there was no 
warrant in Schutz's work for a view of individuals as ego-centred 
fOlmulators of competing multiple realities. Rather, the import of 
Schutz's view was to focus on the essentially sequential nature of the 
evelyday world: despite different experiences and viewpoints there is 
always a taken-for-granted baseline position to return to. 
Ethnomethodological work has long suggested that the assumption of 
a unitary real world, far from being "onerous", could actually be of 
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crucial impOltance to social order and the very possibility of members 
being 'at home' in their intersubjective world. 
Following fi:om the explication and critique of Mulkay, I offered 
some analyses of humorous discourse, where that discourse was in 
some way related to male (in)fertility. In contrast to Mulkay's 
approach, the aim was to show that humour is through and through a 
matter of local production. Thus, it was ru'gued that 'Sperm Bank 
Five' as a band's name was available as an aspect of them doing being 
zany, and not as a putative comment on the real world activity of 
sperm banks. However, in addition, I argued that the exhibit did 
provide evidence for the existence of a presupposition that sperm 
banks are indeed serious business. In the Woody Allen Joke we saw 
an interesting manipulation of the sequential properties of talk: the 
joke 'worked' by inverting norms about masturbation being a sensitive 
matter, but given this, the fU'st task the joke had to accomplish was a 
display of the very sensitivity of talk about masturbation. This was 
accomplished velY simply and economically by a variety of 
conversational devices, devices which because of their utter 
familiarity remained 'seen but unnoticed'. At another level I argued 
that the joke, coming as it did within a movie concelned with male-
female relations, contained embodied materials for fmding, within a 
heterosexual union, conflict over the private sexual practices of the 
male. It was not as if this provided a counter discourse to be used in 
revolt against constraining societal nOlms, values, and so on; rather, it 
was an important piece of knowledge now made available to members 
as inquirers into their own culture. Similarly, the analysis of the third 
exhibit showed how humour was accomplished using common 
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procedural and structuring mechanisms. These also embodied the 
'serious' aspects of the humorous activity, in this case the "doing of 
masculinity" within the context of male-female antagonisms. 
In contrast to Mulkay, the analyses made no appeal to modes of 
discourse, plausibility requirements, nor to interpretative procedures 
where these are framed as a kind of information processing. Instead, 
the emphasis was on analysing the fOlmal orderliness of humour, 
where that orderliness is produced by and within the very structure of 
humour. In this regard, we can see the imprint of Sacks' mode of 
analysis, and it is to this that I now turn to conclude. 
Recall my gloss of Sacks: he argued that the structure of dirty jokes 
hid away implausibilities in the chain of events utilised to produce 
humour. As outlined, it was this comment that Mulkay took issue 
with and led him to introduce "plausibility requirements". But 
Mulkay failed to appreciate that Sacks' analysis of the dirty joke is, 
like all his work, strongly based on the ethnomethodological principle 
of "relevance".19 His main insight here was to look at relevance in 
terms of "sequential relevance". F or example, in "Everyone has to 
lie" (1975) he critiqued the then prevalent abstract philosophical 
discussions of true-false contrast classes, by neatly showing how the 
use of particular utterances sequentially relevanced the production of 
a true or false assignation. Similarly, in regards to humour, the 
simple point is made that an offer to tell a joke relevances the 
production of laughter or some sign of having 'got the joke', and not a 
19 See Schegloff (1991) for a concise discussion of the principle of relevance. 
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true/false assignation. This is the context in which Sacks made his 
remarks about jokes necessarily hiding away implausibilities. 
The general point to be taken from Sacks, is that the initial 
prefacing work which sets up the telling of a joke, makes the 
assignation of true/false (or plausible/implausible) ilTelevant, but this 
is something that must be maintained throughout the remainder of the 
joke's telling. In social interaction any ftrst action is subject to 
misunderstanding, ambiguity, mishearing and concomitant repair 
work, hence the social accomplishment of laughter from a joke is a 
conceIted, constrained, dynamic matter. Given this we can 
understand why Sacks commented that the dirty joke hid away 
implausibilities: the joke has an organisational task to accomplish -
laughter - and any introduction of non-essential items would detract 
from the economical accomplishment of that task. Therefore, 
Mulkay's argument that in the humorous mode speakers "are allowed 
much greater freedom in what they can, say" (20), is perhaps only true 
in terms of the jokeable -impossibilities can be talked of - but, in 
terms of the joke as an interactional accomplishment, it is possibly 
more tightly constrained than so called serious discourse. 
It is the dynamic and organisational nature of interaction that 
provides the rationale for moving from talk of the serious and the 
humorous, to talk of doing humour, seriously. Humour is a serious 
social accomplishment, just as serious, that is, as the 'matter of 
establishing the orderly properties of any situated conduct: 
The demonstrably rational properties of indexical expressions 
and indexical actions is an ongoing achievement of the 
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organized activities of evelyday life. Here is the heart of the 
matter. The managed production of this phenomenon in evelY 
aspect, from every perspective, and in evelY stage retains the 
character for members of serious, practical tasks, subject to 
every exigency of organizationally situated conduct. 
(GarfInkel, 1967: 34, emphasis added) 
In this sense there is no escape :£i.-om the senous practicality of 
everyday life. 
Having collapsed the distinction between the senous and the 
humorous in favour of a view where all social activities are serious 
accomplishments, . there is still a sense in which we can see humour 
involved in activities that are manifestly non-humorous. Why not 
retain the reasonable notion that some things are funny and some 
things are not, but avoid stating this in terms of bi-polar modes of 
discourse. For example, Woody Allen's joke is funny, but many of 
the real world activities that it encapsulates are manifestly not: 
conflict over private sexual activity within a stable heterosexual union 
is, potentially, a serious problem. However, this is not a warrant to 
view humour as a "potentially liberatory force". I prefer the view that 
humorous discourse is, amongst other things, available for 
interrogation by members for the 'sedous' infonnation it contains 
about their culture. That is, we need not work with a view where 
culture, society, social reality or social structures are stable because 
of the interrelationships between structural sub-elements - in 
Mulkay's case humour as a distinct mode of discourse functioning to 
patch-up the paradoxes of serious discourse. Instead, following 
Sacks, we could maintain that a culture "... is stable by reference to 
everybody seeing the world for what it is, without regard to whether 
it's pleasant [or humorous] or not .. ,II (1979: 14). The important point 
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IS, that making the world available for what it is, is no trivial 
achievement. To use a felicitous phrase from Sacks (1974), it 
requires the massive presence of the "fine power of a culture" . 
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Chapter Five 
The Relationship Between Social Science 
and Common-sense, Analysed with Respect to 
Accounts of Non-response 
S.l Introduction 
The vast majority of research on infertility has focused on 
infertility within heterosexual couples. Following from this, an 
obvious research question has concerned gender differences m 
response to infertility: do men and women within infertile couples 
vary in their response to infel1i1ity?; in what general ways does male 
infertility differ from female infertility? Research on this issue has 
produced an apparent consensus on two points. First, it is claimed 
that men and women do react differently to infertility, with women 
fmding it more of a problem than men. Recently, Greil, Leitko and 
Porter (1988) reviewed the literature on this issue and stated that 
"These studies will not support the weight of a conclusive 
interpretation but, taken as a whole, they do seem to suggest that, just 
as his marriage is better than hers (Bernard 1972), so seemingly is his 
infel1ility better than hers" (1988: 180). They illustrate this with 
extracts from their own interview data, and suggest that while women 
were often devastated by infertility, men were merely disappointed. 
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However, as Greil, Leitko and Porter suggest, this is not a 
"conclusive interpretation", and the second point of apparent 
consensus indicates why. Somewhat less frequently, researchers have 
reported the comments of infertile people and others, suggesting that 
societal nonns and values connect male fertility with male virility, 
sexual competency, potency, and so on. Here is an early and typical 
statement of this argument: 
Whilst a sense of failure may be common to both sexes, it is 
only the proud male who regards it [infeltility] as an affront to 
his sexual capacity. For him procreation has always served as a 
means of demonstrating his virility, whereas it is well known 
that a woman's feltility gives no indication of her sexual 
responsiveness. And no matter how bravely he has accepted the 
discovery at a conscious level, unconsciously the equation with 
impotence is likely to remain. (Humphrey, 1969: 52) 
Supposedly, it is in this linkage between fertility and virility1 that 
infertility may have the potential to be a serious problem for men. 
Thus, the infertility literature is equivocal on this aspect of gender's 
role in infertility: on one hand, men are merely disappointed by 
infertility, whilst on the other hand, they may fmd it seriously 
threatening due to the fertility-virility linkage. This apparent situation 
of ambivalence may be partly due to the small size of the literature on 
this topic (for more reviews see, Abbey, Andrews & Halman, 1991; 
Berg, Wilson & Weingrutner, 1991), and the fact that infertility 
research in general is predominantly focused on female infeltility (see 
Matthews & Matthews, 1986b). 
1 Hereafter, this will be referred to as the 'fertilityNvirility linkage'. 
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This latter point could reflect a number of factors, but for ce1tain it 
is connected to the difficulties researchers have experienced in 
gaining male respondents in studies of infeltility. It is this point, 
rather than the equivocality of the literature, that is the focus of this 
chapter. Specifically, the chapter analyses the way that researchers 
have accounted for high rates of non-response by infertile men. This 
topic came about as a result of pragmatic factors: in the course of 
reading research on infertility it was obvious that whenever 
researchers attempted to study infertility they had far more difficulty 
in gaining male respondents than female respondents; and I also 
experienced this difficulty in attempting to gain infertile male 
respondents for this study. The upshot of both these factors is that I 
formed a collection of accounts of non-response in studies of 
infertility . 
In this chapter, these accounts are approached chiefly through 
ethnomethodology's longstanding 'concern with background 
assumptions, or more generally, common-sense.2 In short, it is argued 
that common-sense is central to researchers' accounts of the high rate 
of non-response by men in studies of infertility. While, in principle, 
an analytic conCelTI with common-sense could be applied to any 
substantive area, the problem of non-response turns out to be a velY 
useful point of application. It functions almost as a breaching 
demonstration, as the accounts of non-response display and reinforce 
2 No definition of common-sense will be provided here. Just what is being 
referred to will become clear in the following discussion, besides which, the term 
is mostly self-explicating: common-sense tells us what common-sense is. While 
aware that common-sense can be both noun and adjective, and this is partly why 
different presentations like 'commonsense' and 'common sense' have arisen, the 
term 'common-sense' will be used consistently throughout this chapter. Simply, 
this seems a useful compromise. 
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much of the orderly features of what researchers have said about 
infertility based on data gathered from those who will talk to 
researchers. As will be seen, this includes reference to the fertility-
virility linkage and the supposed different impact of infe11ility upon 
men and women. 
In the main part of the chapter, extracts from the infertility literature 
are presented as a data corpus, the accounts contained are described, 
and then analysis focuses on the intertwining of common-sense and 
social science reasoning in the accounting process. Before this 
empirical section a brief outline of the ethnomethodological approach 
to the relationship between social science and common-sense is 
offered. Between this outline and the presentation of the data corpus, 
some brief details of my own expelience of gaining infertile male 
respondents is offered, chiefly to provide a graphic illustration of the 
problem of non-response, but also to make some initial points about 
the relationship between social science 'and common-sense. 
5.2 Approaching . the Relationship Between Common-sense 
and Social Science 
As a general argument, there is nothing new in suggesting that any 
piece of social action, including social science practice, is necessarily 
based upon a whole range of common-sense background assumptions. 
This is one of ethnomethodology's foundational points} However, 
3 Any introductory text or review article on ethnomethodology will provide 
discussion of 'common-sense'. Heritage (1984, ch.3) provides a particularly good 
discussion which shows the centrality of Schutz's work to the formation of 
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while not a new argument for ethnomethodologists, the issue of the 
relation between common-sense and social science has drawn "much 
agonising" (Sharrock & Anderson, 1991: 56) from other sociologists. 
Therefore, it is worth outlining the ethnomethodological position on 
this issue, with the aim of showing that there is really no need for 
agomsmg. 
There is no reason for agonising because in its general form the 
ethnomethodological argument appears incontrovertible. The 
argument is a form of the 'always and already social' thesis which 
proceeds as follows. Social scientists operate by taking cultural 
members' categories, conceptions and theories and refOlmulating them 
in terms of general social structural principles' which transcend their 
everyday base in common-sense. Thus, we have a transition from 
members' perspectives where 'things are as they seem', to sociologists' 
perspectives where 'things are not always as they seem'. Rather than 
adopt the traditional sociological motto that 'things are not always as 
they seem', from the beginning ethnomethodology has been concerned 
with the question, 'how exactly are things for everyday cultural 
members', or, as Sharrock and Button put it, ethnomethodology's 
recurrent question is "how, within a social scene, are explanations of 
persons' actions found?" (1991: 165). A consequence of such 
questioning is not so much a wholesale critique of other forms of 
ethnomethodology's concern with common-sense. As well as making a general 
argument about the relation between commonsense and science, 
ethnomethodologists have now branched into the study of science itself, which is 
approached as a practically accomplished ordinary activity - Lynch, Livingston 
and Garfinkel (1983) provide a review of the ethnomethodological work in this 
field. 
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sociology, but celtainly the presentation of some nagging problems 
for traditional sociology ~d its motto. 
One of the more persistent of these problems has been well captured 
by Sharrock and Button: 
It is this: show that you can collect a corpus of data which is 
comprised of instances of 'social action' without presupposing 
the organisation of a 'social stnlcture' in the assembly of that 
very collection. (1991: 158, original emphasis) 
The abstractness of this statement is clarified by the more detailed 
example that Shanock and Button discuss. Taking education (but one 
could apply this to any topic area), sociologists set out to study what 
goes on in classrooms, and in this endeavour experience no difficulty 
whatsoever in finding classrooms to study. Equally, they have no 
difficulty in applying the categories 'teacher' and 'pupil' to the people 
in the classroom. The sociologist of education may choose to write 
up his or her research in the classroom in terms of class, gender, or 
ethnicity based inequalities, and must work to do so; but, it is the case 
that there is no difficulty in finding events-in-a-classroom. That is, 
this ordering work is seldom reflected upon - the categories 
'classroom', 'teacher' and 'pupil' do not have to be derived from 
observation, but are 
in place from the very beginning. They are, of course, in place 
from the very beginning because they are institutionalised (so 
to speak) in the social setting that is being desclibed, because 
they are socially sanctioned ways of describing events which 
take place in that setting. (Sharrock & Button, 1991: 159, 
original emphasis) 
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In short, to recall a well known phrase of Schutz's, social scientists 
produce 'second order constructs', "namely, constructs of the 
consttucts made by the actors on the social scene" (1962: 6). The 
point is that the original typification work is not pre-social but is 
another social accomplishment now thoroughly incorporated into the 
realm of common-sense. Or in other words, it is 'naturalised', now 
part of the natural order of things, and researchers rely on these 
naturalised accomplishments in their research activities. 
Put in these terms it seems incontrovertible that social SCIence 
cannot but rely upon common-sense, and there is no possibility of any 
absolute separation of the two. This is now an 'old' argument, but it 
has 'new' repercussions: it suggests that the particularities of the 
relationship between social science and common-sense IS an 
important research topic. Sociologists and others have certainly 
reflected upon the role of knowledge in society, as the existence of a 
'sociology of knowledge' and a growing band of sociologists 
influenced by Foucault testifies. However, in general these 
considerations have taken the traditional sociological approach of 
analysing how bodies of knowledge bear the marks of society, or, 
asking what function(s) bodies of knowledge fulfil in society. While 
legitimate modes of inquiry, these sociological approaches often fail 
to give detailed attention to empirical materials which embody the 
relationship between social science and common-sense. 
Sharrock (1989) has noted these points above, and suggested that an 
altelnative approach would be to study 
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... how professional sociological studies (theoretical and 
empitical) are themselves regulated by insistence upon socially 
sanctioned bona fide facts of life (which is another way of 
saying 'common sense understandings'). This is not a question to 
which one can turn to other sociologists for any kind of answer, 
for ... The role of 'the obvious', of what 'goes without saying', 
'stands beyond question', or 'can be supplied by the 
hearer/reader' is not something that has been systematically and 
self-consciously treated in the main sociological tradition ... 
Obviously, the interest would not be in producing a sweeping 
characterisation of the relationship between 'sociology' and 
'common sense' but in inspecting, rather, the intricate ways in 
which, in pru1icular studies, distinctively sociological 
conceptions are inevitably intertwined with a dense body of 
matters that can be taken to be 'known in common' prior to the 
institution of the inquity in hand and which can, as grounds for 
further action and inference, shape its course. (1989: 662) 
This chapter makes a small contribution to this task. As noted, the 
particular studies that I focus upon are those where a male reluctance 
to partake in research on infertility has been described and accounted 
for. As such it should be clear that the intention is not to make a 
sweeping statement about the relationship between sociology and 
common-sense, but to learn something about accounts of infertility as 
substantive matters, and how the relationship between common-sense 
and social science is involved in these accounts. 
One further proviso should also be made. As Lynch (1991) argues, 
while it is charactet"istic of ethnomethodological studies that they 
exercise "indifference" (Garfmkel & Sacks, 1970) about what they 
study, it must be emphasised that indifference is not equivalent to 
denial. Following Lynch, there is no itnplication in the following 
discussion that "social scientists' measurements have no more than a 
'common-sense' basis or that there are no distinctions to be drawn 
between sociologists', coroners', physicists' or any other lay or 
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professional efforts to measw-e phenomena" (1991: 86). The point is 
to investigate the differences, similarities, incorporations, 
modifications between, with, and of, common-sense and social 
science. That is, to treat the relationship between social science and 
common-sense as a topic of investigation and not suggest that, either, 
common-sense is faulty, or, that social science is merely a fancified 
version of common-sense. 
5.3 Non-re.~ponse in Studies of Men and Infertility: A First 
Illustration 
Social science research very often involves researchers talking to a 
sample from a target population (,subjects', 'respondents', 
'interviewees', etc.) at some stage in the research process. While both 
the world of the researchers and the world of the target population are 
very complex, the linkage between the two is achieved by very 
mundane means: a communication whereby the researcher requests 
the participation of the subject in the research. While such 
communication may take many forms, including face-to-face requests, 
requests by telephone, requests posted in newspapers, and so on, in 
general these communicative acts can be considered as request-
response adjacency pairs. Obviously, the 'preference' operating in this 
pair is 'yes', that is, the respondent indicates a willingness to respond 
to the researcher's questions. 
But clearly, 'preference' is not akin to an invariant rule, and 
celtainiy, in the case of attempts to talk to men in studies of 
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infertility, researchers have often received many negative replies from 
candidate respondents. Below, my own attempt to interview infertile 
men will be outlined to provide a graphic example of this high non-
response rate. 
It was never the intention in this study to attempt to gain a large 
sample from the population of infertile men. Rather, the aim was for 
about thirty respondents, and after appeals in multiple sources over a 
period of ten months, nineteen interviews were successfully 
completed. The sources included: personal acquaintances and 'friends 
of friends'; snowball from previous respondents; requests at two 
regional infertility support groups and the 
national infertility society; contacts from social workers working with 
the infertile; and requests in a university newsletter. As well as the 
men that agreed to talk to me there were a number of refusals and 
other cases, and these are summarised in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 
Results of Attempted Enrolment 
in a Study of Male Infertility 
Result Number 
Candidate agreed to interview 19 
Candidate directly refused 10 
Refusal evidenced by candidate failing to contact 8 
Candidate identified by intennediary but intennediary 
did not ask 5 
Candidate identified but could not be asked due to 
inability to trace, logistical problems 5 
Possible identification of candidate by intelmediary, 
said would ask, but no feedback 4 
Mistaken identification of male infel1ility 4 
Other* 3 
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*Offers to pruiicipate from: a male who had a vasectomy and was 
not uying to have children; a male whose pru1ner was infeliile; and 
one pru1ner who was infertile said her fertile husband would be 
willing to participate. 
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The table shows ten cases of direct refusals to be interviewed and 
eight cases where refusals can be imputed by failure to contact, that 
is, the men were asked if they would pat1ake but there was no reply 
from them. It seems reasonable to add these two categories to 
constitute eighteen cases of non-response.4 Given that nineteen men 
agreed to be interviewed, a non-response rate of 48.6 per cent can be 
calculated. There is also a good possibility that the remaining cases 
include non-response, but even as is, the non-response rate represents 
virtually one refusal for every agreement to be interviewed. Without 
refelTing to manuals of social reseat'ch methods,5 it is reasonable to 
assel1 that such a high non-response rate is an 'observable-reportable' 
, 
matter for reseat'chers, that is, one that naturally calls for accounting 
work. 
Two further points can be made from the table. The fust concems 
the complexity of the process of gaming respondents. Apal1 from 
agreements, direct refusals and assumed refusals, the table shows a 
large number of additional events: in attempts to gain respondents, 
candidates are identified by intermediaries but the intermediary does 
not subsequently ask the candidate to participate; intermediaries 
4 Note here that no attempt has been made to define 'non-response'. This is 
unnecessary, as the interest here is not in operationalising the concept, but in the 
accounting work that it stimulates. Having said this it should be clear that the way 
I have used the term to summarise my own attempts to gain respondents 
incorporates two potentially distinct categories. That is, those who directly refuse, 
and those who are asked to participate by the researcher or an intermediary, but 
who do not contact the researcher about the request to participate. It seems a fair 
assumption to group these together as 'non-response', 
5 If one was interested in social science comment on non-response and related 
issues the journal The Public Opinion Quarterly provides ample and regular 
discussion. 
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mistakenly identify candidates; and people mistakenly identify 
themselves as candidates. Hence, the apparently simple task of 
setting out to interview people of category 'X', where it is the 
researcher who has operationalised 'X', comes up against common-
sense notions of what is meant by that category, and non-
c01Tespondence between the two is not uncommon. It is likely that 
such non-correspondence is generally left out of research reports 
where precise-looking figures of response and non-response rates are 
calculated, but common-sense decisions are undoubtedly involved in 
the production of these figures. 
A brief elaboration shows this process in more detail. In my 
enrolment attempt, the vast majority of candidates were identified by 
intermediaries, and often for various reasons including pragmatics and 
propriety, it was the intermediary who contacted the candidate to ask 
if they would participate in my study. I would then check with the 
intermediary about progress: the case where candidates were to 
contact me, but I heard nothing, would be included in the category 
'refusal evidenced by candidate's failure to contact'; or if the candidate 
contacted me, or I contacted him, and he did not want to partake this 
became a 'direct refusal'. In the first case, the whole counting process 
is predicated upon trust: the researcher trusts that the intermediary has 
indeed contacted the candidate. In one case a candidate was 
identified via a previous male who had been interviewed, and he 
(Brian) subsequently agreed to be interviewed. After the interview 
Brian also said he knew another man that he could ask on my behalf. 
I was very grateful both for his agreement to be interviewed and his 
offer to contact another candidate. Several weeks elapsed with no 
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word from Brian, so I telephoned and asked him what had happened. 
He replied that he had contacted the candidate, but was told that there 
was no interest in being interviewed. I left it at that and thanked him 
for his efforts. However, I was sure that he was lying: I just knew, 
without being able to specify how, that he had not contacted that 
person, that he had made up the stOlY about the candidate's refusal. 
In the practical process of tallying non-response what is to be done 
with occurrences such as this? Should it be added to the category 
'direct refusal by candidate' or would that be a mistake given the 
strong hunch that the candidate was in fact never asked to respond? 
What categOlY would it then go into? Final rates of non-response 
presented numerically, apparently transcend these practical decisions, 
but obviously this whole quantitative process is based upon 
'reasonable' interpretations within the context of pragmatic problems 
that researchers face. In reality, research is an often messy process, 
and the point of the above example is- not that the whole process of 
producing figures of response and non-response is biased, or error 
prone, but that it is socially accomplished, and this accomplishment is 
based upon common-sense, evelyday, rationalisations and procedures. 
This point can now be pursued further by presenting the data corpus 
and analysing the accounts of non-response it contains. The analysis 
is divided into four parts. First, the data corpus is presented along 
with some initial comments; second, the accounts of non-response in 
these data are described; third, attention is turned to a central task that 
accounts of non-response achieve - the attribution of motives; and 
fourth, the above points are more narrowly focused on one example 
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of accounting work which IS more directly concemed with the 
fertility-virility linkage. 
5.4 Data and Some Initial Comments 
The data corpus compnses eight extracts from social scientific 
studies of infertility which include comment on non-response: 
1. Humphrey (1969: 8) 
This response rate, amounting to 86 per cent of the couples 
presumed to have been reached, was regarded as encouraging. 
As in all such enquiries, the non-respondents may have differed 
in important respects: for example, some may have been unduly 
sensitive about their childlessness, others lacking in a social 
conscience ... Even those who could not be reached may have 
had more than their fair share of unresolved problems, or 
perhaps in some cases the marriage had been dissolved. All this 
is sheer speculation, but one suggestive fmding emerged from 
the clinical summaries for these groups. This was that the sixty-
eight couples whose questionnaire was retumed undelivered, 
and the thirty-six who apparently received one but did not retum 
it, showed rather more impairment in their feltility tests than the 
216 respondents. 
2. Miall (1986: 271) 
I began my research with the aim of comparing reactions of men 
and women to their involuntary childlessness. However, I was 
unable to obtain a sample of men sufficient for this comparative 
approach. Indeed, in order to recruit female respondents, I was 
obliged to use a snowball sampling technique. The difficulty 
that I had in obtaining a sample of infertile individuals who 
would participate in my study reflects the sensitivity and secrecy 
that SUll'Ound the problem of infertility. 
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3. Miall (1989: 298, fn. 3) 
Male infertility may be more stigmatizing than female infertility, 
given the link between male potency and fertility (cf. Miall, 
1986). Men may have been more reluctant to discuss personal 
infertility. In addition, our culture continues to link women more 
explicitly to reproduction and family than men. Thus, men may 
have had less interest in participating in research on these issues. 
4. Sabatelli, Meth, and Gavazzi (1988: 339, 342) 
... data were collected from 62 women and 36 men (a 64% 
response rate) ... Unfortunately, because of missing data or 
because of a recent bil1h ... the final sample used within this 
study consists of 52 women and 29 men .... 
In addition, males and, in particular, males with an infertility 
condition, are undelTepresented in the sample. This 
undelTepresentation may be due to the unwillingness of males to 
participate in research on sensitive issues .... 
5. Becker and Nachtigall (1991: 877) 
A study of 43 American couples examined· women's and men's 
experience of infertility treatment .... Data were collected with 
28 couples during a one-and-a-half year period in 1984-85. An 
additional 8 couples and 7 women who chose to be interviewed 
without their pal1ner were interviewed in a second wave of data 
collection '" The 7 women interviewed alone were willing to 
participate only if their pal1ners were not included. They gave 
various reasons, such as, "He's too busy," "It would add stress to 
the relationship," and "I don't want to bother him." There were 
no refusals to participate in the research. 
6. Woollett (1985: 475) 
Fifty infertile people were interviewed .... [consisting ofj F01iy-
two women (mean age 31.4 years, range 24-41) and eight men 
(mean age 36.9 years, range 29-50) ... Women were more 
190 
willing to discuss infertility than men, reflecting assumptions 
that children are less important to men (Owen 1982). 
7. MacNab (1984: 91-93) 
The fmdings of the study are contained in microcosm in this 
description of the difficulties of fmding men to participate in the 
study. The medical clinics explained that their average male 
infertility patient did not return for a second appointment, often 
avoiding even the simplest evaluation procedures. None of the 
men in the study are from this referral source. The urologist 
stated that the men whom he dealt with were usually so 
devastated that they could not talk about what the experience 
meant to them .... Even men who were friends of the researcher's 
friends and colleagues did not consistently return the 
questionnaires. These men had generally had direct phone 
contact with the researcher, and had agreed to participate in the 
study. Many of them did not respond to requests that they state 
their reasons for withdrawing from the study. Two men 
explained that their wives felt uncomfortable about their sharing 
such personal infOlmation with an outsider. One man wrote that 
he was too busy to fill out the questionnaire. Most others did not 
give reasons for changing their minds about paI1icipating. . .. 
What seems to make the critical difference in their willingness 
to join the study is the direct personal connection they feel 
between the referral source and themselves. .., This is evidence 
that the topic is emotionally loaded. ... The reasons for the 
silence that has prevailed about men and infe11ility are manifest 
in these difficulties. The need for a forum for men struggling 
with the problem is both evident and denied. 
8. Link and Darling (1986: 49, 57) 
Fifty physicians were randomly selected from the membership 
list of the American Fertility Society and contacted to enlist 
their cooperation with this study. Since only six physicians 
agreed to participate, additional respondents were obtained ... 
The difficulty in obtaining respondents resulted from the 
reluctance of physicians to participate in research involving their 
patients, as well as problems which couples experience in 
discussing their infertility with persons other than physicians or 
counsellors. The resultant sample consisted of 43 couples ... 
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Furthelmore, the researchers were provided with data from an 
additional 17 wives whose husbands chose not to participate in 
the study. 
Since the data were anonymous, the reasons why the husbands 
chose not to participate are unknown. 
Initially, two questions can be asked about the data: why are these 
pm1icular extracts offered as data?; and how comparable m'e the 
extracts? After answering these questions a brief summmy will be 
made of the data and then analysis proper can begin. 
1. Why are these particular extracts offered as data? 
Obviously, these extracts do not constitute all of the comment on 
non-response within the infertility literature, so the question 'why 
these extracts' is gelmane, It is not easy to fmd extended discussion 
of the researchers' problem of non-response, and a first answer to the 
question is that these extracts constitute some of the more extensive 
comment on this issue. But, more imp0l1antly, they m'e chosen as 
data because as well as containing information on non-response, they 
offer an explanation of it, and this is the more clUcial component of 
interest. Further, with the exception of extract 7, all the extracts are 
from published studies, and m'e good examples of the type of research 
conducted on infeltility. Overall, the extracts provide a good 
indication of the variety and pattemed nature of accounting work on 
non-response. 
2. How comparable are the extracts? 
Broadly speaking, the data above can be conceptualised as the result 
of a resem'ch process involving three elements: i), a population which, 
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ii), is sampled by researchers to gam infOlmation about the 
population, where, iii), the sampling may be conducted in different 
ways. If one was concerned with the comparability of different 
studies of infertility, problems could arise firstly in the definition of 
the population - we would want to be sure that we were talking about 
the same thing when comparing studies of infertility. However, such 
a uniform base does not always occur in the infertility literature, 
because there is a serious lack of clarity in the use of the term 
'infertility'. While a couple may be described as 'infertile', and in this 
sense both the man and woman experience infertility, it is often the 
case that only one partner in the couple will be identified as 
'reproductively impaired'. As one astute commentator has observed, 
"For women, the single most common cause of infertility is '" mating 
with an infertile man. (Conversely, the single most common cause of 
infertility in men is mating with an infertile woman.)" (Rothman, 
1982, as quoted in Greil, Leitko, & POtter, 1988: 175). Obviously, 
infertility can also involve the situation where both the man and 
woman in the couple are reproductively impaired, or, where the 
infertility is due to unexplained factors. Lack of clarity arises because 
infertility researchers do not always make it clear what situation they 
are referring to when they use the terms 'male infertility' and/or 
'female infertility'. Further, there may be insufficient information 
within the published study to clarify matters. This results in the 
situation where it is far from clear what the referents of the telms 
'infertility', 'female infertility' and 'male infertility' are, hence 
comparability across studies is problematic. 6 
6 Recall here the discussion in chapter one about bracketing 'male infertility'. This 
point provides another good reason for the use of brackets. 
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In addition, the studies are not fully comparable because they do 
use differing sampling methods, and it is reasonable to assume that 
this is related to the variation in response rates and perhaps even to 
the gender imbalance in respondents. 
Having noted this problem of comparability, essentially it will be 
sidestepped in the following analysis. In practical telIDs, it is not 
possible to standardise the terms used in the extracts that form the 
data corpus. But more importantly, the essence of male or female 
infertility is not the topic of interest here. The interest is in how 
common-sense figures in social science accounts of non-response, 
and a good argument can be made that ilTespective of whether the 
accounts lack a standard referent, common-sense will figure in the 
accounts as a background, unexplicated feature. 
3. Summary of the data. 
Even though the number of extracts IS small, the number is 
sufficient to see variability and overall pattems in the data corpus, as 
Table 5.2 indicates. 
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Table 5.2 
Summary of Extracts on Non-Response 
Extract Response Rate 
1 86% 
2,3 not given 
4 64% 
5 100% (92%)b 
6 not given 
7 5%c 
8 not given 
Ratio of female 
respondents to 
male respondents 
2.5 : 1 (80/32)a 
confined to women 
1.8 : 1 (52/29) 
1.2 : 1 (43/36) 
5.3 : 1 (42/8) 
confmed to men 
1.4 : 1 (60/43) 
a This is the sub-sample that Humphrey interviewed, the 86% 
response rate is for the initial sample from which those 
interviewed were drawn. . 
b Response can be calculated as 92% if one counts the 7 
women who chose to be interviewed without their partner as 
7 de facto cases of male non-response. 
c MacNab does not give a non-response rate; this is calculated 
from his outline of questionnaires sent out (N=approx. 600) 
and fmal number of respondents (N=30). 
The data's variability is clearly shown in the range of response rates: 
from Link and Darling's 100% (or 92%) (extract 5), to MacNab's 5% 
(extract 7). While it can be ascertained from the comments of those 
researchers who did not give a response rate, that the non-response 
rate was high, the range from 5% to 100% is still very large. In 
general this would suggest that studies of infertility will not invariably 
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face poor response rates (and obviously the differing sampling 
methods need to be bome in mind here). Conversely, the table also 
displays a clear unifonnity - the gender imbalance in the samples. 
For evelY case where a ratio can be calculated, females outnumber 
males, with the ratios ranging from 1.2 : 1, to 5.3 : 1. Thus, in these 
studies men have displayed a greater reluctance than women to 
participate. 
5.S Accounts of Non-response 
Before proceeding to describe the accounts of non-response, it is 
wOlth outlining what is meant here by the telID 'account'. Within the 
wide sociological literature centrally concemed with accounts (eg. see 
Antaki, 1988; Gilbelt & Abell, 1983; Scott & Lyman, 1968) there is 
some variation in definition, but Heritage's discussion of an account 
as an "ovelt explanation in which social actors give accounts of what 
they are doing in telIDS of reasons, motives or causes" (1988: 128) is a 
generally acceptable definition. In simple telIDs, an account is not 
just a description of an event but is an explanation of how or why it 
happened. Such explanatory work may take many fonns, fi'om 
explicit delineation of causal linkages, to taken-for-granted inferences 
about motives for action. Again, most commentators would recognise 
this variability in accounts, but further complicating the concept of 
account is the notion of 'accountability', which is a central precept of 
ethnomethodological inquiry. While accountability may involve 
accounts, the process it conceptualises is more than the simple use of 
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accounts as explanations. As Garfmkel put it in the first page of 
Studies in Ethnomethodology, "... the activities whereby members 
produce and manage settings of organized evelyday affairs are 
identical with members' procedures for making those settings 
"account-able" (1967: 1). A verbalised account is one velY common 
and important way that activities are rendered "account-able", but 
gazes, body movement, gestures, and so on, also contribute to the 
accountability of activities. Overall, the concept of accountability 
emphasizes the situated nature of accounts: accounts "organize, and 
are organized by, the empirical circumstances in which they occur" 
(Heritage, 1984: 141), and together, accounts and accountability 
constitute a 'running index' of implicit understandings continuously 
updated in the course of practical activities (Heritage, 1988). 
While textual accounts, such as the extracts above, can be examined 
with respect to accountability (see McHoul, 1982), this approach will 
not be pursued here. Rather, the focus will be on the accounts as 
explanations. Clearly the data corpus represents social scientific 
accounting work on the problem of non-response. In essence, the 
account consists of an explanation of non-response, where this 
involves attributions of reasons, causes and motives. This attribution 
work is a prime area where important linkages between social science 
and common-sense occur, and this will be discussed in more detail 
after the three main types of account are described, as follows. 
1. Sensitivity 
This appears to be the dOlninant account in the extracts. Very 
simply the explanation is that non-response is an indication of the 
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sensitivity of infertility - it is a delicate matter and hence people may 
not wish to talk to a researcher (or others) about it. Forms of this 
account can be seen in extracts 1, 2, 4, and 7, where, respectively, the 
following pluases are linked to infertility as the underlying reason for 
non-response: "sensitivity", "sensitivity and secrecy", "sensitive 
issues" and "emotionally loaded". The simplest invocation of a 
sensitivity account is seen in extract 4, where Sabatelli, Meth and 
Gavazzi state, "This undenepresentation [of males] may be due to the 
unwillingness of males to participate in research on sensitive issues". 
In its general fmID, 'sensitivity' may be used to account for non-
response by both men and women. For example, Miall (extract 1) 
wanted to interview both men and women but clearly had a problem 
with male non-response, which she explains via a sensitivity account 
(extract 3); but, in addition, she suggests that the fact that she had to 
resort to snowball sampling shows that gaining female respondents 
was also a problem (extract 2). Thus, Miall offers the "sensitivity and 
secrecy" of infertility as an account of non-response, for both 
genders. Although not so explicitly, Link and Darling (extract 8) 
suggest that their problem in gaining a sample of infertile couples, as 
well as being due to the reluctance of physicians to cooperate, was 
due to "problems which couples expeli.ence in discussing their 
infertility". This seems to fit within a sensitivity account, and again is 
applicable to both men and women. 
In addition, there is a more specific fmID of the sensitivity account 
specifically offered for male non-response. This is the fertility-
virility linkage, which might be considered as a subset of the 
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sensitivity account applying specifically to men. The clearest 
statement of it comes from Mial1: "Male infe11ility may be more 
stigmatising than female infertility, given the link between male 
potency and fertility (cf. Miall, 1986). Men may have been more 
reluctant to discuss personal infeltility ... " (extract 2). There are no 
other clear examples of the feltility-virility linkage account in the 
extracts but a further example will be discussed below in section 5.7. 
It should also be pointed out that researchers often make comments 
about the fertility-virility linkage in discussion not concerned with 
non-response. For example, MacNab, identifies the links between 
masculinity and fertility as an important part of the experience of 
male infel1ility, but, he does not take this up as an explicit account of 
the real difficulty he had in gaining respondents. 
2. Children are not so important for men 
As outlined in the introduction, consideration of the question of 
gender differences in response to infertility has produced a consensus 
that women are more adversely affected by infertility than men. A 
very common explanation for this involves, to put it simply, 
socialisation into normative roles. It is argued that in our culture the 
socialisation process places high value on women as mothers, hence 
this becomes a natural and normal role for women. A cOlTelate of this 
explanation is that the role of father and the work of childrearing is 
not so important for men (see Berg, Wilson & Weingartner, 1991; 
Humphrey, 1977; Nock, 1987). This cOlTelate then becomes available 
for accounting work on non-response. Extracts 3 and 6 are two clear 
examples of this account: "In addition, our culture continues to link 
women more explicitly to reproduction and family than men. Thus, 
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men may have had less interest in participating in research on these 
issues" (3); "Women were more willing to discuss infel1ility than 
men, reflecting assumptions that children are less imp0l1ant to men 
(Owen 1982)" (6). While not as common as the sensitivity account, 
this account is offered, and has attractive linkages to other research on 
gender roles and childrearing. 
3. Pragmatic and Other factors 
There are three extracts (1, 5, 7) which include this account. In two 
out of the three examples, the account is made via straight quotes 
from, or rep0l1s of, the subjects' discourse, rather than as researchers' 
direct explanations: "They gave various reasons, such as, "He's too 
busy," "It would add stress to the relationship," and "I don't want to 
bother him." (5); "Two men explained that their wives felt 
uncomfortable about their shating such personal infonnation with an 
outsider. One man wrote that he was too busy to fill out the 
questionnaire" (7). While some of these reports contain matters that 
suggest links with a sensitivity account, there is a common emphasis 
on pragmatism over and above the possibility of sensitivity: being too 
busy; respecting their partner's wishes; not wanting to add stress to a 
relationship. 
One account that clearly belongs in an 'other' categOlY is contained 
in extract 1. Humphrey makes the interesting comment that, "As in 
all such enquiries, the non-respondents may have differed in 
important respects: for example, some may have been unduly 
sensitive about their childlessness, others lacking in a social 
conscience" (extract 1). While Humphrey offers the dominant 
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sensitivity account, he also makes the suggestion that non-respondents 
were "lacking in a social conscience" - this is the sole OCCUlTence of 
such an account. 7 
These then, are the three main accounts which can be identified in 
the data corpus. Each extract may contain two or more of the 
accounts, and there appears to be no sense in which they are mutually 
incompatible. Clearly, the 'sensitivity' account is the most common, 
with the other two being offered as additional explanations. 
5.6' A Central Task in Accounts of Non-Response: The 
Attribution of Motives 
Clearly, in the accounts of non-response the issue to be explained is 
precisely why the candidates did not wish to partake in the 
researchers' studies. Thus, for the sake of brevity, patt of the work 
7 Humphrey appears to be assuming that it is morally correct for subjects to 
respond to researchers' requests for information, and that by agreeing to 
participate, respondents contribute to the social good. If this is the assumption he 
worked upon when he conducted his study, in the light of recent discussions of the 
role of social science in society (eg. Foucault, 1980) it now seems quaint and ill-
considered. However, it cannot be dismissed that easily. It is still an extremely 
common social science research practice to couch requests for information from 
the 'natives' in terms of the possible societal benefits to be accrued from the 
research. Whether researchers themselves really believe this may be immaterial, 
for this whole way of thinking about social science seems to have embedded itself 
in everyday understandings of social science to the extent that the 'natives' 
themselves expect requests to be couched in these terms. Time and time again, 
when I spoke to people about my research and when I made various requests for 
respondents, the people I spoke to would assume I was doing a 'survey' of male 
infertility in order to find out about its frequency and what needed to be done 
about it. While research obviously does proceed in this manner, just as obviously 
it can take other forms. Nevertheless, it is the 'survey' view of research and the 
assumption that policy changes will be offered, that seems pervasive in everyday 
discourse about sociology. 
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that the accounts accomplish can be labelled 'attribution of motives'. 
The question pursued in this section is based upon the assumption 
that the attributions of motive contained in the accounts are perfectly 
plausible - they do not seem strained but are reasonable explanations. 
But of course, the question is, how is this plausibility accomplished, 
how is the naturalness of the accounts produced? In the extracts the 
attributions of motive are made, mostly, as blunt assertions - they 
appear to be so obvious as to not need explaining. But given the 
emphasis within social science on reasoned argument and the 
provision of evidence for generalisation, it would be surprising if 
blunt assertions were all that were offered. Indeed, five forms of 
motive attribution work can be identified in the accounts, and these 
are discussed below. 
1. 'No comment, but ... ' 
In many research situations there' is little possibility of non-
respondents giving any infOlmation on their motives for non-
response. Hence, one possible solution to the question of motives is 
to accept this lack of information and avoid comment altogether. 
Extract 8 appears to be an example of this. Link and Darling's initial 
sample of 43 couples was supplemented by " 17 wives whose 
husbands chose not to participate in the study". While Link and 
Darling used the wives' responses as data, they restricted comment on 
the husbands' non-response to the sole statement that "Since the data 
were anonymous, the reasons why the husbands chose not to 
participate are unknown". In effect, they make no comment. While 
this seems to be a case of adherence to a relatively strict scientific 
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model of social science, where if there is no evidence thel'e is no 
comment offered, it should be noted that Link and Darling previously 
invoked the sensitivity account in relation to their problem in gaining 
couple respondents, Thus, this is not an absolute case of 'no 
comment': 'no comment' leaves the motive attribution work up to the 
reader, but this work may well be informed by Link and Darling's 
previous 'sensitivity account', which provides a minimal frame for 
understanding the subsequent mention of the husbands' non-
response.S 
2. 'The candidates said .•. ' 
In some research situations non-respondents (and others who speak 
for them) do provide at least minimal information on why they did not 
respond. In this situation, a relatively simple option for providing the 
grounds of motive attribution is simple reportage of what information 
non-respondents offer. Extracts 5 and 7 include examples of this: 
Two men explained that their wives felt uncomfortable about 
their sharing such personal information with an outsider. One 
man wrote that he was too busy to fill out the questionnaire. (7) 
They gave various reasons, such as, "He's too busy," "It would 
add stress to the relationship," and "I don't want to bother him. " 
(5) 
The extracts differ in that Becker and NachtigaU (5) directly quote 
three reasons for non-response by husbands, while MacNab (7) does 
8 In general, an absolute case of 'no comment' on high non-response seems very 
unlikely. Given the 'observable-reportable' nature of absence of a second pair 
part, some comment appears to be a socially sanctionable matter - within both the 
world of everyday life and social science. Certainly in the case of high non-
response rates, absence of comment would itself draw comment· it naturally calls 
for accounting work. 
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not opt for direct quotation. But, both show the general technique of 
reporting what the candidates said. 
Some research from conversation analysis suggests an interesting 
point about the use of such a technique. Pomerantz's research (1984) 
on 'the practice in conversation of telling 'how I know" seems 
pru1icularly germane. As part of her paper she discusses excuse 
making, and argues that in the situation where someone repeats an 
excuse they must take some position with respect to the validity of the 
excuse. Simple repetition of the excuse takes the position that the 
excuse is valid and accurate, whereas reportage of only the 
circumstances of hearing the excuse does not imply acceptance of the 
excuse, but displays scepticism and caution about the acceptability of 
the excuse. Now, in the use of 'the candidates said ... ' technique, 
simple repetition of motives for non~response appears. While giving 
a motive for non-response is not exactly the same as giving an excuse, 
it is similru'; yet, my feeling is that the simple repetition does not 
accomplish what it does in ordinary conversation. That is, the overall 
tone of the extracts which use 'the candidates said ... ' technique is one 
of scepticism and caution, and not acceptance of the proffered motive. 
Reporting that a candidate said "he was too busy to fill out the 
questionnaire" invites scepticism - in short, it seems like a convenient 
lie. 
This inversion of an evelyday technique and what it accomplishes, 
seems explicable by reference to the operation of an underlying 
assumption. This point will be taken up more extensively in the 
conclusion, but simply, the suggestion is that the inversion occurs 
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because prior to the offers of what the candidates said, there has been 
massive adherence to the notion that infertility is a sensitive matter. 
To fIrst discuss the sensitivity of infertility, and then to offer "being 
too busy" as an 'excuse' for non-response, invelts the effect of simple 
repetition as a warrant for excuse-acceptance. While speculative, the 
feeling when reading the pragmatic accounts is that the reasons for 
non-response are to treated with caution. This represents an 
interesting intertwining of common-sense and social science. 
3. 'Other evidence suggests .• .' 
The clearest example here is in the extract (1) from Humphrey's 
work Because his initial sample was gained through an infertility 
clinic, Humphrey was able to compare non-respondents' and 
respondents' medical records. Thus, while his initial comments on the 
reasons for non-response are, as admitted, "sheer speculation", access 
to the medical records enables the addition of a more 'objective' 
scientifIc procedure -the use of cross validating information - into his 
accounting and motive attribution work The result is, as he puts it, 
the "suggestive rmding" that non-respondents "showed rather more 
impairment in their fertility tests than the 216 respondents". He does 
not discuss this any fiuther (except in a footnote which states that the 
difference was not statistically signifIcant), but it is notable that he is 
clearly leaving the presumed linkage between greater impairment and 
non-response unstated and implicit. The sense of his argument is 
dependent upon readers' abilities to fIll in the missing clause, to make 
the complete statement that, the worse the feltility impairment, the 
greater the social sensitivity, and hence a greater likelihood of non-
response. More generally this could be seen as an example of an 
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everyday naturalised way of thinking about illness and disease: the 
worse the degree of one's illness or impainnent the greater sensitivity 
one should feel about it. In this case then, the common scientific 
procedure of using cross validating evidence has common-sense 
assumptions about reactions to illness heavily embedded within it. 
4. 'Research shows ..• ' 
There are two examples of reference to previous research in the 
extracts. Miall (extract 3) uses a citation to her own work: 
Male infertility may be more stigmatising than female infertility, 
given the link between male potency and fertility (cf. Miall, 
1986). Men may have been more reluctant to discuss personal 
infertility. 
and W oollett (extract 6) refers to other research: 
Women were more willing to discuss infertility than men, 
reflecting assumptions that children are less important to men 
(Owen 1982). 
Clearly, references function as a persuasive device, suggesting that 
there is evidence to bolster the claims being made (Gilbert, 1977). In 
the first case it is the fertility-virility linkage version of the 'sensitivity' 
account that is strengthened by the reference, while in the second it is 
the 'children are not so important for men' account that is 
strengthened. But equally as clearly, there is a great deal of glossing 
occurring here: a whole research paper is summarised as positive 
evidence for the substance of the accounts. Obviously, academic 
readers who are familiar with the literature being cited can make up 
their own minds about whether the citation displays the knowledge as 
glossed; and, of comse, given that academics do engage in critique of 
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other academic work, disagreement is always a possibility. But, the 
interesting point here is that one cannot doubt everything all of the 
time - the simplest option when reading social science discow'se is to 
accept that references to other research do indeed provide evidence to 
fit the argument. Just as in everyday life where people accept what 
other people say most of the time, the very mundaneity of referencing 
contributes to its effectiveness as a persuasive device, and more 
generally contributes to the continual re-establishment of consensus in 
patticular research at'eas (Gilbert, 1977). 
Moreover, in this process there is the potential for weak research 
findings to become reified as strong and accurate findings. This 
possibility can be seen in Miall's referencing work She cites her own 
work in relation to the fertility-virility linkage, but this work actually 
contains no direct comment from men on this issue - it is based upon 
comments from their partners. It is not being suggested here that 
evidence on the fertility-virility linkage must come from men, rather, 
it is being emphasised that interview talk between a researcher and a 
female partner about how the male partner experienced infertility will 
have its own organisational exigencies which cannot but be 
implicated in the content of such talk. In the 1986 research that Miall 
cites, the question of the socially organised manner in which women 
might speak for their male partners is not considered: there is an 
assumption that asking about another's experience as an interaction 
itself, is unrelated to the content of what is being repOlted, that is, 
their partner's experience of infeltility.9 Despite these problems it is 
9 This is a standard ethnomethodological argument reproduced in any number of 
works. For an empirical analysis of the interactional accomplishment of 
representing others' experience see Perakyla and Silverman (1991 a). And for a 
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clear that the aim of citation is to give her accounting work greater 
persuasive force. 
5. tEveryone knows ••• t 
While the above devices are used sporadically in the extracts, a 
great deal of the motive attribution work contained in the accounts is 
achieved by simple declarative statements of the form, A is well 
known about infel1i1ity, and this clearly explains B (non-response). 
Consider Miall's statement that 
The difficulty that I had in obtaining a sample of infel1ile 
individuals who would pruticipate in my study reflects the 
sensitivity and secrecy that surround the problem of infel1ility. 
(2) 
This displays a simple declarative linkage between infertility and 
sensitivity, which constitutes the explanation for non-response. The 
linkage between infeltility and sensitivity is offered here as something 
that 'Everyone knows' - no references are supplied, no quotations 
offered, it is simply assumed that the facts of the matter are now well 
established (extracts 1, 4, 7, and 8 also contain similru' examples). 
Also, there is a second order of invocation of what 'Evelyone knows' 
occurring here. Miall does not need to say exactly how the sensitivity 
and secrecy of infel1i1ity led to her problems with non-response: it is 
just assumed that we know and can fill in the other logical clause -
people with sensitive conditions will often avoid talking about them. 
That is, the attributed motive for non-response is simply one of 'pain 
avoidance' - people will avoid talking about things that have pained 
them. 
more theoretical discussion germane to wives speaking for husbands (and vice 
versa) see Gubrium and Holstein (1987). 
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Hence, Miall is relying on the fact that in evelyday life "persons' 
actions are all too readily explicable" (Sharrock & Button, 1991: 
165). This 'ready explicability' has a great deal to do with the 
accountability of action: persons' actions occur within social scenes 
and motives for action are displayed and recognised incarnately 
within those scenes. That is, they are a dynamic and embodied 
feature of the velY action that they can be thought to explain. Further, 
the incarnate or reflexive nature of accounts and motive attribution is 
built up over time into publicly available modes of understanding 
human action - there are a wide stock of motive attributions which 'go 
without saying' as explanations of action. 1 0 The point to be taken 
here is that social scientists are equally reliant on publicly available 
modes of understanding in their accounting work on infertility and 
non-response. 
To recall the earlier discussion, we could say that just as the 
sociologist of education has no trouble in fmding 'classrooms', and 
'teachers' and 'pupils' within those classrooms, the infertility 
researcher has no trouble finding infertility as a 'problem', as a 
'sensitive' matter, and inferring motives for non-response from this 
underlying typification. As Watson notes, "Motives are so 
inextricably built into the description of deeds that the imputed 
10 While some sociologists would prefer the 'essentialist' tack of positing motives 
as the direct property of individuals (and hence cognition) there is a strong 
argument that motives can be more profitably dealt with as objects of available 
and public modes of understanding. Mills (1940) is the seminal work here, but 
later work has been more inspired by ordinary language philosophy and 
ethnomethodology (eg. see Coulter, 1979; Watson, 1983). For an illustrative 
debate between a traditional sociological approach and ethnomethodological 
approach to motives, see Bruce and Wallis (1983, 1985) and Sharrock and 
Watson (1984, 1986). 
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motive makes the deed publicly visible "for what it is"" (1983: 42). 
Moreover, there are strong connections between imputation of motive 
and society as a moral order: 
The imputation ofmotive(s) is pal1 and parcel of the many ways 
in which society members ... m1iculate and apply the logic of the 
moral order. To impute motives is one way in which we not 
only make sense, but moral sense of conduct. 
(Watson, 1983: 43, original emphasis) 
Hence, the prevalence of 'Evelyone knows' forms of motive 
attribution in the accounts of non-response: these explanations m'e 
able to be left at a taken-far-granted level because they are morally 
sanctionable descriptions. In effect, to doubt the efficacy of such a 
motive attribution would be to risk negative moral implications. 
Despite social science operating with a notion of scepticism, it is 
heavily dependent on motive attributions that have a taken-for-
granted, and hence, moral force. 
5.7 One Further Account of Non-response Examined for an 
Important Implication of Accounting Work 
As noted in section 5.2, the point of this discussion has not been to 
criticise social scientists for using common-sense in their accounting 
work. Nor, on the other hand, has there been any occasion to argue 
that common-sense is faulty when compared to social science. 
Despite the absence of this latter argument here, it is not uncommon 
within social science, as Garfinkel pointed out some time ago in the 
Purdue Symposium: 
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For example, the sociologists are forever beginning their 
descriptive works, "whereas it is commonly held that ... " then 
comes the corrective. The case is othelwise. 
All of this means that the common-sense knowledge of the 
member is put up against something that we call scientific 
knowledge, where scientific knowledge is a competitor to 
common-sense knowledge (Galfmkel in Hill and Crittenden 
1968:15) 
(as quoted in Flynn, 1991: 219) 
Obviously, in the case of negative stereotypes and 'myths' there are 
good grounds for the sociologists' debunking activities, but Garfinkel 
is referring here to a much more general operation that commonly 
occurs in the social sciences. In shOtt, this is the operation of irony. 
This, and the above-mentioned moral power of public modes of 
understanding, can be clearly seen in Owens' account of non-response 
and his related invocation of the fertility-virility linkage, which is 
discussed below. 
Owens (1982, 1986) studied involuntary childlessness in Wales, 
focusing on reasons couples have for wanting children and the 
possible consequences of childlessness, giving close attention to both 
men and women within the infertile couples. The two main patts of 
his research consisted of interviews with 30 working class couples 
attending an infettility clinic, and a questionnaire study of the 
National Association for the Childless (NAC). In both these areas 
Owens found men more reluctant to pat1ake in his study than women. 
In the infettility clinic study, 44 couples were eligible but 14 refused 
to pattake, of which seven were cases where the wife agreed to 
pat1ake but the husband refused. The NAC study showed an even 
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greater gender disparity: 120 questionnaires were sent out with 80 per 
cent of wives replying, but only 20 per cent of husbands doing so. 
Owens provides several possible explanatOlY factors for the greater 
rate of male non-response: men may be less interested in reproductive 
matters than their wives; men may see women as more responsible for 
these matters and this may extend to the completion of questionnaires; 
there may be structmal factors such as men being in employment 
making them less able to come to infertility clinics; and it may also be 
that medical clinics are oriented to women. Many of these factors are 
not present in the accounts in the data corpus, and in this sense 
Owens provides the most comprehensive discussion of the possible 
explanatOlY factors for non-response. 
However, he does emphasise that the list is suggestive, and further 
research would be needed to confirm matters. Amongst all this, 
Owens concludes by saying that 
The most intuitively plausible hypothesis however concelns 
male sensitivities on these matters. Some of the literatW'e cited 
in Chapter II has alluded to this, and subsequent parts of the 
thesis reinforce these views. There are good grounds for 
believing that men are more reluctant to patticipate in studies 
such as these, because they are more threatened by them. (1986: 
4.45-4.46) 
Thus, faced with the problem of lack of evidence on motives for non-
response, Owens opts to invoke a sensitivity account as the "most 
intuitively plausible". The velY words "intuitively plausible" also 
indicate Owens' fITst device for attributing motive, that is, "intuitively 
plausible" equates with what 'Evelyone knows'. The quote also 
displays the beginnings of another device noted above - a literatme is 
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refelTed to ('Research shows '" ') - and both of these devices are used 
in the "subsequent patts of the thesis" where Owens provides more 
grounds for the invocation of the sensitivity account. This turns out 
to revolve around the fettility-virility linkage, as follows. 1 1 
The fIrst patt of Owens more developed argument is to refer to the 
"considerable evidence that the diagnosis of infeltility has a greater 
impact on the man than on the woman" (1982: 80) due to the feltility-
virility linkage. In both works, Owens cites Bmnage (1977) and 
Humphrey (1969) as pad of this "considerable evidence".12 But, on 
examination, the Bumage reference tums out to be a research-in-
progress repOit of barely two pages. Bmnage gives her research 
method as: "I have been talking to approximately 100 infettile and 
subfettile patients in two London teaching hospitals about the effect 
infettility has had, and is having, on their lives" (Bumage, 1977: 47) 
It is not stated whether infettile men were or were not spoken to. 
Overall, Bmnage's paper is an excellent example of "anecdotalism" in 
sociology (see Silverman, 1985), and the useful anecdote that Owens 
fmds amongst it, and quotes, is that "The discovery that he is infettile 
can be an enOlIDOUS blow to a man's ego and, combined with his 
wife's keen desire to have children, can leave him feeling extremely 
inadequate" (1977: 48). This may well be so, and equally, it may 
well not be so: from what the paper contains there is no way of 
deciding. The point here is not to be cynical about Bumage's research, 
11 Note that discussion covers both Owens' 1982 and 1986 work - they present 
virtually identical arguments. 
12 In fact, in the 1982 paper Burnage and Humphrey are the only research works 
Owens cites, while in the 1986 thesis he makes another reference to Rainwater 
(1960), but does not discuss this work. 
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but to emphasise that regardless of its substance, in its incorporation 
in social scientific discourse via the method of referencing it 
accomplishes plausibility for Owens' argument. 
Owens also cites Humphrey on the fertility-virility linkage and a 
similar process can be seen. Here is Humphrey's argument from 
which Owens quotes: 
The view expressed by Schellen (1957), that awareness of 
sterility inflicts greater trauma on a man than a woman in our 
culture, is widely accepted. Whilst a sense of failure may be 
common to both sexes, it is only the proud male who regards it 
as an affront to his sexual capacity. For him procreation has 
always served as a means of demonstrating his virility, whereas 
it is well known that a woman's fertility gives no indication of 
her sexual responsiveness. And no matter how bravely he has 
accepted the discovery at a conscious level, unconsciously the 
equation with impotence is likely to remain. (Humphrey, 1969: 
52, emphasis added) 
Owens quotes this in both his paper and thesis, and it is worth 
reproducing the quote here because it neatly shows the power of the 
referencing process. As can be seen Humphrey himself combines an 
initial reference to a social scientific work - Schellen - with arguments 
about what 'Everyone knows': the truth of the fertility-virility linkage 
being "widely accepted", whereas in contrast its absence in women is 
"well known".13 Clearly, Owens quotes Humphrey to bolster his 
13 Humphrey's invocation of the well know fact that a "women's fertility gives no 
indication of her sexual responsiveness" is interesting in the light of historical 
research. Lacquer (1990), for example, shows how in past centuries it was 
thought that for conception to occur a woman must have an orgasm. Thus, if 
Humphrey is to be believed, the commonsense assumption of no connection 
between a woman's fertility and her sexual responsiveness may be a relatively 
recent understanding. Also note that Humphrey, in his desire to argue the 
connection between fertility and virility, sets up a no-lose situation via invocation 
of the unconscious: "unconsciously the equation with impotence is likely to 
remain". That is, even if men openly deny any threat to their virility, the threat is 
still there at some essential, hidden, unconscious level. 
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sensitivity account of non-response, and, in effect, this makes Owens' 
referencing work a third generation comment about the fertility-
virility linkage: Schellen notes the link between male feltility and 
virility, Humphrey quotes Schellen, and Humphrey in tum is quoted 
by Owens, Of course, the simple point to be noted here is that 
common-sense declarations are deeply embedded throughout this 
process - see the highlighted phrases for example. No doubt if 
Schellen were consulted a similar dependence on common-sense 
could be found. 
The upshot is that the inteltwining of common-sense and social 
science has a long lineage with respect to the fertility-vnility linkage. 
It is not as if resort to common-sense is hidden in this lineage, but, on 
the other hand, given that this is social science discourse it is not 
made explicit either: it might be considered "seen but unnoticed", to 
use Garfinkel's (1967) felicitous phrase. The end result is that Owens 
can confidently state that there is "considerable evidence" for the 
fertility-virility linkage. 
Having made this f11'st step, Owens then considers his data in the 
light of existent social science knowledge on the fertility-virility 
linkage. And here the whole process takes on some interesting twists: 
we see a classic example of what Pollner (1987), after Laing, has 
called the "politics of experience". This happens in the following 
way. Owens' knowledge of the social science literature and his 
common-sense tell him that when studying male infertility it is 
impOltant to look for signs of infeltility as a 'threat to male vn'i1ity'. 
He then talks to men within infeltile couples, but concludes that 
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"Such threats to virility were not, however, easily discemed. Indeed 
the vast majority of respondents denied them" (1982, 81). Or, as put 
in the later work, "most of the men did not acknowledge such tIn'eats, 
some denying them outright, others saying that the diagnosis of 
infeItility could be taken as a matter of fact ... H (1986: 8.13). This 
presents Owens with what PolIner calls a "reality disjuncture" (1987: 
69), that is, a contradictory experience of the world, a puzzling event: 
Owens cannot fmd in the men's accounts what social science research 
tells him should be there. 
Pollner's research into mundane reason suggests that when faced 
with such a disjuncture, members resolve it by "formulating one or 
another (and perhaps both) of the competing versions of reality as the 
product of an exceptional method of observation, experience or 
repoItageH (Pollner, 1987, 69). Owens resorts to exactly such a 
method to resolve his particular disjuncture, and this resolution has 
two parts. First, in his 1982 paper he states: "Nevertheless, given the 
strength of Humphrey's arguments above, it would be naive to accept 
these statements simply at face value" (1982, 81). He then introduces 
an appeal to cross-validation by arguing that more evidence on the 
threat to the male ego came from the men's wives. 
This res011 to the wive's rep011s, is the second strand which is 
elaborated in Owens' thesis: 
However, despite the husbands' denial of the tin-eats to their 
virility, there was good reason not to accept them at face value. 
Of course it is possible that the men did not feel that their 
virility was threatened because the concept held no salience for 
them, or because they measured it according to other 
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unspecified cliteria. But evidence that the men may well have 
felt insecure came from the wives and a number commented on 
what they felt to be their husband's sensitivities on these matters. 
(1986: 8.14) 
Owens then offers some extracts from the wives' comments, and goes 
on to suggest that the notion of a fertility-virility linkage need not be 
abandoned, only altered. He suggests that "whilst the respondents 
were not wholly forthcoming about any blow to their self-concepts as 
men, they did speak of the threat that infertility would raise to the 
fulfilment of their role as husbands" (1986: 8.15, original emphasis). 
It is in this "complementmy hypothesis", as he calls it, that Owens 
seeks to maintain the robustness of both the sensitivity account and 
the fertility-virility linkage. 
Either way, the sum effect is that the men's reportage is presented as 
exceptional: it hides the truth; it cannot be accepted at "face value"; it 
does not correspond with the reality that social science knowledge, 
and common-sense modes of understanding, say should be there. 
Hence, the resolution of the reality disjuncture centres on acceptance 
of a social scientist's supposedly strong prior m"gument, or on the 
wive's reports of how their husbands experienced infertility. One 
consequence of choosing these views over the infertile men's 
accounts, is that their ability to repOlt their own experience is 
discredited. Hence, we have a "politics of experience". 
The question has to be asked whether social scientists should be 
engaging in such practices. In my view, the short answer is no. This 
is not to suggest that infertile men have a privileged viewpoint of 
infertility, nor that we should fmd some better method of capturing 
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the experience of male infertility. Rather, it is more a critical correlate 
of the argument that if one is concelned with studying the impact of 
infertility on either gender, then a profitable way to proceed is by 
considering the procedural mechanisms through which social 
phenomena are made available. Invoking common-sense is one such 
procedure. 
5.8 Concluding Discussion 
There is nothing new in the argument that social scientists depend 
upon common-sense and unexplicated background knowledge in their 
research. However, just how important common-sense is to social 
science, and just how intricate the linkages between common-sense 
and social science are, cannot be realised without detailed 
investigation of social science practices. This was the task of this 
chapter, and while the analysis has remained at a relatively simple 
level, the pervasiveness of common-sense reasoning in social science, 
and the complexity of the linkage between the two, has certainly been 
shown through examination of accounts of non-response. 
To recap, within the infertility literature researchers have noted 
difficulties in gaining infertile male respondents. The response/non-
response rate for this study showed that for every agreement to be 
interviewed there was a matching refusal, thus illustrating a more 
general trend. Pursuing my own experience of gaining respondents, it 
was suggested that the whole process of producing a non-response 
rate is socially accomplished. This was illustrated by the case where 
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an intennediary had claimed to have contacted a candidate, who 
supposedly said he was not interested in being intelviewed, however, 
there was a strong suspicion that the intennediary was lying. 
Obviously, the recognition of such a possibility involves everyday 
practical knowledge. Moreover, there does not have to be a dramatic 
or odd event for non-response rates to be socially accomplished: the 
research process called "interviewing", whether more or less 
structured, involves talking to people and infelTing from the way they 
are talking, 'exactly' what they are saying - this is a perfectly ordinary 
everyday action. Hence, the messy work of social research cannot but 
be dependent upon common-sense procedures for linking accounts to 
realities, even though this dependence may not be readily apparent in 
the finished textual product of social science. 
This 'seen but unnoticed' dependence upon common-sense was 
highlighted in the analysis of the accounts of non-response. Eight 
extracts were presented as data, and, three main accounts of non-
response were identified in the data COlpUs: 'sensitivity' with the 
subset account of the 'fertility-virility linkage'; 'children are not so 
impOltant to men'; and 'pragmatic and other factors'. It was argued 
that these accounts were centrally concerned with the attribution of 
motives for non-response. Given that the extracts were from social 
science discourse, it could be expected that there would be a strong 
conceln for the adequacy of, and grounds for, the statements made. 
But interestingly, the extracts displayed a wide range of motive 
attribution work: from the apparently more scientific model of 'no 
comment' when no evidence was available, to the grafting of 
traditional objective scientific methods onto taken-for-granted 
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inferences about infertility; and to an almost complete reliance on 
taken-for-granted knowledge of infertility in 'Evelyone knows' 
declarative statements. In general, there was a strong presence of 
common-sense assumptions about infertility which flowed through to 
the motive attribution work. This should be no surprise: social 
scientists, as thoroughly enculturated members of the same culture 
they are studying, will, in their accounts of infertility and non-
response, use public, held-in-common ways of understanding 
infertility and motives for non-response. To do otherwise would be to 
produce non-sense. 
A central objective in this chapter has been to avoid presenting 
either, common-sense as faulty, or, social science as a fancified 
version of common-sense. That is, the analysis was descriptive, 
focusing on the intennixing of common-sense and social science in 
accounts of non-response. However, Owens' work, provided as a case 
study in the final analytic section, appears to provide good grounds 
for a more critical stance. Owens provided the most detailed list of 
explanatory factors for high rates of male non-response, but in the 
end, based on an appeal to what 'Everyone knows', he opted for a 
sensitivity account. By itself this does not present a problem; 
however, implicit in Owens' argument is a 'politics of experience'. 
The men who did speak to Owens commented only very infrequently 
that they found infertility a sensitive matter, or that they felt infertility 
threatened their virility. This presented Owens with a 'reality 
disjuncture': his reading of the infertility literature told him that men 
are threatened by linkages between their fertility and virility, but the 
infertile men that he talked to hardly ever said this. It is in the 
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resolution of this disjuncture that Owens res011ed to a politics of 
experience. He discounted what the infertile men said, and favoured 
the views of the infertility researchers and the wives of the infertile 
men (who, Owens suggests, did provide some validating evidence for 
the fertility-virility linkage). In my view, there are good grounds to 
question whether the reports of infertile men should be so easily 
discounted and ironised by researchers. Such a blatant politics of 
experience should be avoided. 
Before proceeding to the fmal chapter, which in many ways is 
relevant to the problem of irony, there is one further point of 
discussion. This concerns what can be called the 'seamless web'. 
The Seamless Web 
A point that has not been highlighted above, but should nonetheless 
be apparent, is the way that both the actions of those who do, and do 
not, respond, are incorporated in a mutually consistent and reinforcing 
manner in the broader explanation of infeltility. For example, in the 
'children are not so important for men' account, previous theoretical 
and empirical examinations of fertility and infertility were used to 
explain non-response, and in tum, albeit implicitly, accounts of the 
high rate of male non-response reinforce these theoretical and 
empirical examinations. Thus, to conclude this chapter it is worth 
looking at the way that accounts of non-response figure in the broader 
explanation ofinfe11ility and are incorporated in a 'seamless web'. 
Heritage uses the phrase 'seamless web' in a discussion of "accounts 
and the structure of social action" (1988: 138-141, also see Heritage, 
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1984: 106-110). His concern is with the centrality of accounts in the 
reproduction of social order, and he struts by emphasising a basic 
point of ethnomethodology's 'procedural turn': shared procedures are 
both the means whereby actions are produced, and understood. 
Maintain these procedures (or methods) and both the social 
organisation of action, and the social intelligibility of action, are 
maintained. As an example, Heritage considers the simple lUle that 
after a question a second speaker should produce an answer. 
Consistent with the above, this is both a lUle of conduct and a rule of 
interpretation - the rule provides guidelines for temporal sequencing, 
and for how the action and its respective parts are to be interpreted. 
But, like all rules, it is not always complied with; this could be seen 
as an erosion of the lUle's power, but this does not happen because an 
accounting machinery with impOltant socially integrative functions 
comes into play. 
Simply, the absence of an answer to a question brings with it two 
major types of interpretive option. Firstly, it could be reasoned that 
the lUle that questions should be answered no longer applies to the 
current situation, and that some other yet to be determined rule 
applies. This option very rarely happens. Instead, secondly, we cling 
to the presupposition that questions should be answered, and therefore 
the result is that the absence of an answer requires explanation an 
account is fOlmed. In a logical sense, any number of accounts could 
be thought of, but the task is to fmd one that fits the circumstances, to 
offer the 'natural' account for the situation. Tn addition, accounts 
often have negative implications for the non-answerer, hence adding 
to the rule's power. 
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The crucial point to be taken from this relatively simple example is 
that the second interpretive option does not weaken the rule, but in 
fact embodies the presupposition that questions relevance answers. 
That is, as Heritage puts it, the 'exception proves the rule': 
For speakers there are only two options: either the rule linking 
questions and answers is complied with and the question is 
answered, or the lack of an answer is an exception to the rule 
which requires some kind of 'secondarily elaborative' 
explanation. ... The exceptions with their explanations thus 
become 'the exceptions that prove the rule' because the provision 
of such explanations maintains the rule's presuppositional status 
both as a rule of conduct and as a rule of interpretation. Once 
again, we encounter a closed circle of interpretation. 
Presuppositional rules of action and interpretation interlock with 
the organization of account giving to fOlID a seamless web - a 
self-motivating, self-sustaining and self-reproducing normative 
organization of action. (1988: 140) 
In this way, ordinary everyday accounts of even the most mundane 
matters (eg. failure to return a greeting; failw'e to answer a question) 
make a crucial contribution to the maintenance of social order. 
In many ways the 'seamless web' can be seen as a restatement of the 
"documentary method of interpretation" (Garfmkel, 1967), and it is 
mainly in this sense that implications will be drawn from it, as 
follows. While this thesis does not contain an overall review of the 
social science literature on infertility, it should be clear from the 
literature that has been discussed, that infertility is framed as a social 
and individual problem. So often academic work on infertility begins 
by stating that it is a major life crisis for individuals (see introduction 
to chapter four). This approach is clearly linked to the predominance 
of psychological studies of infertility that have considered both, 
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possible psychogenic causes of infeltility, and the impact of infertility 
on psychological function (for reviews see, Edelmann and Connolly, 
1986; Unruh and McGrath, 1985). But, in addition, social scientists 
have studied infertility as a 'social problem', as the following list of 
research topics indicates: the 'social construction' of infertility as a 
matter of "desperation", "disease" or "social concern" (Gerson, 1989; 
Becker & Nachtigall, 1992; Scritchfield, 1989); stigmatisation, self-
labelling, infertile identity, and coping strategies (Miall, 1986, 1989; 
Olshansky, 1987; Sandelowski, 1986, 1987; Woollett, 1985); the 
impact of infeltility on marital and sexual relations (Greil, Porter, & 
Leitko, 1989); problematic aspects of doctor-patient relations within 
infertility treatment (Becker & Nachtigall, 1991; Meerabeau, 1991); 
provision of health services for the infertile (Henshaw & OD', 1987; 
Pfeffer & Quick, 1988); the 'medicalisation' of infertility and negative 
impacts of reproductive technologies on women (see chapter three); 
and the epidemiology of infertility (Aral & Cates, 1983; Belsey & 
Ware, 1986). There are many more studies in this vein. 
At risk of generalisation, this approach to infertility establishes the 
underlying patteln that infertility is a problem.14 It is not being 
argued here that this notion is a fabrication, a fallacy, a myth, 
etcetera; it is simply being emphasised that this general typification of 
infeltility as a problem can be treated as an underlying pattern which 
infOlIDS the practical work of researching infeltility in various ways. 
14 I am not aware of any research specifically on the topic 'infertility', which does 
not make at least some reference to infertility being a social or individual problem 
in the way that the above research approaches 'problem'. Research of a more 
meta-theoretical nature on infertility seems to occur when 'infertility' is not the 
specific topic of research. An interesting example here is the work of Heritier-
Auge (1989) on mythical notions of blood and semen. 
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Accounting for non-response is the case m point. It has been 
accounted for in a way which strongly reinforces the view of 
infertility as a problem, but this is despite the fact that non-response 
as an absence of information (although, as we have seen, some 
information can be made available by non-respondents or others), 
makes possible an indefmite number of accounts. For example, a 
peliectly plausible account of non-response is that the family pet died 
just prior to the request for an interview, hence the candidate did not 
wish to respond. It would be straining things to apply this as an 
overall account of non-response, nonetheless, it is logically plausible 
as a pragmatic account. But, the point is, we do not see this account 
precisely because it does not fit the circumstances in which the 
accounting work is being done, that is, the predominance of the view 
that infertility is a problem. Very clearly, the "documentary method 
of interpretation" is applicable here: the underlying pattern (infertility 
is a problem) provides the basis for fmding and interpreting individual 
evidences (the phenomenon of high male non;.response), and in tutU 
the underlying pattern is derived and reconstituted from the individual 
evidences. 
The interesting thing here is that using the same principle the 
following is equally possible. Take the case where researchers work 
with, or to, the assumption that male infertility is not a problem for 
men - call this assumption one. 15 Presuming that these researchers 
15 The following discussion is stimulated by Heritage's argument about the 
'seamless web', but note that it is a speculative use of Heritage's argument. For 
one, I am referring to 'assumptions' and not 'rules', although the two are similar. 
More generally. social science accounts of infertility and non-response are much 
more complex than the relatively simple rule that after a question a second 
speaker should produce an answer. Nevertheless, my argument seems consistent 
with the general principle of Heritage's discussion. 
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set out to talk to infertile men, then we have the simple outcome of 
'yes' or 'no' to requests for interviews. Response and non-response 
rates can then be calculated and made available for accounting work. 
Now, a good response rate, in itself, can be taken as confIrmation of 
assumption one: infelti1e men do not fInd infertility a problem and 
concomitantly have no qualms in talking to researchers about their 
experience of infeltility. That is, the assumption is being complied 
with. In the case of non-response, under assumption one it is 
perfectly plausible to offer the account that infelti1e men did not 
respond because the matter was so mundane and uninteresting to them 
that they could see little point in responding to a researcher. In 
Heritage's terms this would equate to the exception (non-response) 
proving the assumption, hence, response and accounts of non-
response would f01ID a 'seamless web' tuming on assumption one. 
Obviously, however, this f01ID of explanation is absent in the data 
corpus - it does not even appear to have been enteltained. Instead, 
response and accounts of non-response are quite clearly derived from, 
and constitutive of, a different assumption: male infertility is a 
sensitive matter. In sh01t, it is a problem - call this assumption two. 
Here, response can be interpreted as compliance with assumption two 
by arguing, for example, that infeltile males will talk to researchers 
because it has a cathartic effect - they are glad to 'get it off their 
chest'. MacN ab's statement that "The need for a forum for men 
struggling with the problem is both evident and denied" (extract 7) 
seems related to such an argument. Equally, non-response is 
accounted for m a way that is consistent with the underlying 
assumption. Despite there being any number of plausible 
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explanations for why men would not want to talk to a researcher 
about their infel1ility, a sensitivity account is the most dominant and 
"intuitively plausible". Ful1her, as Owens' work so clearly 
exemplifies, even if respondents' repol1s are directly at odds with 
assumption two, the assumption can still be maintained ilTespective of 
the respondents' contrary repol1s, through a 'politics of experience'. 
This is a very powetful device for maintaining presuppositions or 
assumptions, and in this sense we could say, milToring a well known 
phrase from Garfmkel's study of jurors' practical reasoning (1967: 
104-115), that 'the explanation comes before the evidence', or, at 
least, that it stands ilTespective of the evidence. 
In this way, both response and non-response are incorporated into a 
'seamless web': infertility is constituted 'for another first time' as a 
problem, as a sensitive issue. People who are approached by 
researchers wishing to hear about their experience of infel1i1ity, 
in'espective of whether they agree or disagree to be intelviewed, thus 
fmd themselves in a world of practical actions having the 
propel1y that whatever they do will be intelligible and 
accountable as a sustaining of, or a development or violation, 
etc. of, some order of activity .... [T]he actors' actions, to adapt 
Merleau-Ponty's phrase, are condemned to be meaningful. 
(Heritage, 1984: 110, original emphasis) 
Infel1i1ity researchers work within, and in relation to, the world of 
academic knowledge, which strongly guides them to study infertility 
as an individual or social problem. This underlying pattern is then 
brought into play in both, accounts of respondents' experiences of 
infel1i1ity, and, in accounts of the m.otives of non-respondents. Thus, 
non-respondents' actions become an exception that proves the 
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underlying assumption that infertility is a problem. The simple act of 
non-response is "condemned to be meaningful" as social scientists 
reconstitute infertility as a problem. Common-sense procedures are 
deeply embedded in the whole process; the whole process is a 
common-sense procedure. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion: What's the Point? 
6.1 Introduction 
The four empitical chapters offered in this study are essentially 
stand-alone pieces. They do have general points in common, the use 
of ethnomethodological insights being the most obvious, but they are 
not intended to add up to a comprehensive sociological account of 
male infertility. Hence, this conclusion will not offer a Summ31Y 
view of 'what has been learnt' about male infertility. However, it is 
useful to reflect on the study as a whole by considering the general 
question, 'what's the point?'. This question has a history with respect 
to ethnomethodology, and discussion begins by cl31ifying the 
PaltiCUI31' valiant of it that is pel1inent to this study, 
By the history of the question, I am referring to the fact that a 
common reaction to early ethnomethodology was a terse, 'what's the 
point?' (Lynch & Peyrot, 1992: 118; ShalTock, 1989: 660). Typically, 
this stemmed from ethnomethodology's detailed attention to 
apP31'ently trivial or mundane social action, and the way that analysis 
focused on form and ignored the content of the action, In the view of 
many sociologists there was little point to such analysis - it did not 
even look like sociology, Of course, counter-responses were made to 
this reaction, and there are now a good number of progratnmatic 
statements that make clear the inherently sociological nature of 
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ethnomethodological inquiry, clarify misunderstandings about it, and 
make the general point that form and content are mutually constitutive 
(eg. see, Button, 1991; Heritage, 1984; Hilbert, 1992; Peyrot, 1982; 
Sharrock, 1989; Sharrock & Anderson, 1986). And, as noted in the 
introductory chapter, there are a growing number of empirical studies 
which combine a traditional sociological interest in substantive topics, 
with insights from ethnomethodology. 
The upshot of both these factors is that the sociological 'point' of 
ethnomethodology is no longer opaque or mysterious. As Ponner has 
put it in a nice metaphorical tum: 
Ethnomethodology is settling down in the suburbs of sociology. 
There are signs of recognition, acceptance, and even welcome 
from the neighbors (Zimmerman 1987) .... To be sure, few want 
their children to many an ethnomethodologist, much less to be 
one - and they rarely hire one. Nevertheless, the discipline 
recognises and begins to incOlporate the contributions of what 
was once regarded as a pariah. (1991: 370) 
However, as this piece also indicates~ there is still some lingering 
doubt about ethnomethodology - most sociologists would not want 
their children to marry one, and they are rarely hired. 
In my view, a good pat1'ofthe reason for this lingering doubt stems 
from a more specific fOlm of the 'what's the point?' reaction. Given 
sociology's long-standing concern with the topic of 'social inequality', 
and an almost sanctionable trend for sociologists to offer cOlTectives 
to alleviate social inequality, the complaint can be raised that 
ethnomethodological studies 'do nothing'. Indeed, under the policy of 
"ethnomethodological indifference" (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970) offers 
of correctives were explicitly avoided. The argument being, that if 
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any social scene is reflexively constituted, there and then, as orderly 
and sensible, the point is to study the practical reasoning procedures 
involved, without 'taking sides' as to who has the conect description 
of the events. 1 Thus, even if the earlier fOlID of the 'what's the point?' 
reaction is now heard only infrequently, the variant reaction, 'what's 
the point? - it does nothing', is still common. 2 
Again, this more specific reaction has not gone without comment 
and discussion from ethnomethodologists. Some have argued that 
ethnomethodology can take on a critical role, while others have 
argued that it was never designed for such work, for good theoretical 
reasons, and it should not begin to attempt it now. Given the 
existence of a general debate on this issue, there is the possibility of 
reviewing and weighing-up these different arguments. However, this 
approach will not be taken; instead, I wish to take a closer look at a 
single debate between three proponents of ethnomethodology. This 
debate centres on the issue of description· and critique in social 
science, which clearly is central to the 'what's the point?' Issue. 
Moreover, the debate provides a useful platform for reflection on this 
study's four empirical analyses, and, as will be seen, this ultimately 
leads to a relatively optimistic conclusion about the study. While the 
1 Moving the focus of investigation from the 'correctness' of everyday assertions 
to how they are possible and intelligible is clearly a central tenet of 
ethnomethodological investigation. Sacks in particular stressed this focus early in 
the development of ethnomethodology (Sharrock & Button, 1991, fn. 24, p. 174). 
2 Hereafter, when the phrase 'what's the point?' is used it is the second variant 
that is being referred to, that is, 'what's the paint? - it does nothing'. 
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debate is of interest in itself, this latter section of the chapter provides 
the central reason for discussing the debate. 3 
6.2 Description and Critique: the debate between Bogen and 
Lynch, and McHoul 
Recently the Journal of Pragmatics presented a debate with an 
apparently simple two-prot fOlmat. First, a comment by Bogen and 
Lynch (1990) on an earlier paper by McHoul (1988a), and second, a 
reply in the srune issue by McHoul. 4 This apparently simple fonnat 
belies the complexity of the debate. The initial paper by McHoul was 
in tum an extended critical review of Jeff Coulter's substantial body 
of work on language and the sociology of mind. Thus: McHoul 
critically reviews Coulter; Bogen and Lynch offer critical comments 
on McHoul's review; and then McHoul replies to Bogen and Lynch. 
As McHoul comments "Who, then, can tell what the rules ro'e here? -
who is addressing whom in what sequence about what?" (II: 523). 
Despite this initial complexity, it is clear that the debate is concelned 
with the general problem of what social science should do, and this is 
approached by considering the specific case of ethnomethodology. 
The overall question is, what tnixture or separation of the elements 
'social critique' and 'description' should ethnomethodology achieve. 
3 Note, though, that explication of the debate takes up more space than reflection 
on the study. However, as the two sections are closely connected and the 
explication of the debate allows a quick reflection on the study. this imbalance 
should not present a problem. 
4 Below, there will be substantial quotation from the debate, and since it comes 
as a two-part package, referencing will proceed as follows: (I: page no.) 
references Bogen and Lynch (1990); and (II: page no.) references McHoul (1990). 
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The participants to the debate all have a high standing in 
ethnomethodology,5 making it clear that this is a debate of some 
impOlt within ethnomethodology - Jayyusi (1991: 247) has labelled it 
as "perhaps the most salient example" of debate about the role of 
political critique in ethnomethodology. Below, consideration is given 
first to Bogen and Lynch's critical comments on McHoul (1988a). 
Bogen and Lynch's Position 
Although McHoul's review of Coulter's work is extensive (and 
generally very positive), Bogen and Lynch make it clear that they will 
be focusing on only one aspect of McHoul's review. As they put it in 
the first sentence, "we will be considering recent arguments advanced 
by Alec McHoul (1988) to the effect that ethnomethodological and 
Wittgensteinian lines of inquiry hold forth the promise of providing a 
rigorous analytic basis for the socio~political critique of 'discourse'" 
(I: 505). In short, they find McHoul's attempt to link 
ethnomethodology with a 'political tum' to be "ill~fated". Since 
McHoul's reply is addressed specifically to Bogen and Lynch's re-
presentation and attendant critique, it is this explication, rather than 
McHoul's initial argument, which will be summarised. 
5 Lynch, with links to Garfinkel both in terms of training and research 
collaboration, and with his seminal studies in the social study of science (see, 
Lynch, 1985; Lynch, Livingston & Garfinkel, 1983), is recognisable as a leading 
contemporary ethnomethodologist. Bogen is more a newcomer, having only 
recently completed his PhD, but he has already published a number of 
ethnomethodological studies and his placement at Boston University along with 
Lynch and Jeff Coulter, suggests high regard within ethnomethodology. In 
contrast McHoul is much more eclectic in his field of study, with his early work 
including standard conversation analysis (1978), theoretical defence of 
ethnomethodology (1981), and an important ethnomethodological investigation of 
texts and reading (1982), but with his later work branching out to the more general 
field of communication studies (eg. 1983). Despite this eclecticism there is no 
doubt that McHoul is recognised as a very competent ethnomethodological 
researcher. 
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From the start, Bogen and Lynch cast McHoul's project as one of 
assimilating two poles in social science: on one hand, detailed 
empirical investigations of social praxis, and, on the other hand, 
social critique. They see McHoul's positive reading of Foucault as 
the major reason for this assimilation project: he takes from Foucault 
the important point that academic disciplines are not outside of 
discursive fonnations, but are indeed 'disciplines' which have direct 
and indirect power-effects. The upshot is that academic neutrality is 
now seen as an impossibility -after Foucault one can no longer remain 
neutral about discursive practices, and this includes the discourse of 
members and academic analysts. 
McHoul's agreement with Foucault on this point sets up an initial 
problem of incompatibility with the policy of "ethnomethodological 
indifference". Within conversation analysis, for example, it is argued 
that if conversation has an endogenous order, then it is legitimate to 
analyse that order inespective of any concem for social inequalities, 
or the possibility of extemal structures enabling or constraining the 
talk-in-interaction (eg. Schegloff, 1987). McHoul accepts the 
argument that conversation displays an endogenous fonn of 
organisation, but does not accept that this necessitates "indifferent" 
analysis. 
Bogen and Lynch admit that his argument here is a challenging one. 
McHoul suggests that the devices which ethnomethodological 
analyses of language-use identify - tum-taking rules, sequential 
combinations, and so on - are also used by institutionally 
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subordinated subjects for resisting power. Certainly, institutional 
power acts as a skewing force, or limit, on actual social interaction 
and language use,6 nevertheless, given the dynamic nature of 
interaction, in the actual use of institutional conversational machinery 
there is room for resistance by subordinated subjects. As Bogen and 
Lynch put it, McHoul has identified the everpresent "potential 
difference between the 'legitimate options' for action provided by the 
local organization of interaction, and the skewed disttibution of 
options in institutionalized uses of interaction" (1: 508, original 
emphasis) as a resource for political struggle. But more importantly, 
McHoul suggests that fine-grained empirical analyses can uncover 
such sttllggle, and hence academic analysis can be a basis for social 
critique. 
This argument is made clearer by following through an example that 
McHoul provides. This consists of a re-analysis of some ordinary 
conversation that Coulter had analysed, and since it is important in 
McHoul's (1988a) argument, and Bogen and Lynch also focus on it, it 
is as well to reproduce the excerpt here. The transcript is of a tape-
recorded interaction between a 'Mental Welfare Officer' (MWO) , a 
'prospective patient' (PP), and the 'patient's wife' (PW): 
"1 MWO: 
2PP: 
3MWO: 
4PW: 
Dr ... Dr K. asked us to call ... to take you to 
hospital. 
ElT ... I'm ah'ight as I am. 
You know Dr K. and Dr. S. that saw you last night-
-Yes-
6 This occurs primarily through pre-specified turn-taking procedures and limits on 
types of action done in turns. Interaction in the army, courtrooms, and medical 
consultations are obvious examples. 
5MWO: 
6PP: 
7PW: 
8PP: 
9MWO: 
10PW: 
11 PP: 
12MWO: 
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-they want you to go up this afternoon, and they've 
asked us to call ... we've got the car with us, you 
know-
-Aah, I, I'll make it in my own time/lif you don't 
mind. 
/Iya can't make it in yer own time. 
Course I can. (Pause of 1.5 secs.) 
EIT, well, you know, I mean Dr K. 's quite busy and 
he's made an appointment for you this afternoon at 
the hospital//( ) 
Ilno harm to go and see him is there?II() 
/lno, I-I'd rather go on me own I ... I 
Won't take us long down the motorway in the car ... 
go up the M55. Be there in no time. 
13 PP: Nah I'll remain as I am (Pause of2.0 secs) 
14 PW: Ya can't remain as y'are ya gotta see the doctor ... 
[I I marks point at which overlap commences]. " 
(McHoul, 1988a: 376-377, quoting Coulter, 1979: 26) 
McHoul's re-analysis of this transcript emphasises the "conceptual 
contestation" OCCUlTing in the interaction: while the MWO is trying to 
'bring off an incarceration', the PP, through the conversational 
interaction, succeeds in getting the outcome heard as simply a lift to 
the hospital. This is despite the common knowledge that asylum 
admissions of this sort are not a matter of choice. 
There is nothing patticularly stunning about pointing out that people 
contest one another's actions, but when considered within the context 
of how ethnomethodology analyses ordinaty conversation, Bogen and 
Lynch suggest that McHoul's at'gument represents a fundamental 
challenge to ethnomethodological naturalistic inquiry. McHoul 
at'gues that when an analyst identifies an 'ordinaty conversation', the 
telID is a gloss for what is always and already an at'ea of political 
contestation. Moreover, this political contestation is over factors 
endogenous to the interaction, rather than over factors exterior to the 
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interaction (eg. gender, class, etc.). The point of McHoul's re-
analysis of Coulter's transclipt is to show that the PP worked to get 
the putative incarcerative act heard as an everyday conversation, and 
hence recast the telms of the interaction. As Bogen and Lynch put it: 
To say that the above instance is identifiable and analyzable as 
an ordinary conversation is, in McHoul's account, to take an 
ethical stance in SUppOit of PP's 'right' to refuse to go along 
with the MWO. 
Such a 'right' is included within the optionality system of the 
adjacency pair organisation of conversation. Although refusals 
of offers may be 'dispreferred' ... they are none the less a 'legal' 
option for recipients of offers in conversation. Presumably, the 
work of "bringing off an incarceration" in the above instance 
includes no such option, so that what is legitimate and logical 
for conversation is transgressive for incarceration. 
(I: 510-511, original emphasis) 
Thus, McHoul's challenge to ethnomethodological approaches to 
language-use does not question the well established incarnate 
orderliness of conversation, but builds upon it to ask questions about 
how the very relevance of ordinary conversation for interaction is 
accomplished for the case being studied: how is the system of lUles of 
conversation legitimately put in place? As McHoul tries to show 
from his re-analysis of Coulter's transcript, consideration of this 
question involves a move from naturalistic inquity to a critical 
pragmatics of language-use (hereafter, 'critical pragmatics'). On this 
view, fine-grained analyses of ordinary conversation can be used to 
expose the political contestations oCCIDTing in, and as, talk-in-
interaction. 
237 
It is clear that Bogen and Lynch recognise McHoul's argument as an 
important and challenging one, nevertheless, they do not fmd it 
convmcmg. Their critique is twofold: fIrst, they identify some 
problems with McHoul's re-analysis and recommendations that 
similar analyses might be the basis for a critical pragmatics; and 
second, they return to the more general issue of what 
ethnomethodological descliption aims to do, suggesting that McHoul's 
dissatisfaction with it is misplaced and based upon several 
misunderstandings. The two parts to their critique are explicated 
below. 
Briefly, Bogen and Lynch make four "obvious criticisms" about 
McHoul's re-analysis and recommendations. First, regarding 
McHoul's suggestion that the PP had the interaction successfully 
"heard" as the offer of a lift to a hospital, they suggest that there may 
be no connection between how the interaction is 'heard' and the 
eventual outcome. Choices may indeed be offered in 'bringing off an 
incarceration', but this may make no difference to the eventual 
outcome - the social control authorities may presume the ultimate 
outcome but leave the actual details of how it is effected to the 
prospective patient. Second, there is the issue of just why political 
critique should be based on analyses of conversation. It is possible 
that critical pragmatics could counteract institutional power, but 
slll"ely there are more obvious and practicable techniques, for 
example, lobbying for patients' rights legislation. Third, Bogen and 
Lynch comment that, "in any event, it seems that PP is quite able to 
exploit the options presented by the local interactional situation 
without having to be instructed by academic analysts" (I: 513). 
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Fourth, they note that while it is clear McHoul endorses the notion 
that pragmatic analyses of language-use ought to do something, he 
provides nothing of substance about how it should do what it ought to 
- there is no attention to the appropriate means whereby critical 
fmdings might be applied to real-world social praxis. Without such 
details, Bogen and Lynch conclude that McHoul's suggestion "looks 
like a mere aggrandizement of academic critique" (1: 514). 
Bogen and Lynch continue in this openly critical manner in their 
discussion of McHoul's treatment of ethnomethodological description. 
The discussion here is broad-ranging moving from an outline of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, to problems of 'irony' in social science. 
However, in this complex discussion there is one main point being 
made: McHoul is mistaken in trying to link 'descriptivism', as 
formulated by Coulter and in ethnomethodology, to forms of social 
science which make socio-political critique a primary aim. 
Central to this argument is discussion of the policy of 
"ethnomethodological indifference".7 Here Bogen and Lynch spend 
some time outlining Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy, quoting 
favow'ably his programmatic statement that "We must do away with 
all explanation, and description alone must take its place" (1: 515). 
They emphasise that such a stance did not evolve ex nihilo, but 
clearly involves a fundamental shift from well established 
philosophical practice: the key to understanding disinterested analysis 
is to put it in relation to what it is disinterested in, or indifferent to, 
7 Bogen and Lynch reference Garfinkel and Sacks' (1970) introduction of 
"ethnomethodological indifference", but their discussion mixes the terms 
"indifference" and "disinterested analysis". 
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and that IS philosophical or sociological explanations of 
language/language-use. Thus, disinterested analysis does not imply 
"blanket indifference to, and hence, total detachment from, the 
normative commitments intrinsic to the analytic 'object' (viz., 
language)" (1: 516). Instead, it represents a "reasoned indifference" to 
explanatOly modes of sociological and philosophical inquity. Also, 
indifference is not to be equated with 'objectivity' -there is no claim 
that disinterested analysis is of necessity conect because it affords a 
privileged stance on reality. 
Having attempted to clarifY the matter that indifference is posited in 
relation to avoiding causal explanatory theorising, and is not another 
attempt at objectivity, Bogen and Lynch move on to McHoul's main 
problem with indifference. Simply, that after Foucault and Derrida 
indifference is no longer feasible: pragmatic analyses of language-use 
now have to show that they have something critical to offer - they 
ought to do something. The trouble here, Bogen and Lynch argue, is 
that if disinterested analysis is dropped then one can only return to the 
traditional problems of 'explanatOly theorising', primarily that of 
irony. They suggest that the traditional sociological approach to the 
heterogeneity of social action is 'methodological irony': deciding in 
advance how interaction will be treated; implicitly aligning with one 
or another participant's reading of the social event. For example, in 
McHoul's fe-analysis he sided with the PP and valorised his practices. 
Bogen and Lynch argue that McHoul wants to retain 
ethnomethodology's emphasis on fine-grained analysis, which aims 
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precisely to mmllntSe problems of irony, while retaining a 
commitment to political analysis. But the two cannot be reconciled: 
Although he subsequently argues that "(s)uch an analysis 
does not necessarily entail a methodologically ironical 
position" (1988: 379), what he fails to notice is that by 
valorizing 'transgressions' he implies exactly this, irony, but 
now in the name of a presmnably progressive political 
platform. 
... McHoul operates under the mistaken impression that 
politically interested analysis represents a progressive 'turn' 
in sociological and linguistic thinking. In contrast, we argue 
that such a 'tum', however much inspired by contemporary 
theories of discourse and social action (eg., Habennas and 
Foucault), represents a return to a vety familiar fOlID of 
intellectual undeliaking, and fmally, that for all its critical 
pretensions, McHoul's attempt at constructing a post-
conventional, politicized theory of discourse fails to move 
beyond the traditional aporias of social critique. (I: 518, 
original emphasis) 
Bogen and Lynch do not detail what the "traditional aporias" are, but 
it is clear from their discussion that they are refening to the related 
problems of 'irony' and 'constructive theorising'. 
Overall then, Bogen and Lynch thoroughly reject McHoul's 
fOlIDulation of critical pragmatics. They fmish by claiming that their's 
is not a "despairing conclusion": descriptivist analyses of ordinary 
action can have "more limited 'therapeutic' import"8 (I: 519), and 
furthermore, their critique of 'explanatOlY theorising' is of value in 
itself. 
8 Bogen and Lynch do not detail what they mean by this, but they seem to be 
referring to the ability of ethnomethodological studies to offer practical 
implications for real world praxis. Atkinson and Drew's concluding chapter -
"Postscript: Notes on Practical Implications and Possibilities" - in their book on 
interaction in courts (1979) is a very good example. See the list in chapter one of 
studies which engage ethnomethodology with conventional sociology for other 
good examples. 
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MeDoul's Reply 
The title to McHoul's reply - "CRITIQ1JE AND DESCRIPTION: 
An analysis of Bogen and Lynch" -indicates his intentions. The topic 
is offered as critique and description, not critique or description, 
which Bogen and Lynch seem to prefer; and, McHoul calls his reply 
an "analysis", which we fmd means a 'deconstruction' of Bogen and 
Lynch's underpinning assumptions about the social sciences. 
McHoul suggests that Bogen and Lynch's primalY underpinning 
assumption is that social science has a twofold division of labour. 
Supposedly, one program produces rigorous descriptive analyses with 
no social critique, while the other produces explanatory theoretical 
schemes accompanied by social critique. The fOlmer engages in 
critique only of the latter program, essentially over its explanatOlY 
mode. The first point that McHoul makes is that it is debatable 
whether such a division of labour actually exists. At least, the two 
poles are far from independent, for in Bogen and Lynch's model of 
social inquiry "the descriptivist program ... depends for its velY 
existence on the explanatory program yielding mistakes, ungrounded 
theorisations and the like. Its purpose would be lost without its foil" 
(II: 524). 
McHoul's main point 'of reply is that this binmy is in need of 
deconstruction. He is defmitely committed to, the view that it ought 
not to exist, and this stems from his acceptance of post-stmcturalist 
m'guments regarding language and power. Pmt of the process of 
deconstmction that he recommends "has to do with showing that to 
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speak or write within any social scientific fOlID of life - descriptive, 
explanatOlY or otherwise - is to engage practically with what Bogen 
and Lynch call "disciplinary power 'at large'" (1990: 519)" (II: 524). 
Accepting the argument that academic disciplines are entwined with 
and within the operation of these types of power, leads McHoul to 
reject the separation of description and critique. What he proposes is 
not so much a synthesis of the two, or their recombination at another 
level, but a simple recognition of their mutuality: 
... description and critique are mutual ends since (i) description 
cannot be performed without certain bedrock theoretical 
assumptions none of which are, a priori, beyond critique - an 
example being Bogen and Lynch's own assumption about the 
division of labour in the social sciences and (ii) critique can 
have no point if it remains purely transcendental; that is, unless 
it gears into the complex and specifically 'worldly' matters 
which empirical descriptions, such as those of 
ethnomethodology itself, afford. (II: 525, original emphasis) 
Thus, the interdependence of description and critique is contrasted 
with Bogen and Lynch's binary of description or critique. 
Making this point takes up the fust three pages of the nine page 
reply, after which McHoul moves to the issue of indifferent analysis. 
Consistent with his deconstruction of the critique or description 
model, he argues that social scientists must now take serious heed of 
Foucault's descriptions of the unintended power effects of disciplinruy 
knowledge. He notes that many social scientists ru·e indeed 
attempting to calculate the resistive and emancipatory potential of 
their own disciplinruy knowledge, or at least trying to gain more 
control of the way that knowledge can be used to legitimate existing 
modes of surveillance. His point here is that ethnomethodology needs 
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to take heed of this trend, as even the "most dogged descriptivism" is 
not immune from power-knowledge effects. 
This argument is not substantiated to any degree, nevertheless, 
several points are mustered in general support. There is the continual 
acknowledgement in early ethnomethodological studies of grants from 
the U.S. armed forces, and McHoul's own experience of being asked 
for reprints of his conversation analytic work by medical, military, 
psychiatric, govel1lmental, and fmancial organisations. At a more 
chilling level, McHoul cites the case of the South African corrective 
services asking for a copy of his paper on interrogation (McHoul, 
1987c). In light of such events McHoul suggests that at a practical 
level the notion of 'indifference' is a dangerous luxury. 
Bogen and Lynch's other main argument, that 'indifference' is not 
about 'blanket indifference' but specific indifference to the uuth 
claims of explanatory theorising, is also quickly dispatched. McHoul 
argues that this is based upon a false conception of the difference 
between ethnomethodology and other social science paradigms. 
Natural or literal description is just as inaccessible to 
ethnomethodology as it is to any other form of sociological inquiry. 
All social science paradigms constitute their 'object' in their 
procedures of study, and ethnomethodology is not immune from the 
problems that it identifies in explanatory theorising. 
However, the impossibility of literal description should not be taken 
as a reason to end analysis or to reu'eat into nihilism. Instead, inquity 
into how social science is actually accomplished becomes a prot of 
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critical pragmatics. For McHoul, clitique IS directed precisely 
towards self-reflection upon the relationship between theorising and 
the objects of theorising, whether this is 'society' or more localised 
interaction. And this self-reflection is far from an "aggrandizement" 
of social science, as Bogen and Lynch claimed. It is on this point that 
McHoul clearly elaborates his envisaged program, which is wOlth 
quoting at some length: 
... the idea of a political linguistics or, more generally, a critical 
descriptivist program in the social sciences, could only ever 
mean a highly minimalist and piecemeal realisation that social 
science is always prut of and imbricated in whatever 'social' it 
attempts to describe or otherwise ruticulate . . . A good 
ethnomethodologist, in my book, would want to ask 'how'? -
how does this ruticulation take place? The velY idea that social 
scientific accounts, including ethnomethodological accounts, are 
irrevocably incrunate in the social practices which they account, 
is to me essentially the point of Garfmkel's (1967) 
ethnomethodological principle of reflexivity: except that for me 
it must operate at other levels than the merely 'methodological'. 
If the above holds at all, it may be possible to see that the 
debate between Bogen and Lynch and myself instantiates a 
point which I med to make in 'Language and the sociology of 
mind': namely that the level of 'bedrock assumption' (or 'depth 
grammar') in any form of life can itself be contestable. . .. If the 
level of logical grammar ... is not contestable then we run the 
risk of invoking an absolute categOlY such as Language with a 
capital 'L'~ ... And so what I am proposing is no more and no less 
than a radicalisation of ethnomethodology's commitment to the 
piecemeal - so that it obtains not merely in empirical social 
relations but also at the level of the logical-grammatical 
'agreements', 'conventions' or 'contracts' which may underpin 
those 'surfaces' (McHoul (1986». (II: 527) 
In short, McHoul takes a central premise of ethnomethodology -
social facts are socially accomplished from within social settings 
and argues that this must be applied to the study of the 'bedrock 
assumptions' underpinning social action. If these underpinnings ru'e 
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conceptualised as accomplished, then, equally, they are contestable. 
Hence, we have a space opened up for critique - by members and 
analysts - of both smface action and underlying assumptions. 9 
Of course, this argument comes up against Bogen and Lynch's 
criticism that if members can perfonn such critique for themselves, 
they have no need of instruction by academic analysts. In response, 
McHoul is remarkably frank. After arguing that critique must mesh 
with complex real-world matters known via empirical descriptions, he 
comments that "I would even be prepared to concede that my paper 
on Coulter came nowhere near actually instantiating the position in 
practice if it were conceded, on the other side, that the position is 
sound in principle" (IT: 525). This does seem akin to an admission 
that Bogen and Lynch's four critical points about his re-analysis, as an 
example of the proposed critical pragmatics, are cogent. However, 
while McHoul does admit the infancy of critical pragmatics, hence 
the cogency of Bogen and Lynch's points, . he does provide some 
strong pointers as to how it might proceed. Specifically, he cites 
Foucault's work with a prisoners' infOlmation group, emphasising in 
particular the aim of avoiding speaking for others. Thus, contrruy to 
Bogen and Lynch's somewhat unchru'itable remark about academics 
telling people what they already know, McHoul favours an opposite 
pdnciple: "more a broadening of the circulation of minor discourses 
... than an 'importation' of theoretic knowledges into marginal locales" 
(II: 528, original emphasis). 
9 McHoul's reference to studying 'underlying assumptions' should not be equated 
with 'realism' within social science. In an earlier paper (1987b) McHoul suggested 
the phrase 'anti-realist materialism' as another way of understanding 
ethnomethodology. and clearly the rejection of realist approaches to language-use 
is maintained in his vision of critical pragmatics. 
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McHoul concludes his reply by reiterating a belief that social 
science needs to show, publicly, that it has a fOlm of critique to offer. 
For him this means showing three things: fIrst, that it is not simply 
and unwittingly part of the technologies of power; second, that it can 
fInd a way to describe dominant social understandings and can 
construct social understandings outside the dominant; and third, that it 
has something critical and emancipatOlY to offer, even if the actual 
details of delivery are unformulated or sparse. The spirit of these 
three aims is probably commonly invoked within social science, 
however, what distinguishes McHoul's desired program is his 
insistence on ethnomethodological desctiption as a base for critical 
pragmatics: 
... this [fOlm of ctitique] cannot be achieved without the 
plausibility, the analytic precision and the attention to 
empirical detail that Coulter and some of his colleagues have 
pioneered and so successfully demonstrated in their work as a 
technical end in its own tight. ... [Thus] it seems sensible (to 
me at least) to recognise ethnomethodology for what it is, if an 
analogy from physics can serve: the most exacting and exciting 
approach we have to discursive 'particles', while remembering 
that approaches so far to 'wave' and 'fIeld' are still 
comparatively inchoate and ludimentary at best, and often not 
even that. Hence my compulsion towards them. (II: 530-531, 
original emphasis) 
6.3 Reflection on tlte Debate 
To recap, Bogen and Lynch argued that McHoul's suggestion of 
reconciling descriptivism with socio-political critique is misplaced 
because the two are mutually incompatible. In reply, McHoul 
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deconstructed the critique or description binalY and argued that the 
aim of producing socio-political critique is not a whim but a necessity 
for social science, and one which can proceed from a descriptivist 
beginning. Thus, the debate features two strongly argued opposing 
positions. Given this, it almost seems natural to pronounce a victor, 
but there are good reasons to downplay such adjudication. Chief 
amongst them is that the position of critical pragmatics is very much 
in the development stage, making judgement premature. In addition, 
reflection on the debate suggests that while there are obvious 
differences between the participants, there are also strong points of 
convergence. 
At the core of the debate there is a central and pelvasive agreement. 
Both parties adhere to ethnomethodology's central methodological 
policy that social research should proceed by precise analytic 
description of real-world social activities. Fine-grained description 
remains the cornerstone for Bogen -and Lynch's, and McHoul's, 
program of inquiry. The point of stubborn difference is the issue of 
whether description can be extended into critique. But, it should be 
noted that this is not a debate about an actuality, but about a potential. 
This is clearly admitted in McHoul's comment, "I would even be 
prepared to concede that my paper on Coulter came nowhere near 
actually instantiating the position in practice if it were conceded, on 
the other side, that the position is sound in principle" (II: 525). This 
admitted lack of an instantiated program is a very good reason for 
avoiding pronouncing a victor. 
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However, one can certainly comment on the general principles 
being argued, and here I have to agree with McHoul that the position 
of critical pragmatics is "sound in principle". Despite the strength of 
Bogen and Lynch's arguments, particularly their critique of McHoul's 
re-analysis of the 'incarceration' interaction, in my view, McHoul's 
argument is more convincing. In principle, why should not 
ethnomethodology be used as a basis for critical inquiry? Whatever 
one makes of Foucault's work, there is little doubt that his arguments 
about the effects of disciplinruy knowledge have been widely 
discussed within academia and have resulted in much self-reflection 
by academics. McHoul's progrrun is obviously sensitive to such 
concerns, and his general view is no more neatly summed up than by 
Roy Tmner's statement that "Ethnographers who have read Foucault 
lose their innocence" (1989: 13). Clearly, McHoul is no innocent, 
indifferent, ethnomethodologist; but the point of making his view 
public is not self-aggrandizement, but to argue that other 
ethnomethodologists should also lose their innocence. 
If ethnomethodology can be thought of as ethnography of our own 
cultural practices, then, in the light of Foucault, to claim production 
of 'indifferent descriptions' of cultural practices while also eschewing 
socio-political critique, seems paradoxical. And one does not need to 
agree with Foucault to reach the srune conclusion. As Jayyusi (1991) 
notes, ethnomethodology has always emphasised the mutual 
embeddedness of the conceptual, the practical, and the moral. Such 
an emphasis is well suited to critical analysis: "in offering detailed 
descriptions of the ways that practices get constituted locally as 
politically or morally relevant, shelhe [the analyst] is involved, 
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minimally and unavoidably in laying bare the moral significance of 
these practices as these are made available in our culture" (Jayyusi, 
1991: 249, original emphasis). To offer such inquiIy while holding to 
a notion of 'indifference' does seem a dangerous form of innocence, 
there being no better example than the request by the South African 
corrective services for a copy of McHoul's paper "Why there are no 
guarantees for interrogators" (1987c). It seems unlikely that the 
request arose from a mere academic interest in conversation analysis. 
However, having sided in principle with McHoul's argument it must 
be reiterated that an ethnomethodologically based critical pragmatics 
has yet to 'deliver the goods', as McHoul frankly admits. That this 
'delivety' will be difficult is suggested by at least two points. First, 
McHoul began publicly formulating the program as early as 1984 
("Being seen to read the signs"), and has continued recommending it 
since (see 1986, 1987b, 1987c, 1988a); but despite this amount of 
time for refmement, the program has not progressed. significantly 
beyond statements of intent. Second, similar arguments by others 
have also remained at a programmatic and anticipatory level (eg. 
Gubrium, Buckholdt, & Lynott, 1982; Gubrium & Holstein, 1987: 
777; Hilbert, 1992, ch.1O; Jayyusi, 1991: 246-249; Mehan & Wood, 
1975: 218-224; Pol1ner, 1991), and extant empirical analyses which 
share the same spirit as critical pragmatics, have been disappointing 
(eg. Hartland, 1989; Smith, 1983, 1990). To put it briefly, Bogen and 
Lynch's "traditional aporias" - irony and constructive theorising do 
seem to present a perennial problem for the development of 
ethnomethodologically inspired socio-political clitique. 
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6.4 Reflection on the Study in Light of the Debate 
The above admittedly brief reflection on the debate will suffice, for, 
as noted in the introduction, the main reason for explicating the 
debate is to consider the 'what's the point?' issue as applied to this 
study. 
One immediate question arises from the discussion of the debate: if 
I have endorsed McHoul's vision of critical pragmatics, why is it that 
this study looks more like Bogen and Lynch's version of 
ethnomethodological inquity? On reflection, it appears oriented to 
descriptivism and not critique: the emphasis is on criticism of 
explanatory theorising, and alternative empirical analysis, and not 
offers of explicit socio-political critique or conectives for real-world 
problems that might be associated with male infe11ility. 
Consideration of this puzzle provides a useful endpoint for this study. 
To precis the argument, it is suggested that my endorsement of critical 
pragmatics is not so much a paradox, but more a reflection of the 
similarities in the views of Bogen and Lynch, and McHoul. Below, 
the empirical chapters will be discussed in chronological order in 
relation to the points made about the debate. 
In chapter two the question of how people disclose their infel1ility 
to others was considered. The foil here consisted of a dramaturgical 
model and the beginnings of a F oucauldian confession model of 
infeI1ility disclosure. The fOlmer began with theoretical constructs 
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like 'face' and explained disclosure by individual motives and 
intentions linked to face concerns; the latter framed infertility 
disclosure in telIDS of constant societal pressures on individuals to 
confess their everyday illnesses and troubles. Against the emphasis 
of these models on factors which are anterior to talk-in-interaction, 
following Sacks I argued that a prior analytic task is to understand the 
kinds of devices that people have available to disclose infertility. 
This approach is based on the argument that the use of conversational 
machinery is itself a normative sanctionable matter -talk about 
experiences (infertility disclosure) has its own powerlul endogenous 
structure. Although my analysis was speculative due to data 
constraints, it was sufficient to highlight the efficacy of a 
conversation analytic (ie. descriptivist) approach to infertility 
disclosure. 
Clearly, the argument in chapter two does not offer direct critique 
of social practices involved in disclosures of infertility. Nevelthe1ess 
there are two points worth noting here. First, )although the possibility 
was not pursued, a full-fledged conversation analysis (using 'naturally 
OCCUlTing' data) of infertility disclosure, could be of 'therapeutic 
import' for people experiencing infertility. To know something about 
the form that disclosure talk takes should be a prerequisite for the 
realistic design and direction of practical actions for changing the 
experience of infertility disclosure.! 0 Second, following Bogen and 
Lynch, it can be emphasised that my descriptivist-based critique of 
explanatory theorising is of value in itself. If my argument is cogent, 
10 Of course. this assumes the identification of factors to be changed - this 
identification itself requires consideration of empirical materials. 
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then it suggests that any cOlTective actions based on either the 
dramaturgical or the confession model will have an unceliain 
foundation. This is not to suggest that practical actions based on 
conversation analysis would be infallible, but it is to emphasise that if 
one is concelned with a conversational activity, which infertility 
disclosure is, then one should consider the dynamic constraints and 
resources that conversational machinety itself provides, rather than 
neglecting this in favour of external societal structures or quasi-
psychological motives and intentions. 
Chapter three (The language of reproduction: Is it doctored?) 
presented as a foil three examples of feminist arguments about the 
language of reproduction (or more specifically the description of male 
(in)fertility). Socio-political critique was absolutely central to these 
studies, the general argument being that the language of reproduction 
is doctored to further the subordination of women and the 
superordination of men in society; In critique, . a standard 
ethnomethodological insight was used: language should not be treated 
as merely a secondruy site where the effects of societal structures can 
be found, for language is a social practice in its own right. The three 
ru'guments by the feminists used vrulous extracts fi'om medical 
discourse as a site to find the workings of patriarchal inequality; in 
critique the point was made that this approach neglected the local 
socially organised nature of medical discourse. On this view, talk of 
medical discourse being 'doctored' is only made in the sense that 
medical discow'se is produced by and for doctors, and assumes and 
enacts the background knowledge of their existential world. 
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"Ethnomethodological indifference" figured strongly in chapter 
three. It was noted that the whole area of reproductive technologies is 
saturated with socio-political issues, but no direct comment was made 
on these issues. Instead, my approach involved a critique of feminist 
explanatory theorising which highlighted specific misconceptions in 
the empirical analyses of the language of reproduction. This 
'negative' approach is one area where the aforesaid paradox seems to 
'bite hard': given the endorsement of critical pragmatics, why did I not 
attempt both description and socio-political critique of the practices of 
reproductive medicine? There are many factors which could be 
mentioned in answer, predominant amongst them being that such a 
study would be a major undertaking in its own right, hence, beyond 
the scope of this study. Simply, all I want to suggest is that in this 
case a clitique of explanatOlY theorising was in order, and useful. 
Given contemporary views about the relationship between language 
and society, analysts need to be reminded that it is poor analytic 
practice to treat language as merely a- reflection of other structures. 
The feminists took this approach because of an overarching desire to 
critique the external structure 'pattiarchy' (or some reflection of it), 
but if it is agreed that language-in-use has its own social organisation 
then to approach the language of reproduction for the way it 
supposedly bears the marks of patriarchal society, is to risk a 
dangerous gloss of its first order social organisation. Surely, socio-
political clitique must connect somewhere with this first level of 
socially organised practical action. Hence, there is some value in first 
attempting to describe the socially organised nature of medical 
discourse. 
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In chapter fow', the scope of study was broadened from an aspect of 
male infel1ility to that of humour, but examples of humour connected 
to male (in )fertility were used in the empirical analysis. Here the foil 
for discussion was Mulkay's study of humour, particularly his 
argument that humour could be a "potentially liberatory force" in 
society. Mulkay founded his argument upon Schutz's concept of 
'multiple realities', arguing that humour establishes realities altemative 
to that of the serious world. Ultimately, Mulkay argued that humour 
served an essential function within society because it provided an 
escape from the onerous duty of maintaining the seriousness of 
reality. 
The critique of Mulkay was based upon descriptivist principles. 
Following Sharrock and Anderson (1991), it was suggested that 
Schutz's comments on multiple realities could be read in a different 
manner: not for any claims about the existence of serious and 
humorous worlds, but to lead to a focus on the sequentiality of 
everyday life. This focus moves the study of humow' away from 
humour as a competitor to serious discourse, to humour as a serious 
accomplishment. If members are treated as inquirers into their own 
culture, then humour can be seen not as a "liberatOlY force" but as 
discourse which provides important infOlmation about common 
cultural practices. Humour partakes of the seriousness of any 
practically accomplished situated conduct; the analytical task is then 
to describe the pal1icularities of how it is accomplished. Several 
empirical analyses were made, consistent with these points. 
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Summarising so far, chapters two, three, and four all displayed a 
two part sttucture: in the first pad, explanatOlY theorising was 
explicated and cdticised, while in the second pad a contrasting 
analysis based upon ethnomethodological descriptivism was 
presented. The degree of socio-political critique offered in the 
explanatory theorising ranged from a more individualist viewpoint in 
the dramaturgical model of infedility disclosure, to a clear sttuctural 
power model in the feminist argument on the language of 
reproduction. Regardless of this range, they are all committed to a 
view of social science which 'takes sides' and fonnulates correctives. 
Regarding the paradox noted above, three simple points can be 
emphasised: i), the criticism of the explanatOly theories should not be 
read as a wholesale rejection of the aim of socio-political critique 
itself, as the criticisms are more specifically addressed to theorising 
which is insufficiently grounded in precise consideration of the 
endogenous orderliness of social interaction, and, ii), nor should the 
criticism be read as an indication of belief in a twofold division of 
labour in social science (descliption or critique), instead, iii), the 
analyses reiterate fine-grained description as a wOlthy goal in itself, 
where this does not preclude the possibility that such fme-grained 
description might be pad of socio-political critique. 
While there is one fmther point I wish to develop in this conclusion, 
my feeling here is that these three points are a sufficient and succinct 
reflection on the study and the critique/description issue. Perhaps the 
cautiousness inherent in the three points invites the negative comment 
that nothing much has really changed. But such a comment forgets 
that simple description is not simply accomplished - as Sharrock notes 
256 
in a discussion of the way ethnomethodology has been received by 
other sociologists, 
Those who have no interest whatsoever in the analysis of 
research materials and have never seriously attempted their 
careful (often unmotivated) inspection are unlikely to recognise, 
let alone, appreciate the sense of accomplishment available to 
those who try to analyse such materials in an intensive and close 
way, when they manage to give their materials as scmpulous a 
treatment as they can. (1989: 660) 
While not evelyone will recognise the amount of work that goes into 
simple description, and despite the still-present possibility of a terse 
'what's the point?' reaction, the good news is that the sense of 
accomplishment available from fine-grained description is tangible 
and persistent. 
A further point of optimism can be drawn out in relation to chapter 
five, which discussed the relationship between social science and 
common-sense with respect to accounts of non-response. This 
chapter differed from the other three in 'that there was no··initial foil of 
explanatory theorising followed by an alternative descriptivist 
analysis. Instead, social scientific accounts of non-response became 
the data for analysis. At a general level, it was shown that these 
accounts were dependent upon everyday practical reasoning and 
background knowledge - in short, common-sense. More specifically, 
it was argued that central to the seamless intelligibility of male 
infertility as a problem, was the 'natural' use of the documentmy 
method of interpretation: social scientific accounts of non-response 
(particulars) were intelligible through utilisation of existing 
background knowledge of infertility (underlying patteln), and each 
was used to elaborate the other. It was m'gued that through the 
257 
complex interconnections between social science and common-sense, 
an understanding of male infertility as a problem was reproduced. 
Nowhere did I address the question of whether, when, in what ways, 
or for whom, male infertility is a problem. In this respect the analysis 
was 'indifferent', that is, no sides were taken on the question of 
whether male infeliility 'really' is a problem or a sensitive issue. 
However, alongside this indifferent approach, the chapter also 
displayed a critical element, again different from the other empirical 
chapters. Previously, criticism had been addressed towards 
explanatOlY sociological theories with the point made that these paid 
insufficient attention to endogenous structures of interaction. But in 
chapter five, the criticism centred around the broader question of how 
social scientists should speak about the subjects of their research. A 
case study was provided which showed how male non-response and 
unexpected accounts of respondents were analysed using ironic 
methods, in particular a 'politics of expelience'. The experience of 
male infeliility was constituted via an Other: the accounts of wives, 
researchers, and generalised others (what Everyone knows), were 
privileged over the accounts and non-accounts of infeliile men. The 
critical stand was taken that this was definitely not a desirable 
research practice. 
Clearly, what researchers say about the phenomena they study can 
be incorporated, in myriad ways, in evelyday practical action. 
Ethnomethodology sensitises us to the possibility that while 
substantive claims are open to critical rebuttal - for example, the 
claim that infeliility is a threat to male virility is debatable by 
258 
members - in the velY focus on substantive claims, the question of 
how phenomena are available in the first place is glossed over. Palt 
of McHoul's argument is that members (and analysts) do have the 
ability to question the limits and bases of their actions. However, as 
Pollner's seminal work on reality disjunctures (1975, 1987) has 
shown, it is usually only when an ilTesolvable disagreement occurs 
that argument moves from debate about what the world is like, to 
debate about the way the world is perceived; in the latter instance, 
one party or both argues that the other's mode of perception itself is 
faulty. While there was some ambiguity about the effects of 
infertility on men, it was far from a state of ilTesolvable disagreement; 
in fact there was more of an overwhelming taken-for-granted 
assumption that male infeltility is a problem. Hence, there appeared 
to be little consideration of the question of how the problem of male 
infertility might be available for description in the frrst place. 
In the absence of such consideration, analysts utilised ironic 
methods in their accounting work, and while criticism of this 
tendency pervaded the study, it was in chapter five that we saw most 
clearly how ethnomethodological critique of ironic methods can have 
socio-political implications. The clUcial point to be made here is the 
simple one that fOlm and content are intimately connected. If we 
gloss content as the claim that male infertility is a problem, and form 
as partly the process of its discovery by ironic methods, then what I 
tried to show was how ironic methods produced both a privileged and 
conservative version of the experience of male infeltility. It was 
privileged in the sense that researchers deigned to speak for non-
respondents and to manipulate the accounts of those who did respond. 
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It was conservative in the sense that it came from within a powerful 
institution (academic research), and promulgated the interests of that 
institution (reproducing 'problems' to be researched). Further, in 
reproducing the understanding that male infeltility is a problem, the 
analysts' accounts contributed to the stifling of an alternative view: 
that male infertility may not be a problem. That is, not essentially 
'not a problem', but 'not a problem' in various local situations with 
cOlTelative socially organised methods for fmding male infeltility as 
'not a problem'. 
While the relationship between fOlm and content is inescapable, 
researchers can attempt to avoid the use of overly ironic methods. In 
my view, the standard ethnomethodological inquiry produced in this 
study -describing members' methods of disclosing, desclibing, 
laughing about, and, in general, making intelligible, aspects of male 
infertility - is a good way to avoid excessive irony. Fwther, to argue 
for this approach and against the use of ironic methods is a minimal 
fOlm of socio-political critique. But a recognition of this critical 
aspect of the study requires some reconceptualisation of 'political'. 
McHoul's arguments are an impOltant patt of such 
reconceptualisation: in one of his fITst attempts at expressing the ideas 
found in the debate with Bogen and Lynch he commented that, 
The way they [ethnomethodological studies] make their 
contribution might perhaps be this: instead of having the social 
scientist reproduce a model of the social actor as either cultural 
or political dope and instead of producing difficult syntheses ... 
where privileged individuals supposedly know intuitively the 
real conditions of their social existence, we can show that the 
political is through-and-through a matter of everyday practice -
and vice versa. And instead of a relatively purist concern with 
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the stmcture and 'fonns' of everyday conduct, ilTespective of 
their supposed 'content' (political or otherwise), we can show as 
Harvey Sacks suspected that these 'content' considerations are 
just as much matters of technique ... That the political turns out 
to be technical doesn't mean that the politics, of, for example, 
sign following gets subsumed; it simply points to the manner of 
its investigation. (1984: 76) 
Clearly, the difficult task is to link up suitably intricate investigation 
of the technical with practically relevant socio-political critique. The 
difficulty of this task should not be underestimated, and in many ways 
the difficulty itself can only be realised through actually attempting 
the linkage. The closest this study has come to such a linkage is the 
analysis of accounts of non-response; unfortunately I cannot claim to 
have brought out the politics of male infertility through consideration 
of its technical aspects consistently throughout this study. 
Nevertheless, I have avoided promulgating either, a "cultural dope" 
type account of male infertility, or a "privileged individuals" account; 
and more imp 0l1antly, I have made a start at intricate investigation 
with the realisation that there is the possibility of linking such 
ethnomethodological analysis to critical comment. This is an 
important first step. 
Overall, in terms of existing sociological studies of infertility, this 
study represents a new approach. Moreover, this original aspect 
constitutes a minimal fOlID of practical political action in itself. After 
the 'linguistic tum' in social theOlY, discursive actions are now 
conceptualised as the means by which the social is created - our world 
is made up of socially available means of representation. To retum to 
a point McHoul made in the debate, if no speech or writing is 
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exempted from this process, then something important can be noted 
about how social research might make a point and deliver its goods: 
To speculate on 'delivelY systems' and the like for 'making' 
emancipatOlY social science 'arrive' at marginal destinations is to 
ignore what both Wittgenstein and Garfmkel saw so clearly: to 
imagine a language is to imagine a form of life. Thus: to speak 
or write 'anew', even minimally 'anew', is to change, to remake a 
form of life. (II: 529) 
Utilising insights from ethnomethodology to analyse 'male infertility' 
has been a fOlm of writing 'anew', and through it this study makes a 
practical point and minimally changes a form of life. 
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